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The thesis analyses the visual space displayed in pictures, film, television and digital 
interactive media. The argument is developed that depictions are informed by the 
objectives of the artefact as much as by any simple visual correspondence to the 
observed world. The simple concept of ‘realism’ is therefore anatomised and a more 
pragmatic theory proposed which resolves some of the traditional controversies 
concerning the relation between depiction and vision. This is then applied to the 
special problems of digital interactive media.
An introductory chapter outlines the topic area and the main argument and provides 
an initial definition of terms. To provide a foundation for the ensuing arguments, a 
brief account is given of two existing and contrasted approaches to the notion of 
space: that of perception science which gives priority to acultural aspects, and that of 
visual culture which emphasises aspects which are culturally contingent.
An existing approach to spatial perception (that of JJ Gibson originating in the 1940s 
and 50s) is applied to spatial depiction in order to explore the differences between 
seeing and picturing, and also to emphasise the many different cues for spatial 
perception beyond those commonly considered (such as binocularity and linear 
perspective). At this stage a simple framework of depiction is introduced which 
identifies five components or phases: the objectives of the picture, the idea chosen to 
embody the objectives, the model (essentially, the visual ‘subject matter’), the 
characteristics of the view and finally the substantive picture or depiction itself. This 
framework draws attention to the way in which each of the five phases presents an 
opportunity for decision-making about representation. The framework is used and 
refined throughout the thesis.
Since pictures are considered in some everyday sense to be ‘realistic’ (otherwise, in 
terms of this thesis, they would not count as depictions), the nature of realism is 
considered at some length. The apparently unitary concept is broken down into 
several different types of realism and it is argued that, like the different spatial cues, 
each lends itself to particular objectives intended for the artefact. From these several 
types, two approaches to realism are identified, one prioritising the creation of a true 
illusion (that the picture is in fact a scene) and the other (of which there are 
innumerably more examples both across cultures and over historical time) one which 
evokes aspects of vision without aiming to exactly imitate the optical stimulus of the 
scene. Various reasons for the latter approach, and the variety of spatial practices to 
which it leads, are discussed. In addition to analysing traditional pictures, computer 
graphics images are discussed in conjunction with the claims for realism offered by 
their authors. In the process, informational and affective aspects of picture-making 
are distinguished, a distinction which it is argued is useful and too seldom made.
Discussion of still pictures identifies the evocation of movement (and other aspects of 
time) as one of the principal motives for departing from attempts at straightforward 
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optical matching. The discussion proceeds to the subject of film where, perhaps 
surprisingly now that the depiction of movement is possible, the lack of 
straightforward imitation of the optical is noteworthy again. This is especially true of 
the relationship between shots rather than within them; the reasons for this are 
analysed. This reinforces the argument that the spatial form of the fiction film, like 
that of other kinds of depiction, arises from its objectives, presenting realism once 
again as a contingent concept. 
The separation of depiction into two broad classes – one which aims to negate its own 
mediation, to seem transparent to what it depicts, and one which presents the fact of 
depiction ostensively to the viewer – is carried through from still pictures, via film, 
into a discussion of factual television and finally of digital interactive media. The 
example of factual television is chosen to emphasise how, despite the similarities 
between the technologies of film and television, spatial practices within some 
television genres contrast strongly with those of the mainstream fiction film. By 
considering historic examples, it is shown that many of the spatial practices now 
familiar in factual television were gradually expunged from the classical film when 
the latter became centred on the concerns of narrative fiction.
By situating the spaces of interactive media in the context of other kinds of pictorial 
space, questions are addressed concerning the transferability of spatial usages from 
traditional media to those which are interactive. During the thesis the spatial 
practices of still-picture-making, film and television are characterised as ‘mature’ and 
‘expressive’ (terms which are defined in the text). By contrast the spatial practices of 
digital interactive media are seen to be immature and inexpressive. It is argued that 
this is to some degree inevitable given the context in which interactive media 
artefacts are made and experienced – the lack of a shared ‘language’ or languages in 
any new media. Some of the difficult spatial problems which digital interactive media 
need to overcome are identified, especially where, as is currently normal, interaction 
is based on the relation between a pointer and visible objects within a depiction. The 
range of existing practice in digital interactive media is classified in a seven-part 
taxonomy, which again makes use of the objective-idea-model-view-picture framework, 
and again draws out the difference between self-concealing approaches to depiction 
and those which offer awareness of depiction as a significant component of the 
experience. The analysis indicates promising lines of enquiry for the future and 
emphasises the need for further innovation. Finally the main arguments are 
summarised and the thesis concludes with a short discussion of the implications for 
design arising from the key concepts identified – expressivity and maturity, prag-
matism and realism.
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1 Introduction
1 About the thesis
The thesis comprises the following chapters:
1 Introduction
2 Approaches to the study of space
3 Depth perception and depiction
4 Spatiality and realism
5 Screen space I: the spatiality of film
6 Screen space II: factual television
7 Screen space III: depiction and the space of interactive media
8 Conclusions
‘Media space’ in this thesis refers to spaces which may be seen in the planar media of 
still pictures, film, factual television, and interactive digital media presented on 
computer displays. It inevitably touches on configurational approaches to such space, 
but gives priority to the subject of depiction. While substantial discussion is given to 
the meanings which viewers or users take from planar pictures, it is not concerned 
with those spaces which are essentially metaphoric, such as ‘hypertext’, ‘information 
space’ or ‘cyberspace’ (though of course these often also have visual representations).
In 1992 Gaver pointed out that as technologies such as video, audio, or computer 
change, so do the kinds of space that it is possible or desirable to make. He used the 
term ‘media space’ and suggested that its analysis would highlight possibilities for 
design (Gaver 1992). This is also the rationale for the present thesis – to stimulate 
fresh approaches to spatial design and to the spatial aspects of depiction – even 
though the interpretation of media space here is, as indicated, different from the one 
Gaver had in mind.1 
The thesis is that picture-making (to be defined) is best conceived of as a pragmatic 
activity in which the objectives intended for the artefact have equal weight with (and 
often take precedence over) the relation between the picture and what it depicts. It is 
concerned with the visible formal aspects of pictures, rather than with, for example, 
metaphors of space.
The method used is to analyse how space is depicted and used in figurative 
representations. Analytical description is informed by texts from a number of 
normally discrete literatures, since my subject is not (yet) a defined discipline.
To bring out the pragmatism of picture-making offers two important advantages. It 
makes it easier to explain the multiplicity of kinds of pictures which have been made 
and continue to be made. Snyder (1980 p246) suggests that ‘the grab bag category of 
realistic pictures will forever defy general analysis’ but this is just what I aim to do. It 
also, I hope, offers the designer a way of thinking about the demands of unfamiliar 
1 Gaver’s paper related to network-linked work locations supporting a variety of media such as video, audio and 
digital data.
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media, encouraging the development of new pictorial solutions. I emphasise in the 
final chapter the idea that interactivity, like any other change of use of pictures, 
permits – and requires – new spatialities.
I ask the reader to tolerate terms which have only cursory initial definitions, on the 
understanding that their full definition is part of the subject of the thesis itself. For 
example, to say that the working definition of a picture is that it is ‘a planar 
representation of a scene’ raises the questions of what a scene is and how depiction 
represents it. These questions are an important part of this enquiry.
The motivation for the research is partly practical, arising from my work in teaching 
designers of digital interactive media. In considering various computer-based 
products and projects, I have found myself thinking that, whereas pictures, film and 
television seem to make expressive use of space, both as subject and medium, 
interactive media, certainly so far as they deal in pictures, generally do not. This has 
led me to enquire what this apparent expressivity is and what its sources are.
2 The chapters
Chapter 2: Approaches to the study of space
This chapter offers a brief account of two approaches to explaining how depiction 
works, which in some respects are opposed. One gives predominance to acultural 
factors while the other claims a high level of cultural conditioning in the way that 
pictures are made and perceived.
I note perceptual theories of how spatial configurations are interpreted, particularly 
concerning the extent to which this is acultural, and show examples which seem to 
suggest a significant role for cultural interpretation even of simple artefacts.
This is one of the few times in the thesis when I touch on non-pictorial spatial 
configuration (the others are in connection with television and digital interactive 
media), which is outside my scope. The study of such configurations, whether 
through perception science, theories of diagramming or of design more broadly 
considered, is a huge subject in its own right.
The other approach noted is that of theories of visual culture. This is included to 
establish a context for the consideration of space and specifically for a discussion of 
relativist views of the geometry of depiction in Chapter 4, and to introduce three 
ideas which I make use of throughout the thesis.
This chapter contributes only a little which is original to the research, but forms a 
necessary foundation for what follows.
Chapter 3: Depth perception and depiction
This chapter concentrates on the use of pictorial images to suggest depth. Its main 
purpose is to decompose the single concept of depth depiction into a range of 
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techniques, exploring how each offers different affordances (defined below) through 
the resulting image.
In defining pictures, I propose a simple framework which characterises the 
components of picture-making as each in its own way representational. In particular I 
distinguish decisions made about the model – that which is to be depicted – from 
those concerning the view and its representation through picturing. This framework is 
used and refined throughout the thesis.
One of the most obvious ways in which pictures and the world they depict differ is 
that pictures are generally flat, while the world is not. This chapter takes the thirteen 
depth cues of visual perception proposed by JJ Gibson (1950) and applies them to 
depiction. This may seem an odd approach given that Gibson consciously formulated 
his cues in opposition to an established tendency to consider vision in pictorial terms. 
However, by highlighting the differences between perception and depiction – and by 
anatomising the general concept of depth – it is beneficial to the thesis presented here, 
especially because it emphasises those aspects of depth depiction which are not to do 
with geometry and suggests that selectivity in the use of pictorial depth cues may 
have advantages, which I begin to evaluate.
In analysing pictures in relation to their evocation of depth a number of questions are 
raised which are pursued through the remainder of the thesis.
The application of Gibsonian theory to pictures is an original approach which helps 
prepare for the following chapter on realism, not only by emphasising historic and 
contemporary selectivity in depth depiction, but also by hinting at the difficulties of 
saying quite what it is that pictorial media are supposed to imitate.
Chapter 4: Spatiality and realism
This chapter is pivotal in the thesis, following the analysis of static pictures and 
preceding that of dynamic screen-based media. I ask what the criteria are for 
considering a picture to be realistic. Contrary to the advice of Gombrich (1973), I 
argue that the illusion that a picture is an actual scene (pictorial illusion) offers the best 
means of testing claims of pictorial realism. 
Analysing both texts and artefacts, I critique the generalised notion of realism and 
suggest replacing it with an approach based on multiple realisms. These different 
realisms tend to be promoted by different kinds of depth cue and have varying 
results for the user of the artefact (I distinguish particularly between the 
informational and the affective). I argue that these multiple realisms cannot usefully 
be subsumed into one ‘super-realism’ which approaches the illusion of looking at 
actual scenes, principally because realisms are selected to serve particular objectives, 
even when the picture-maker believes that some unitary notion of realism is 
employed.
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I evaluate the claim of PI-realism (defined as that realism which could fool the 
observer of a picture into believing that they see a real scene) to present a true spatial 
geometry of scenes. I show that the idea that many projection systems have equally 
valid claims to be accounted realistic is, on the criteria of pictorial illusion, incorrect. 
In the process I highlight errors made by some major theorists. However, I proceed to 
question the usefulness of this correct projection when tested against various 
demands. These include difficulties of implementation, failure to correspond to more 
subjective aspects of vision, and mismatch to the many functions which pictures are 
intended to perform.
I show that attempts to accommodate aspects of time in still pictures are an important 
influence on their form, and this leads me to propose an alternative conceptualisation 
of realism, visual experience realism, which in a variety of ways aims to make looking 
at a picture evoke aspects of looking at scenes (not the inert visual stimulus of the 
scene itself). This alternative realism I argue is both more limited (since it does not 
unequivocally match an external referent and is qualified by cultural codes) and more 
expressive (since it allows the design of pictures to be attuned pragmatically to their 
objectives).
The argument thus runs that though there are projection systems which have a 
particular claim to be regarded as superior in matching the optical stimulus before 
the eye, for most picture-making this is irrelevant because of the failure of such 
images to capture subjective and time-based aspects of vision (failure of correspondence) 
and the likely mismatch of such pictures to the objectives which they are intended to 
fulfil (mismatch of function).
I argue that the ‘limitations’ of still pictures have been turned to strengths and that 
this is a mark of a mature medium. This theme is pursued through the remaining 
chapters.
The framework proposed in the previous chapter which links the objectives of a 
picture to an idea, instantiated in a model which is viewed and pictured is now 
reconsidered to take account of the way in which for a picture, and, it will be seen, for 
film, every aspect can be considered in some sense pictorial, since the model and 
view may be, usually are, configured with a view to achieving a certain pictorial 
outcome.
Chapter 5: Screen space I: the spatiality of film
Film is unlike natural vision in being framed, as still pictures are, but it does offer 
motion and other time-based phenomena, so remedying one of the key ‘failings’ of 
pictures. This might mean that film is much more like natural vision. However, I 
demonstrate that the broadly mimetic intra-frame qualities of film do not extend to its 
inter-frame spatiality. This forms another stage in the argument concerning 
pragmatism. By analysing intra-frame space (the variables of viewing and picturing) 
and the larger spatial practices of film, I demonstrate that the key requirements on 
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film are concerned with authorially determined showing. This is subject to many 
demands, of which any matching to natural vision is relatively unimportant. 
However, the spatiality of the mainstream fiction film is not in general designed to be 
perceived as authorially contrived, so that the suppression of overtly artificial spatial 
practices in mainstream film is one of its distinctive traits. I use three examples –  
Welles’ Citizen Kane, Gance’s Napoleon and the films of Peter Greenaway – to draw 
out the spatial differences between those kinds of film which belong to the fictional 
mainstream and those which do not.
The objectives-to-picture framework is applied to film. I show how, as with painting, 
backtracking is an essential aspect of the process: though as a pipeline of physical 
process it is clear that the set is built, then populated with actors and finally viewed 
and pictured, every aspect is designed in the light of the final image (and normally in 
the context of the adjoining shots). In that sense I argue that fiction film could be 
considered wholly pictorial.
The most important function of this chapter is to demonstrate how the spatial 
practices of film are bound up with its being an authored narrative. This relationship 
of authorial control to the spatial practices of film hints at the difficulties explored 
later of transferring those practices of film to media which are interactive. 
I argue that film should be regarded as a mature genre with a high level of 
expressivity – it is a genre in which any spatial practices which do not suit its 
objectives have been expunged. This is not to suggest that its characteristic spatiality 
will not continue to develop, since it is part of my argument concerning maturity that 
technological change and audience expectation – even of the supposedly ‘natural’ – 
develop together.
This chapter offers a new analysis of film in spatial terms and in so doing reveals 
aspects of the medium which have not previously been highlighted, probably as a 
result of the general preoccupation with film’s temporal rather than spatial 
characteristics.
 
Chapter 6: Screen space II: factual television
The spatiality of television has hardly been studied; this chapter is novel. I trace the 
recent history of those spatial practices ousted from film-making which continue to 
flourish in factual television, and consider why this has occurred. Of all the many 
genres of television, factual programming is selected here because it most noticeably 
uses those spatial practices rejected in the fiction film. This reinforces the argument 
that spatial practices are closely allied to genres, which are in turn bound up with the 
objectives of the artefact. 
 Some of the characteristics of factual television are inevitable given the nature of its 
raw material which usually does not offer many opportunities for the construction 
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and selection of model and view to achieve a particular pictorial outcome. However I 
argue that more important than this is the key difference between the spaces of fiction 
film and factual television – that the former aspires generally to seem like natural 
vision (however artificial it may really be) while factual television is content to be 
perceived as explicitly ‘showing’. Nevertheless, even within this one genre, variant 
spatial practices can be discerned, which once again reflect the different objectives of 
various programmes.
I claim that the spatial practices of factual television, while opposed to those of the 
fiction film, are just as well attuned to the objectives of each artefact, and that this 
marks out factual television also as a mature medium.
Chapter 7: Screen space III: depiction and the space of digital interactive media
In this penultimate chapter I apply the approach developed so far to the various 
spatial practices of digital interactive media, which have hitherto not been studied. I 
propose a taxonomy of seven types reflecting the range of current practice. Based on 
the criteria developed in the thesis, I describe this practice as by-and-large 
‘immature’, though I offer an explanation as to why this is inevitably the case. Within 
the taxonomy, I discern the two broad tendencies already outlined – namely that 
some artefacts aspire to seem like simply seeing, while others are overtly 
presentational. As also for film and television, I emphasise that spatial practices 
belong not to media or technologies but to genres, and that one should therefore 
expect that there will be increasingly divergent spatial practice as the genres of digital 
interactive media evolve.
Unlike the previous chapters, this one concludes with suggestions as to what may, 
and perhaps should, happen in the development of the spatiality of this medium, 
based on the arguments of the thesis as a whole.
Throughout, I take pains to avoid neat theories which fail to fit the evidence of 
artefacts. The arguments are therefore couched in terms of tendencies and 
characteristic qualities rather than rigid prescription. The ‘messiness’ of spatial 
practice, arising from its pragmatism, is highlighted on many occasions. 
Nevertheless, I am confident not only that the main argument is clearly made but that 
other important advances are made in the development of a specifically spatial 
approach to depiction.
3 Concepts and definitions used
A small number of terms which recur throughout the thesis are defined and briefly 
discussed here.
Pictures
The thesis is largely concerned with the nature of depiction, so it would be premature 
to define the term picture here. However it is probably useful to make clear at this 
stage that I do not differentiate between representations which are derived from 
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scenes in the world really observed by the picture-maker, those derived from the 
imagination and those which are some combination of the two. I believe it will 
become clear in the course of the thesis that the formal issues concerning the 
relationship of the depiction to the depicted are the same whether the depicted matter 
is fictional or factual, so no purpose would be served by making this distinction. 
Automorphism
The term automorphism arises in discussing pictures and realism. It refers to matching 
aspects of a representation to corresponding aspects of whatever is represented. In an 
automorphic representation, colour of ink might be used to represent the colour of 
the thing it represents. There are degrees of automorphism, so the colour of the ink 
might match the hue of the object, but not its tone. Spatially, in an automorphic 
representation a symbol being to the right of another might stand for the thing it 
represents being to the right of the other – as is normally the case in pictures (Currie 
1995 p97). If a picture could be a perfect copy of a scene then it would be completely 
automorphic. 
Affordance
Representations, I argue, are made for purposes, not for their own sake: the artefact 
lends itself to particular ways of thinking and makes possible certain operations. As 
has been said of the spatial organisation of text, ‘one can operate on these 
representations’ (Goody 1987, p187) and in the case of interactive systems this is 
literally true. 
The concept of affordances arose in Gibson’s work on perception (1979) and has been 
popularised by Norman (1988) in relation to design. It refers to the way in which any 
object has preferred ‘readings’ – inferences the user makes as to how the object can be 
employed. So, for example in looking at a simple tool like a spade we are almost 
involuntarily drawn to the idea that one part is for hands to hold, while another, the 
blade, is for piercing and cutting. The parts of the artefact afford particular operations.2 
Norman has complained (1999) that affordance has become a mindless talisman in 
the HCI literature. I use it in this thesis because it emphasises that what the designer 
does is to make some readings more likely, not certain (the user might misinterpret the 
form of any design, however simple). It implies the inevitability of some error in 
interpretation (a key point in Norman 1988), emphasising that the designer is not 
making meaning, only favouring the apprehension of certain meanings among others. 
Diegetic space
Rimmon-Kenan (1983) notes how the distinction between Plato and Aristotle’s 
mimesis (often translated as showing) and diegesis (telling) had come by the end of the 
nineteenth century to mean, on the one hand, the direct presentation of events and 
conversations in which the narrator seems to disappear (as in drama), and, on the 
other, presentation mediated by a narrator who, instead of directly and dramatically 
2 Strictly speaking there are two different aspects to affordance: (1) what can be done with an object, (2) what its 
appearance suggests can be done with it. The latter is the important one here.
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exhibiting events and conversations, talks about them, sums them up, and so 
forth. Since then, the term diegesis has been widely adopted in film theory with a 
rather different sense: it now usually means the space or world which is accessible to 
the characters in a film, so that for example Giejgo says (2001): ‘Events and 
knowledge known to the characters within the plot and story are diegetic. Therefore 
characters only perceive diegetic material. Audience[s] can perceive everything a text 
has to offer – including non-diegetic material.’ While Armes complains that this use 
of the term is ‘misleading’ (Armes 1994 p12) he acknowledges that it is now 
conventional and I have adopted the newer meaning here. For any kind of depiction, 
it will prove useful to be able to distinguish between diegetic space – that which is 
occupied by the world depicted in the image – and non-diegetic or extra-diegetic space 
which is occupied for example by a set of controls for interacting with the world. In 
the case of a painting, the artist’s signature is usually in the non-diegetic space of the 
canvas – but occasionally is made diegetic by being incorporated into the scene itself.
Function and affect in design
Certain assumptions are made in this thesis about the nature of design, particularly 
that both function and affect are important in most kinds of designing. If we consider 
various kinds of artefact, it is clear that though many have a functional purpose (or 
several purposes) their form is not limited to functional considerations. Clothes must 
normally keep the wearer warm and dry, yet this tells us almost nothing about the 
innumerable different forms of garment which are worn. Legibility in the design of a 
newspaper is presumably essential, but the reason why one newspaper looks 
different from another is not to do with legibility, but with the associative qualities of 
the type-face, layout, proportion of picture to text, and so forth. These are affective 
aspects of a design, intended to do something to the user, to alter the relationship 
between the user and the artefact. 
It is therefore useful to think of the objectives of a design not just in functional terms 
but as including the affective aspects. For pictures, these may be crucial in 
determining the spatial attributes. For example, to see an object depicted 
stereoscopically may not provide any significant information which is not visible in a 
monocular view, but it will alter the affect: users may have a stronger sense that the 
object exists in the same space as themselves.  Such a case demonstrates that 
information and affect cannot in fact be rigidly separated. For example, if the sense of 
immersive presence in a virtual environment enables the user to achieve a better 
understanding of what some corresponding real experience is like, it could be argued 
that the user is thus more fully informed. Film space helps demonstrate that 
informational and affective aspects can become inextricably bound up in a single 
spatial device, so that, for example, moving the focal plane (pulling focus) is 
informational since it allows something else in the scene to be more clearly observed, 
but it has a strong effect on the viewer-subject relationship. The difference between 
function (in this case the provision of substantive information) and affect (an altered 
relation to the representation) is thus one of emphasis rather than a categorical 
distinction. 
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Expressivity
The word expressivity is often used artistically to suggest some rather vague idea 
about how a picture, or a film, or a digital artefact, expresses its meaning. On the 
other hand, in the context of information design, Mackinlay (1986 p114-6) proposes a 
strict test of expressivity that representations must ‘encode all the facts in the set and 
encode only the facts in the set’. This is a view which I suspect is simplistic even in its 
original context,3 but which certainly does not extend well to other kinds of 
representation. I show in the next chapter that all but the most trivial visualisations 
can only be understood on the basis of prior knowledge and that the observer 
employs that prior knowledge to decide which spatial attributes of the representation 
are meaningful. It is not possible to say categorically: these are the facts and a design 
conveys these and no others. Such a view also leaves out of account the affective 
aspects just discussed. Since a design includes the relationship between the user and 
the artefact it cannot be conceived as purely the transmission of facts. A more subtle 
definition of expressivity is developed in this thesis.
3 Though in some respects Mackinlay’s test of expressivity seems reasonable, it implies that all the structures which 
could legitimately be incorporated in a representation inhere in the data. While it is reasonable to say, as Tufte (1983 
p55-77) and Wainer (1997 p22-25) also do, that arithmetically significant spatialisation should not be used in the 
absence of data (so that three-dimensional visual representations are demonstrably misleading when only two 
dimensions of data are available), Mackinlay’s dictum implies that all the facts are pre-configurational, that all that 
can be found is in the data itself, independent of context. I suggest that the context shared by designer and user, 
which is essential to the user’s understanding, calls the purity of his view into question. Mackinlay takes a view of the 
designer as one who transmits pre-existent facts, rather than as an agent who interprets and discovers. 
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2 Approaches to the study of space
1 Introduction
Taking the concept of space in general terms, a number of questions arise: Is space 
perceived the same in all times and places? Is there an idea of space which is 
universal? Does the conception and depiction of space relate to the values of the 
culture that produces it? I summarise in this chapter contrasting approaches to space 
which help create a context for the following chapters.
Looking for constants in our relationship to space, Lakoff and Johnson highlight the 
preponderance of spatial metaphors in language (1980 p14-21) and suggest that since 
our world is spatial, we are contained in space and are ourselves containers of it, the 
notions of space which pervade our everyday experience are likely to be shared 
across cultures. Similarly Harrison and Dourish emphasise those aspects of the 
spatiality of the world which seem to offer a universal frame of reference. They 
suggest that ‘dealing with physical structure, topology, orientation and 
connectedness, spaces offer opportunities and constraints. Places, on the other hand, 
reflect cultural and social understandings,’ (Harrison and Dourish 1996 emphasis 
added). In contrast, Hall (1959, 1966), arguing that space is fundamental to non-
linguistic communication, identified culturally determined variations as well as 
constants. Recent studies of the spatial dynamics of social organisation again 
emphasise the interrelatedness of spatial and social factors (Dunbar 1996 passim). 
Markus, studying the effects of principles of social organisation on the design of 
buildings has suggested that ‘there is no a-spatial society and no a-social space’ 
(Markus 1993 p13). He documents the influence of the Panopticon, also cited by 
Foucault (1970 (1966)) as an emblem of the ‘politics’ of seeing which has inspired 
many other writings within the ambit of visual culture (see below). 
I shall argue that the form of pictorial representations has a strong relation to their 
purposes, which presumably cannot fail to reflect the values – and not just the 
graphic capabilities – of the culture within which they are made and used. Spaces, 
built or depicted, ‘reflect cultural and social understandings’ just as places do. It is 
however also useful to consider the invariant aspects of spatial awareness.
2 Components of spatial perception
Perception science has a need to identify how we makes sense of what we see. A 
principle of all approaches to perception is the assumption that the retinal image is in 
itself of no use: only some sort of comprehension of the image can provide advantage.1 
At what point this comprehension occurs, and under what influences, is a matter of 
dispute. Nevertheless most models incorporate aspects which are data-driven, 
determined by inherent mechanisms of the visual system, and aspects which are 
hypothesis-driven and are subject to influence by prior knowledge (Figure 2.01). 
Gregory (1987) dates the assumption of a hypothesis-driven component to the work 
1 This comprehension may not amount to much, yet still serve its purpose. Marr (1982 p32-4) cites the limited spatial 
‘comprehension’ of the housefly, which is nevertheless sufficient to trigger appropriate actions. Vision thus extracts 
from images of the world information which is useful and relevant (op cit p31). 
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of Helmholtz (1821-94). Even Marr, who emphasises what can be achieved by the 
visual system without recourse to hypotheses, proposes a three-stage process model 
(1980) in which, following the generation of a primal sketch and a 21/2-D sketch, the 











Figure 2.01. Conceptual relationship of data-driven and hypothesis-driven aspects of perception
The sense-making work of the visual system which is not influenced by prior 
knowledge has been described in terms of gestalt, a term coined by Wertheimer (1880-
1943) to capture the idea that some sort of pattern is derived from sense-data before 
any cultural understanding is applied. Whether or not framed in terms of gestalt 
theory, there seems to be a broad measure of agreement that some of the visual 
system’s organisational abilities are so fundamental that they are not significantly 
different across cultures (Marr 1982, Hochberg 1980, Gregory 1987, Barlow 1990, 
Bruce, Green and Georgeson 1996). Later in the thesis, the difference between two 
kinds of image – the real image projected by light on the retina and the ‘virtual 
image’, an internal representation which the visual system as a whole creates from 
the retinal image – will create many difficulties in establishing the meaning of visual 
realism.
Lansdown, in a summary of gestalt perceptual theory (Boyd Davis, Lansdown and 
Huxor 1997), highlights smooth continuation, proximity, similarity, orientation, closure, 
relative size  and common fate , which I briefly define here. Most are accessible in static 
stimuli, while one – common fate – arises only in relation to movement. One can 
speculate on ecological origins for these phenomena, an approach to perception 
promoted in particular by Gibson (1979) which has informed subsequent thinking on 
perception. 
In smooth continuation the observer groups together in a single structure those parts 
which seem to align or continue smoothly. This may be part of the process by which 
we segment the retinal image into objects: parts which align are seen as belonging to 
a single object. Solso suggests that it is also related to ecologically valuable trajectory 
prediction, since good continuation in object paths tends to fit well with the laws of 
the physical universe such as gravity and the conservation of momentum (Solso 1994 
p95). 
In the case of proximity the observer groups those parts that are closest together. This 
presumably assists in identifying both single entities which have modular parts and 
groups of objects which are likely to behave in a coherent fashion, such as flocks and 
other groups. In a set of objects, similar objects will be perceived as belonging 
together. Under suitable circumstances, this will cause the pattern of the objects to 
stand out as an identifiable form. Objects may be perceived as parts of a group by 
virtue of their distinctive orientation. 
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Closure ‘completes’ intermittent parts of an enclosing shape. As Solso indicates, 
enclosed shapes seem to have greater concreteness than unjoined marks (Solso 1994 
p96). This touches on figure-ground phenomena: given a small shape within a large 
one, the observer tends to see the smaller as a figure against the larger background 
rather than as a pierced hole in the larger shape. When there is little difference in the 
size of the parts, ambiguity can result as in the familiar faces/vase illusion. 
The tendency to see stimulus components as belonging together, as an entity or as a 
group, is accentuated when movement is introduced: items that move together, have 
a common fate , are seen as grouped together. Though a shape may not be discernible 
in a static pattern of dots, when the dots move in a coherent way, the shape becomes 
apparent.
Limitations of the scope of gestalt principles
It is easy to observe difficulties where a visual configuration has been made ignoring 
gestalt principles. In Figure 2.02, study reveals that there are two separate ‘and’ gates 
in the top row of the blue diagram, but this is not the user’s initial impression because 
proximity causes grouping of the top row as a whole.
Figure 2.02. A gestalt principle 
ignored
‘How computers work’ CD-ROM 
(Time-Life Books with Warner 
New Media , 1993) (detail). 
When the designer ignores basic 
principles of spatial organisation, 
the user has difficulty making 
sense of what is shown.
In some cases one gestalt principle will conflict with another. For example, Gregory 
shows a case2 (Figure 2.03) where the tendency to organise dots into rows through 
smooth continuation overrides the grouping effect of proximity (Gregory 1970 p20).
   
Figure 2.03. Competing organisational principles.
From Gregory 1970 p20.
The lowest dot of the diagonal is close to two dots of the upright. 
However it is the two rows which are perceived as primary 
structures, not the cluster of three dots.
While it might be argued that the benefits of acultural perception are still available in 
2 Gregory does not describe it in gestalt terms.
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a case such as this, since presumably all observers will prioritise continuity over 
proximity, the suspicion arises that no safe prediction could be made for the 
indefinite number of variant designs where these two (or other) gestalt principles 
might compete. Marshall and Shipman (1995), in developing designs for a visual 
interface to hypertext in which users could move objects about in order to express 
relations between them, found not surprisingly that users expressed these 
relationships by using proximity, alignment and similarity in combination. 
Cultural conditioning tends to invade the interpretation even of very simple visual 
structures. For example, two small diagrams are used together on the door controls of 
certain UK trains (Figure 2.04). The upper symbol denotes opening, while the lower 
denotes closing, of the double doors. It relies on the learned recognition of the angled 
marks as arrow-heads (denuded of their shafts) which are to be understood as 
indicating the direction of travel of the doors which will result. No doubt most users 
are familiar enough with this graphic convention to recognise their meaning 
correctly. However, considered purely in gestalt terms, the upper symbol has a unity 
which might be analogous to the closure of the doors, while the lower symbol 
conveys a contrasting impression of fracture. Only the user who has learned the 
diagrammatic conventions of arrow-heads is likely to make a correct interpretation, 
even of these extremely simple spatial configurations. 
Figure 2.04.
Graphics on buttons for operating train doors
 Only the user familiar with the diagrammatic conventions 
of arrow-heads is likely to make a correct interpretation of 
these configurations. 
We may underestimate the extent to which learned knowledge is required. At the 
beginning of modern data visualisation,3 in the ‘lineal arithmetic’ of Playfair (1759-
1823) (Tufte 1983 p32, Bertin 1973 p222) a method is described which is so simple 
that it seems to rival the acultural qualities of gestalt principles: larger marks stand 
for larger quantities – ‘presenting to the eye a figure, the proportions of which 
correspond with the amount of the sums intended to be expressed’ (Playfair 1801 pix-
xi quoted in Twyman 1986 p223). However when Playfair continues his explanation it 
becomes clear that this is not so: 
Suppose the money received by a man in trade were all in guineas, and that every 
evening he made a simple pile of all the guineas received during the day, each pile 
would represent a day, and its heights would be proportioned to the receipts of that 
day; so that by this plain operation, time, proportion and amount, would all be 
physically combined.
Lineal arithmetic then, it may be averred, is nothing more than those piles of guineas 
represented on paper, and on a small scale, in which an inch (suppose) represents the 
thickness of five millions of guineas, as in geography it does the breadth of a river, or 
any other extent of country.
Playfair 1801 pix-xi quoted in Twyman 1986 p223
3 Playfair introduced the line graph, bar chart and area chart (Twyman 1986 p220 ). His work was not entirely unique: 
Johann Heinrich Lambert in Germany also used line graphs in his scientific writings from the 1760s, both for analysis 
and display (Twyman 1986 p221, Tufte 1983 p32). Tufte nominates a seventeenth century example as the first 
statistical graphic (Tufte 1997 p15). 
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As described, the method owes a lot to depiction (the aspect of geographic mapping 
to which Playfair compares it being also essentially a pictorial rather than a symbolic 
one), and it is not impossible to imagine that an observer wholly unused to graphic 
visualisation might grasp that the heights of marks on the paper correspond to the 
quantities being measured. However no such assumption can be made about the 
horizontal axis, for all that Playfair implies that the piles of guineas would be set out 
in chronological order. The idea that time can be represented quantitatively, using the 
same graphic variable as actual quantities, is entirely cultural: it does not operate at 
the basic, irresistible level of gestalt principles (hence perhaps the necessity of 
Playfair’s ‘manifesto’ and explanation). This relation between time and quantity used 
by Playfair is perhaps best considered a metaphorical one. Though Lakoff and 
Johnson have argued (1980 p p14-21) that some of the commonest metaphors, 
including the spatialisation of time, arise from our shared physical experience of the 
world (so they might not be cultural), their examples are all spatialisations of time in 
relation to the observer (such as the use of the concept ‘look forward’ to mean both 
looking to a later time and looking in front of oneself) rather than a representation of 
time such as Playfair’s dimension on paper, which has its own spatiality independent 
of that of the observer.4 
Playfair’s contemporary Joseph Priestley (1733-1804) used proportional graphic 
representation of time as the basis of his work (Figure 2.05) and this may have been a 
direct influence on Playfair (Twyman 1986 p216).5 
 
Figure 2.05. 
Part of Priestley’s explanatory 
leaflet for his timeline,1765, 
reproduced in Twyman 1986
While gestalt principles clearly facilitate the reading of such timelines (such as the 
noticing of clusters at times when several notables lived, compared with fallow 
periods), many of the visual properties must be ‘decoded’ to be understood. There is 
very little of value in this representation which can simply be ‘seen’ in the sense, say, 
that one can see planar relationships in a geographical map. The observer must 
employ prior knowledge to decide which basic spatial attributes of the representation 
are meaningful. Visual clustering inevitably takes place whether the grouping is 
horizontal (meaningful) or vertical (meaningless) since the perception of clustering 
cannot differentiate in terms of axes.6 Likewise while users should infer meaning from 
the vertical alignment of two items, they should not infer anything from horizontal 
4 In mapping other kinds of data, acculturated metaphor is even more evident: for example in the ideas of mapping a 
‘high’ temperature, or a ‘high’ note in music. 
5 His innovation in graphic visualisation was the development of the timeline (Twyman 1986 p216). He also published 
important research into the nature of electricity and contributed to the discovery of oxygen.
6 If it makes any sense to consider the perception of clustering in coordinate terms, it could be considered as multi-
polar so that the nearness of all other objects to each object is measured.
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alignments. Even though users need not necessarily understand the intentions of the 
individual who devised this specific representation, they must be in a position to use 
knowledge of the communicative intentions normally embodied in this kind of 
diagram. 
My aim here is not to criticise the quality of this particular information design, but to 
indicate the inevitability of invasion of the semantic field by unwanted meanings. 
Even quite simple graphic organisations such as a timeline cease to be able to rely on 
the foundational predictability associated with gestalt principles. In the somewhat 
unpredictable relationship between culture and perception, prior knowledge is 
necessary at a surprisingly low level of interpretation. 
3 Visual Culture
An approach grounded in cultural history offers a relativist view in strong contrast to 
the universalising aims of perception science. While the defining characteristic of 
theories of visual culture 7 is a belief that the visual artefacts which a society produces 
and uses indicate and inform its values and beliefs, it has also come to stand for a 
number of related theories, including that visual realism is a social construct and that 
the shared attitudes of a culture are ‘invisible’ to those who hold them. In this thesis I 
make use of both ideas, though I take issue with the extreme view that every aspect of 
figuration is culturally determined and that therefore no pictorial geometry has a 
better claim to be considered correct than another (Chapter Four). I often use the idea 
that the familiarity of particular forms of representation – what Barthes (1977 p17 
passim) would call ‘codes’ – leads to their becoming invisible or transparent. I also 
borrow the idea, implicit in most writing on visual culture, that intention can be 
embodied in an artefact even when no conscious intending, and no particular 
intending individual, is implied.
Relativism of spatial concepts
There are many references in this literature to alleged differences in perception, 
conceptualisation and estimation of space. Differentiation by culture is generally seen 
in qualitative terms, while quantitative differences in the estimation of space are 
usually linked to era.
Perhaps the earliest visual culture text predates the term itself: Panofsky’s Perspective 
as Symbolic Form (1991 (1925)). This essay set the agenda in two ways: as the title 
suggests it explored the relationship between planar representations of space and the 
cultures which make them; it also contains a significant error concerning perspectival 
depiction which has since been repeated by others and with which I deal in Chapter 
Four.
Harvey considers Durkheim to have been the first anthropologist to suggest that 
different societies produce fundamentally different conceptions of space and time 
7 Alpers is credited with the dissemination of the term in 1972 (Evans and Hall 1999 p5) though Alpers herself 
attributes its origination to Baxandall (Alpers 1983 pxxv).
Media Space 2  Approaches to the study of space | Stephen Boyd Davis  |  June 2002 15
(Harvey 1996 p210). In the linguistic field, the suggestion that they might be 
culturally determined arises in the work of Sapir (1884-1939) and Whorf (1897-1941). 
The Sapir-Whorf hypothesis is now cited as fact in some sources (for example Kress 
and van Leeuwen 1996). A favourable view of Whorf’s work is also found in a paper 
by Hopgood (1993), who was struck,  while developing standards for specifying time-
based multimedia, by the widespread tendency to make categorical assertions about 
both time and space. His conclusion (op cit p3) was that ‘Europeans have a notion of 
time and space that is generally assumed by them to be universal. This gratuitous 
assumption is naive, arrogant and wrong.’ As Hopgood suggests, this implies shifting 
the requirements of visual representation, even in figurative pictures, from a simple 
(if problematic) attempt to capture the truth to a more functionally directed agenda.
The key argument of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis is that perception of space is 
determined by culture, and particularly by language. Pinker aligns himself strongly 
against this nurture-based view: ‘No matter how influential language might be, it 
would seem preposterous to a physiologist that it could reach down into the retina 
and rewire the ganglion cells’ (Pinker 1994 p62). This is surely a false antithesis: it is 
not necessary for culture to alter physiology in order to interfere with perception, 
unless visual perception is considered synonymous with vision, in other words as 
having no hypothesis-driven part but being entirely data-driven. However he does 
usefully point out the circularity in Whorf’s arguments, in that language is the only 
evidence Whorf has to demonstrate that people perceive differently! 
Quantitative differences in the estimation of space are reflected in the tendency widely 
remarked in industrial societies to see space as becoming compressed as a result of 
the ease with which it is traversed. Thrift (1996 p264-265) considers this compression 
to have been a phenomenon of stagecoaches, railways, bicycles, the post and the 
telegraph: the railway age has many such references.8 For Heine (quoted in 
Schivelbusch, 1978 p34) ‘the elementary concepts of time and space have begun to 
vacillate. Space is killed by the railways. I feel as if the mountains and forests of all 
countries were advancing on Paris.’ The Quarterly Review of 1839 predicted that ‘As 
distances were thus annihilated, the surface of the country would, as it were, shrivel 
in size until it became not much bigger than one immense city.’ (Schivelbusch, 1978 
p32). For Williams (1852 p284-85) ‘the extremities of the island are now, to all intents 
and purposes, as near the metropolis as Sussex or Buckinghamshire were two 
8 Unfortunately Thrift like a number of writers in this area, builds fantastic claims on the basis of these reasonable 
observations, viz: ‘even if in some mystical past it had been possible to analytically separate space and time, in the 
contemporary world the notions of space as enclosure and time as duration are unsettled and redesigned as a field of 
infinitely experimental configurations of space-time’ (Thrift 1996 p285). In recent years the idea of spatial 
compression through technology has become a feature of cyberspace, a term generally denoting metaphorical spaces 
(Gibson, coining the term in 1986, gave a kind of visual equivalence to the metaphor as ‘bright lattices of logic 
unfolding across the colourless void’, Gibson 1986 p10). According to Taylor and Saarinen (whose experience of 
cyberspace at the time seems to have been confined to the use of email) ‘omnipresence descends from the heavens and 
becomes actual on earth’ (Taylor and Saarinen 1994 p2). There are striking similarities between the polemic of 
cyberspace and that of the railway age. As Marvin points out (1988, p193), in the nineteenth century it was argued 
that, ‘instantaneous electric communication augured a universal language, usually thought to be English, and global 
harmony [...] the devices which social imagination constructed and then reacted to sometimes actually existed, but 
just as often were entirely imaginary’. New technologies were seen not only as annihilating space and time but also 
difference. For Ascott (1994 ) ‘cyberception not only implies a new body and a new consciousness but a redefinition of 
how we might live together in the interspace between the virtual and the real.’ Like Marvin, Standage notes the 
hyperbole of spatial compression in relation to the telegraph (Standage 1998 p125) and the similarity of the benefits 
claimed for the telegraph and for cyberspace. 
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centuries ago.’ Massey (1993 p60-61) has pointed out that this notion of time-space 
compression needs differentiating socially: it is hardly reasonable to suggest that the 
sensation of spatial compression was the same for all at a given historical period, 
regardless of wealth, gender or other factors. This returns the discussion to 
qualitative differences of spatial interpretation. 
Such relativistic thinking has directly influenced some kinds of visual representation 
of space. For example, whereas geographers traditionally saw themselves as dealing 
in the appraisal and mensuration of the physical landscape, they have taken an 
increasing interest in the semantics of space and this has affected the kinds of maps 
which are made. According to Jackson (1993 p207), geography has been ‘remodelled, 
remade and rethought’ in a shift away from the ‘obsession with landscape’. The 
concept of ‘relative space’ has dominated feminist and other challenges to traditional 
‘absolute’ spatial geographies (Rose et al. 1997 passim). Cartesian distances are 
replaced by models representing, for example, accessibility by particular users. In fact 
the term ‘spatiality’ has, following a suggestion by Soja in 1985, been used by 
geographers mainly to denote this kind of socially produced and interpreted space 
(Rose et al. 1997 p4-7).
In some respects this has led to an attack on map-making in general, leading Pickles 
(1992 p193) to complain that ‘the theory of maps has received comparatively little 
attention amidst the burgeoning literature of the new theoretically informed 
geography’. One innovative visual form which seems however to have been accepted 
into the mainstream is the ‘cartogram’ used by Kidron and Segal in 1981 (Dorling 
and Fairbairn 1997 p146-150) in which countries of the world are assigned 
approximately their conventional Cartesian locations but are scaled according to 
other criteria than topography, for example according to per capita CO2 emissions 
(Smith 1999 p98-99). 
Of course ‘traditional’ geography has its own history. For Harvey (1996 p239), the 
introduction of the Ptolemaic map into Florence in 1400 is fundamentally linked to 
the emergent needs of trade and commerce, of property and territorial rights which 
differ from those of the feudal world. However, the modernity (or postmodernity) of 
such concerns is often overstated: it is difficult to believe that anyone has ever held the 
‘traditional theory of maps as unproblematic mirrors of nature’ which Pickles 
suggests (Pickles 1992 p193).
The ‘hegemony of vision’
A particular characteristic of much visual culture theory is its tendency to attack any 
notion of visual realism, offering in its place an entirely relativistic view (I return to 
this in Chapter 4). There is a tendency to regard the alleged ‘hegemony of vision’ as 
an actual conspiracy. Thus Crary states that ‘The standardisation of visual imagery in 
the nineteenth century must be seen then not simply as part of new forms of 
mechanised reproduction but in relation to a broader process of normalisation and 
subjection of the observer.’ (Crary 1990 p17 emphasis added). The premise that there 
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was a standardisation of visual imagery in the nineteenth century is unproven: this 
was the period when the proliferation of image types which had begun in the 
previous century continued: cartoons, engineering drawings, architectural 
renderings, botanical illustrations, fine art in a wide variety of styles, photographs 
and pictorial advertisements. Crary’s fundamental point has some value: that if one 
kind of image becomes regarded as ‘realist’ this has a polarising effect on other 
images, but the vocabulary of subjection seems misplaced. For Harvey 
‘representations of space and time arise out of the world of social practices but then 
become a form of regulation of those practices.’ (Harvey 1996 p212 emphasis added). 
Jenks (1995 p7) claims that ‘the overwhelming appeal of such a rigid and intransigent 
relation between vision and visual field [that is, linear perspective] must surely 
derive from its strengths in protecting the variety of interests inherent in any social 
order of signs and images.’ This invective of conspiracy seems to ignore the fact that 
the claim of photography (for example) to be the arbiter of realism arises from 
popular perception of its special relationship to the visible world, not from 
oppression. Who is doing the oppressing is not made clear. When Virilio (1994 (1988) 
p21) claims that ‘Considered irrefutable proof of the existence of an objective world, 
the snapshot was, in fact, the bearer of its own future ruin,’ one can only wonder 
what form this ruin took or is taking.
Not only is Crary simply not correct in suggesting that there is a single hegemonic 
type of image in the nineteenth century, there is little sign of such a visual 
monoculture in more recent times. In this thesis it will become clear that spatialities 
are varied, and that diverse complex and subtle spatial ‘languages’ have been 
developed, to respond to different needs. One suspects that visual culture tends to be 
insensitive to the different spatial usages of visual technologies because this would 
militate against sweeping statements about periods and cultures. By contrast I hope 
to offer a view which does justice to the variety of artefacts and the subtlety of their 
spatial practices.
Invisibility of shared beliefs and attitudes
The ‘shattering of space’ which seems to occur roughly simultaneously in the sciences 
and the visual arts around the beginning of the twentieth century has been taken as 
an example of the episteme, a set of shared values which reflect a particular culture’s 
biases, preferences, values and oversights (Foucault 1970 (1966) passim), a concept on 
which that of visual culture is largely based. The idea that individual cultures have 
characteristic styles of thought is almost as old as historiography itself, but the novel 
idea implicit in Foucault and explicit in Kuhn’s idea of the paradigm (Kuhn 1970), is 
the emphasis on the ‘invisibility’ to the participants of the assumptions which the 
group or culture shares. This conceptual innovation seems to have arisen in several 
related fields; for example in relation to cross-cultural linguistic translation Becker 
remarks that ‘for the most part, in most cultures, knowledge of plot constraints is 
unstated background knowledge’ (Becker 1995 p30-32 emphasis added); Hall (1959 p30) 
suggested that ‘culture hides much more than it reveals, and strangely enough what 
it hides, it hides most effectively from its own participants’; Barthes’ concept of 
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mythologies (1973 (1957) passim) reflects how what is historical, cultural and 
conventional comes to seem natural and inevitable; Harvey, discussing time, space 
and their interrelation, suggests that though clock time is a social construct, modern 
societies accept it as an objective fact: the sense of objectivity in a shared social 
construct tends to make the construct invisible (Harvey 1996 p212). 
I make use of this concept of ‘invisibility’ in the present thesis, for its valuable 
emphasis on the difficulty of pinning down a single ‘truth’ about spatial perception. I 
shall develop the argument that some spatial languages9 (for example those of film, 
comics and textual layout) can be thought of as ‘mature’ and that this maturity has 
often emerged through pragmatic experiment rather than a search for objective visual 
truth. I shall argue that the artifice involved in their production is concealed, 
appearing naturalistic, because its methods have become invisible. A culture might 
believe that its visual representations match a truth while nevertheless experimenting 
pragmatically and developing spatial representations in a partly ad hoc way.
The role of intention
In discussing visual artefacts of many kinds I will refer to the intentions of their 
makers. However, this should not be taken to mean that I impute consciously formed 
intentions to the individuals responsible, nor that an unlimited range of actions was 
available to them. It would be ridiculous for example to imagine that a thirteenth-
century painter had a free choice as to whether or not to use geometric perspective as 
we now know it. In many cases there is no possibility of knowing what such 
intentions might have been, and so the intention referred to is often both unconscious 
and collective. In one sense this is standard art-historical practice: ‘The Baroque 
appealed through the emotions to the widest possible audience’ (Clark 1969 p182). It 
also underpins the concept of visual culture, since this assumes that societies in 
diverse places and times use characteristic visual artefacts which reflect their 
preferences, taboos, world views and so forth. Culture in part comprises views of 
what is possible, legitimate or correct and these views in turn have a formative effect 
on individual and group actions. 
9 In this thesis I occasionally use the idea of language (for example, the ‘language of film’) when describing the way in 
which meaning can be afforded by assembling, juxtaposing and sequencing components. I mean to imply no view as 
to whether this might be more than a metaphor.
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3 Depth perception and depiction
1 Introduction
In this chapter and the next I deal with two problems concerning the planar 
representation of world scenes in still pictures.1 These problems are (1) that what is to 
be represented is sometimes considered uncontroversial – this is the idea that what is 
‘out there’ to be pictured is easily and objectively established; and (2) that there is a 
kind of picture which is definitively ‘realistic’ – the belief that particular ways of 
using planar media to depict the third dimension are correct in an absolute sense. Is 
there a pictorial representation which is fundamentally realistic in the sense that it is a 
correct representation of a scene? If there is, then such pictures would be essentially 
pictorial, and looking at the picture would be like looking at the scene. Any other 
picture would be a divergence from this archetype and correspondingly less correct. I 
shall argue that no such perfect representation is possible, and that the definition of 
realism is instead dependent on the purposes of the artefact. The unattainability of 
perfect realism I consider to be fundamental, and not simply a practical difficulty 
arising from the limitations of media.2 
My purpose is to demonstrate that:
   • there can be no still picture which fully imitates the experience of natural vision3 
   • the ways in which pictures fall short of matching vision is a vital part of their 
expressivity4 
I therefore discuss two aspects of the relationship between natural vision and 
pictures: (1) issues arising from the attempt to match pictures to vision and (2) 
reasons why one might want not to match pictures to vision. For those specifying and 
designing pictorial information – computer graphics, virtual environments, pictorial 
multimedia interfaces – this last point is the most significant. Expressivity is not 
necessarily increased by greater realism, however defined. Nevertheless I later show 
that what might be called the illusion of realism has an important role to play in some 
kinds of pictures.
This chapter concentrates on the variety of means for suggesting depth in pictures, 
and argues that each method has its own distinctive potential. Choosing to use some 
depth cue rather than another leads to specific results both in terms of information 
conveyed and in the relationship created between the picture and the user. The work 
of Gibson in relation to depth perception is used in an analysis of depth depiction. This 
provides a taxonomy of depth cues which serves as a basis for subsequent discussion. 
1 As indicated in the Introduction, I do not differentiate in this thesis between representations which are derived from 
actual scenes really observed by the picture-maker, those derived from the imagination and those which are some 
combination of the two. 
2 Depending on the technology employed, the shortfalls of media when compared with observed scenes include the 
smaller tonal gamut of painting, the narrower angle of view of VR displays, the limited colour range of printing, and 
many others.
3 In a sense this is uncontroversial given that the pictures discussed are still, while the world and the observer are not. 
However the exact ways in which such pictures fail to imitate the natural vision of scenes yields important insights 
into the nature of picture-making.
4 This term was given an initial definition in the Introduction.
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2 Definitions
In discussing the third dimension and the issues arising from its representation in 
planar media (treating physical surfaces and digital displays alike for reasons which 
will be explained) some preliminary definitions are necessary.
Depth and dimensions
Jones (2001 p56-61) points out that space can be defined as ‘three-dimensional’ in 
various ways.5 When used in this thesis with reference to the real world, the term is 
generally used simply to denote that the world has volume. Specifically, the three 
dimensions are measured against Cartesian axes in relation to the observer 
representing distance across the field of view, distance up or down the field of view, 
and distance from the observer. There are cases to be made for rival systems. Lannoch 
and Lannoch (1989 p41) object that any such system little resembles our experience of 
the world, that ‘the three-dimensional geometric model in particular fails to account 
for specifically human perceptions and points of view.’ To reflect a view of the world 
as enveloping the user, it might be considered preferable to use spherical polar 
coordinates representing how far up or down, right or left (or a combination) the 
observer turns, together with the distance from the observer of the various parts of 
the environment, in order to see or reach some part of the scene. But here, for 
simplicity’s sake, I use the same Cartesian terms for real space perceived and for 
depicted space.
In relation to depiction, I use the term three-dimensional to distinguish images 
appearing to have volume from those which are purely planar, and the word depth to 
denote one of those dimensions. Considering pictorial space in Cartesian terms the 
plane is taken to be that on which the representation appears, its width and height 
accounting for two dimensions, while depth refers to the remaining dimension 
beyond the plane6 which (assuming that unevenness of substrate or media is ignored) 
only exists through some illusion or depiction. 
         
Figure 3.01. 
Schwitters, Kurt. Circle, 1925
For this thesis such artefacts are not considered to be pictures.
From 20th Century Art Book 1999 Phaidon, London p418
5 For example in Cartesian coordinates, three distances; in cylindrical polar coordinates, two distances and an angle; in 
spherical polar coordinates, a distance and two angles. The location of a point in any of these systems may be 
represented in each of the others: though conceptually they suggest different models, they are equivalent.
6 Depth can be conceived before as well as beyond the plane, and some pictures have attempted to represent it, but for 
this thesis depth can be considered as always beyond. 
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The working definition of a picture is that it is a representation which resembles an 
actual scene. The term therefore excludes strongly abstract artefacts such as the late 
works of Mondrian or the collages of Schwitters (Figure 3.01) which though they may 
exhibit apparent depth are almost certainly not to be taken as representations of 
scenes. Quite what the resemblance between scenes and pictures may be is a 
fundamental theme of the chapter. The thesis hinges on the nature of this 
correspondence between actual space and pictorial space, which has strong 
implications for how any representation is designed. In particular I demonstrate that 
the relationship between world space and pictorial space differs with the functions 
which pictorial representations are intended to serve.
Distinguishing pictures and diagrams
The argument will be made here that, though pictures represent in a different way to 
diagrams, the design of both is affected by pragmatic decisions about the use of 
space. On the face of it, this seems a strange assertion. In a schematic representation, 
if element P appears to the left of element Q, this need not denote that the thing 
signified by P is to the left of the thing signified by Q, whereas in a picture – by 
definition – that is just what is denoted. It would be careless therefore to suggest that 
the schematic and pictorial represent in just the same way: it seems that in schematic 
representation the significance of the spatial relation must be ‘decoded’, whereas in 
the pictorial it is ‘just seen’, without the intervention of any symbolic mechanism. 
Nevertheless, I shall develop the argument that many aspects of the space in pictures 
are arbitrary in the sense that they are chosen to fulfil particular purposes rather than 
being dictated solely by the properties of the scene and that there is a continuum 
which connects the schematic to the pictorial. The study of spatiality in planar media 
highlights the way in which all visual representations embody pragmatic decisions: 
the designer may benefit by recognising this.
Levels of representation
Considering a picture P of an object or scene in the world (which I will refer to as the 
model, M) it is useful, rather than thinking only of how M is represented using 
picture P, also to consider briefly what M itself represents. Ostensive subject matter – 
a landscape, a streetscene, a human subject – often has a metaphorical or symbolic as 
well as a literal relation to meaning so that, for example, a dove represents peace or a 
trash-can represents the concept of deletion. Taking the simple case of a scene which 
represents a single idea – such as deletion – if this is denoted as I, one can begin to 
map the stages of representation from idea to picture in the form:
I  Õ  M  Õ  P
It is important to note that the model is chosen as a vehicle for an idea: it is rare for 
something to be depicted for the sake of depiction. 
This illuminates the problem of Mackinlay’s test of expressivity (1986 p114-6, see 
Introduction p9), if the ‘facts in the set’ are considered to be the ideas for which the 
model stands, then a picture can represent more than the set of facts by having both a 
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simple pictorial and a metaphorical relation to its subject. In addition, any picture 
presents less than is in the ‘model’ since few representations can show all aspects of 
the model, particularly when a three-dimensional world must be mapped to the 
plane.
In most cases the idea I is selected to serve some objective O. This could be 
diagrammed as:
O  Õ  I  Õ  M  Õ  P
This needs to be further developed, to represent the fact that another representational 
process takes place between the model M and the picture P. The model M is pre-
pictorial and probably three-dimensional. The picture P is flat. The stage in between 
is the one with which this chapter is primarily concerned. It is useful to borrow here 
from the pipeline approach of synthetic computer graphics (Lansdown 1987 p54-55, 
Foley et al 1995 p334-5, 806-9), in which it is normal to conceptualise the difference 
between two sets of decisions in the design of a picture: one involves the geometry 
and other attributes of the model M – that which is to be depicted – while the other 
relates to the visualisation of the model necessary to its display, including such 
factors as projection system, mode of rendering, point of view, framing and so forth. 
Both are processes of representation. Denoting the viewing parameters by V, the 
stages can be redrawn as:
O  Õ  I  Õ  M  Õ  V  Õ  P
In sum, this crudely represents how the purpose or objective O informs the selection 
of an idea I which is instantiated in some particular model M. This in turn is viewed 
V in a particular way, and also pictured P. It should be noted that this staged diagram 
is equally applicable whether the picture are traditional or digital, static or moving, 
highly realistic (eg. photographs) or more abstract (eg. ‘icons’ in computer interfaces). 
For simplicity the diagram shows each of the stages as singular. In fact, objectives are 
likely to be many for a single picture, while a single model may yield many views 
and many pictures, and so forth. It is also shown as linear, when in fact, as discussed 
later in the thesis, it might also show various forms of ‘feedback’.
While adequate as a pipeline view of the process, the diagram could be read as 
implying that the effects of the objective O are confined to the next stage (the 
selection of the idea I) and so on. It is part of the purpose of this thesis to show that 
the objectives of a representation are best considered as strongly influencing all these 
processes, including the viewing stage V and even the depiction itself P. As a map of 
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The inevitability of depiction
As already indicated, models do not themselves exist visually: it is only rendering 
which makes them visible, and, except where actual physical three-dimensional 
artefacts are made, all representations to be received via the eye must be made 
pictorial. The technology used to achieve this is irrelevant to the general principle. It 
makes no difference whether the user looks at a single planar image on a monitor, 
two such images in a headmounted display, or even has the image beamed directly 
onto the retinae (in which case the planar images are virtual but are still identifiable 
in the visualisation process). Because each retina is responsive only to a two-
dimensional array of light, ambiguities are acknowledged to permeate depth 
perception. Gregory (1970 p25) refers to the ‘infinity of possible three-dimensional 
shapes’ and Hoffman (1998 p13) describes as the fundamental problem of vision the 
fact that ‘the image at the eye has countless possible interpretations.’ In some ways, 
therefore, how observers interpret a picture is analogous to how the retinal image 
itself is interpreted.7 While vision may be supplemented by background knowledge 
and by the evidence of other senses, it is essentially a pictorial mechanism in the 
sense that the eye is a visual device only and one which itself deals with two-
dimensional projections, not three-dimensional information. To stimulate this device 
using planar media in order to suggest the appearance of some scene, a process of 
picture-making is required: there is no escaping the need to map the three-
dimensional world to a surface. 
3 Depth perception and depiction
Some aspects of depth perception are as fundamental and irresistible as gestalt 
principles, and indeed one gestalt principle is itself concerned with depth perception: 
relative size is shown to promote the differentiation of figure and ground.8 Colour 
and tone, focus and other factors, can all provoke a sense of depth in the absence of 
ostensive depiction. Mondrian, having eliminated subject matter from his paintings 
but having elected to use the psychological primaries red, yellow and blue, found 
that he could not get his paintings to look as flat as he wished,9  and began to enclose 
the panes of colour in a black grid in order to reassert the sense of flatness (Oxenaar 
1982 p75-6). Depth insisted on appearing even in such highly abstract subject matter.
  a         b
Figure 3.02. Taken from Healey 1999
In a, shapes are combined to represent three-dimensional solids; in b similar shapes are combined to confound any 
depth impression. Within a pre-attentive timescale (less than 200 to 250msec) the zone of difference can be detected in 
a, while in b it cannot.
7 I discuss later whether the curvature of the retinae is significant.
8 As always, conflicting factors can undermine this principle.
9 The inherently spatial properties of colour are discussed later in the chapter.
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Enns and Rensink (1990 cited in Healey 1999) seem to have shown that three-
dimensionality can enable even pre-attentive perception of differences in a scene 
(Figure 3.02a-b). This also suggests that depth-awareness operates at a very low level, 
before mental processing has had time to recognise the shapes as depictions of cubes. 
It is hardly possible to make pictures without suggesting depth, at least of the figure-
ground type. The difficulty is aggravated by prior knowledge in that, as soon as 
something in a picture is recognised, the viewer tends to impose on it a depth 
awareness which has been learned from the experience of similar objects in the real 
world and of other pictures. Perception of depth is thus in part informed by world 
knowledge. For example the perception that a line of telegraph poles recedes may be 
assisted by the assumption that such poles are normally of uniform height.10 
However, many pictures have been made which suppress or minimise particular 
depth effects, and such images form part of the discussion of the relation between 
depth cues and picturing below. I will argue that selectivity over the depth cues 
employed is a vital aspect of expressivity.
Depth perception is often attributed primarily to binocular vision, and it is certainly 
worth considering that the overlap of the visual fields of the two eyes necessary to 
stereopsis has been achieved at the price of losing the panoramic vision possessed by 
animals with side-facing eyes. The work of JJ Gibson (1950, 1979) is important in 
emphasising the range of stimuli evoking spatial perception which are not dependent 
on binocular vision – and which are therefore available for use in single planar 
images. In fact, of Gibson’s 13 stimuli (or quasi-stimuli: he calls five of them probable 
signs) only 2 require binocular vision. This is not to deny that for a complete spatial 
experience binocular stimuli are necessary, but does help to indicate the range of 
other stimuli which can be used in monocular artefacts. It also may help to explain 
why we are generally satisfied with the monocular spatiality of images such as 
photographs and films. Similarly, though movement of objects or scenes relative to 
the observer is of fundamental importance to depth perception in natural vision, only 
two of Gibson’s cues are directly dependent on it. 
There is an obvious irony in applying Gibson’s pictureless taxonomy to pictorial 
images. However, Gibson’s work serves three purposes here: (1) it provides a 
vocabulary of terms useful in subsequent discussion; (2) it has the standard 
taxonomic advantages of identifying individual issues and disentangling them from 
generalised approaches and (3) it highlights the similarities and differences between 
looking at pictures and the perception of the natural world. This last is a particular 
reason for choosing Gibson’s approach rather than any other, since he explicitly sets 
out to systematise our understanding of the perception of the world without 
resorting to pictorial concepts.
10 Another possible determinant is the principle of minimal assumption, in that a set of similar objects may be assumed 
to be the same height unless there is contrary evidence. Hoffman proposes a set of rules to which he claims vision 
conforms which are mostly variants on this idea of minimal assumption (Hoffman 1998).
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Gibsonian depth cues
Gibson’s ‘varieties of perspective’ classifies postulated cues into groups 
(Gibson 1950 p137-144). 




Group B – perspectives of parallax
4 Binocular perspective (requires binocular vision)
5 Motion perspective (requires scene/observer motion)
Group C – perspectives independent of observer’s motion or position
6 Aerial perspective
7 Perspective of blur
8 Relative upward location in the visual field
Group D – perspectives perceived at contours (edges)
9 Sudden shift of texture density or spacing
10 Shift in amount of double imagery (requires binocular vision)
11 Shift in the rate of motion (requires scene/observer motion)
12 Completeness or continuity of outline
13 Transitions between light and shade
It is immediately apparent that a traditionally important set of cues is missing – 
shading and cast shadows. In fact, Gibson breaks his own classification scheme by 
including graduated shade variation in cue 13, within the group which is supposed to 
be confined to edge phenomena. Shadow perception may belong partly to very early 
stages or very low levels of perception, but Baxandall (1995 p40-1) remarks that 
shadow perception ‘might well be considered as a systematic activity [ie. not at 
stimulus level] in the sense that any one shadow needs to be established within a 
larger pattern to signify with any force: a solitary, uncoordinated, uncaused shadow 
may be just a dark patch.’ Shadow is an aspect of depth perception which has 
historically been extensively studied by artists with the specific intention of 
constructing spatial illusions. Because of this, I have introduced a fuller discussion 
than Gibson would have approved under his final category.
Nearly all of the examples described here are paintings, for the simple reason that 
taken together they represent a far wider range of approaches to depth depiction than 
any other medium. Media with a more limited gamut of effects such as ink drawings 
are unable to exploit depth cues such as colour. Photographs on the other hand tend 
to be unable to omit or suppress size and linear perspectives. A ‘hand-made’ medium 
such as painting offers more examples of selectivity and pragmatic decision-making 
than the general run of algorithmic images. Nevertheless it is impossible in most 
cases to offer a pictorial image which corresponds to one Gibsonian cue and to that 
alone; for this discussion images have been chosen which use a subset of the full 
range of cues, perhaps prioritising one.
Texture perspective
There is a gradual increase in the density of texture of a surface as it recedes into the 
distance.
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Figure 3.03. 
Van Gogh : The Café Terrace on the Place du Forum at Night, 
September 1888
From Uhde, Wilhelm 1972 Van Gogh, Encyclopaedia Britannica, 
London, Plate 23.
Van Gogh regularly used texture perspective. In some of his drawings it is an 
indispensable cue (Figure 3.04.). In Figure 3.03, geometric perspectival construction 
(Gibson No.3) is also present, but its effects are reduced for example by the way in 
which the strong slope of the orthogonal of the blue shop front is similar to that of the 
transverse canopy. The texture of the cobbles therefore plays a significant part in 
constructing the space. Similarly in the drawing the convergent lines of field edges 
are made less decisive by the odd angles of other field boundaries so that more of the 
work has to be done by texture.
Figure 3.04. 
Van Gogh: The Plain of La 
Crau 1888.
From Uhde, Wilhelm 1936 The 
Life and Work of Van Gogh, 
Phaidon, Vienna, Plate 29.
As with many of the Gibsonian cues, the presence of differential textures is not in 
itself diagnostic: an alternative explanation for an apparent change in texture may be 
that the texture-giving components are themselves variable. The default assumption 
is likely to be of uniform texture, however. 
Texture has been one of the more recent preoccupations of the computer graphics 
industries. Generally it seems that the recent growth in the use of texturing has been 
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particularly with mimesis in mind: little work has been done on the use of textures in 
more abstract environments. Popular mainstream artefacts include entirely synthetic 
films such as Toy Story (1995) and Toy Story 2 (1999), where considerable time and 
expertise is invested in making detail ‘bumpier and dirtier’ with the specific aim that 
it should not ‘look like it was made on a computer’ (Toy Story 2000 p29). But, 




Paul Nash: We are Making a New World, 1918.
From Leeds City Art Galleries, 1988 100 Years of Art 
in Britain – an exhibition to celebrate the centenary of 
Leeds City Art Gallery, p34
For a set of similar objects, decrease in size will be interpreted as greater distance.11  
Factors at work in Figure 3.05. include discontinuities of contour in the occlusion of 
the profiles of the earth ridges by trees (Gibson No.12) and, to a small extent, changes 
in tonal contrast (No. 6 aerial perspective), but a key mode of depth articulation is 
relative size. In the central band of the picture, unusually little contribution is made 
by relative upward location in the visual field, since the full height of the distant tree 
stumps is seen between the nearer ones: scale dominates here. 
There seems to be some evidence from vision studies of subjective perception of 
distant objects such that they appear larger to the observer than they should if 
considered purely optically. This may begin to suggest that there is some divergence 
between truth to the optical fact (as defined for example by measuring the size of 
objects as cast on the retina) and truth to perception more subjectively conceived. 
Such issues arise often in this chapter and inform much of the ensuing discussion of 
realism.
In a counter-example (Figure 3.06), the principal determinant of size is not distance 
but social position and dramatic importance. King Herod is apparently at the back of 
the scene, according to the interruption of contours and height in the image field, but 
is larger than the figures who are apparently nearer. Such anti-perspectival scaling is 
of course common today in diagrammatic graphics where visual mimesis is not an 
overriding concern. This image is certainly not devoid of spatial depth, which has 
11 Texture and size perspectives might be considered as the same thing. Gibson (1950) distinguishes them on the 
grounds of how they are captured in perception, while Marr (1982 p233-9) and Gregory (1998 p190-1) are more wary 
of this distinction. 
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Figure 3.06. 
Stained glass window, The Massacre of the Innocents, St 
Peter Mancroft Church, Norwich, UK , 15th Century. 
From Lee, Lawrence; Seddon, George and Stephens, 
Francis 1982 Stained Glass Mitchell Beazley, UK, p26. 
been used effectively to condense a large amount of incident into a small space. This 
condensing of the image also facilitates rhetorical juxtaposition (such as the sword-
pierced baby between the heads of Herod and a horrified parent).
Figure 3.07. 
Crivelli: The Annunciation with Saint 
Emidius, 1486. 
From Cole 1992 p23
Media Space 3 Depth perception and depiction  |  Stephen Boyd Davis  |  June 2002 29
A number of other depth cues are notable by their absence, including atmospheric 
and textural transitions (Gibson Nos. 6, 1, 9). What linear perspective (No.3) there is 
undermines the depth-wise spatial coherence of the whole, since the orthogonal of 
the bed points away out of the picture rather than into it. However, in two-
dimensional terms it helps to frame the scene.
Even when there is an apparently rigorous application of the rules of geometric 
perspective, all is not necessarily what it seems. Hart and Robson (1999) have 
‘reverse-engineered’ a computer model of the buildings and figures depicted in The 
Annunciation with Saint Emidius (Figure 3.07) and shown many deliberate deviations 
from size perspective, in the interests, in their view, of reconciling depth with 
intimacy. The range of reasons for such ‘subversion’ of ‘correct’ perspective are 
discussed later.
Linear perspective
In picture-making there are many varieties of linear perspective or projection 
systems, whereas in the study of vision, including in Gibson, there is usually only 
one, that of convergent linear perspective. This suggests that the convergent 
representation is correct, since it is based on vision, and that others are wrong or 
imperfect. The major issues raised by such a supposition are discussed in the next 
chapter; here I offer examples of various kinds of apparent rule-breaking in the 
making of pictures, and show the range of motives which these practices might serve.
Non-convergent systems include the orthographic, axonometric, and isometric (all 
varieties of parallel projection). In the isometric all lines are drawn to scale, rather 
than decreasing in size with distance, the cardinal horizontals are inclined at 30°, and 
all planes are equally distorted. Approximations to such views have been used in 
Roman, Byzantine, Persian and Chinese paintings and extensively in Japanese 
woodcuts (Dubery and Willats 1983 p38-9). In axonometric projection horizontal 
surfaces are drawn in rotated plan view, and the necessary verticals and horizontals 
are then appended to them (op cit p28-9). This projection has attracted architects 
throughout the twentieth century, because of its ability to combine an undistorted 
plan with an evocation of the character of the interrelated spaces.
Figure 3.08. 
Uccello: The Battle of San 
Romano (c1450s). 
From Cole 1992 p16-17
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Since the Renaissance, when the rules of perspective construction in painting were 
developed and codified by Alberti, Viator and Dürer and others (Ivins (1975) 1938), 
linear perspective has become so identified with the depiction of depth that it is often 
used as a synonym for it, though Gibson draws attention to the fact that it is only one 
cue among several. He also points out that its full effectiveness is contingent on the 
choice of subject matter. In the example illustrated (Figure 3.08.) Uccello has 
engineered the positioning of the armaments on the ground to create an improbable 
number of orthogonals. This is a particularly obvious example of a picture-maker 
contriving a relationship between subject matter, viewpoint and perspective cues, but 
this threefold synthesis later becomes more subtle and effective as the use of 
convergent linear perspective develops into a mature spatial practice. In Uccello’s 
time perspective was still an ‘added feature’ rather as it might be in a computer game 
today. Considerable aura was attached to Uccello’s technological prowess in its own 
right. Elkins suggests that, for most Renaissance artists, perspective was in paintings – 
rather than paintings being in perspective. Up to and beyond the time of Vasari, 
perspective treatises enumerated the perspectival parts of pictures such that a good 
painting could be ‘full of perspectives’ (Vasari quoted by Elkins 1994 p55). 
The Uccello painting shows the use of two combined projections: the landscape 
background does not conform to the same perspective as the foreground. Solso (1994 
p160) suggests that it was a lack of competence that led Uccello to use two different 
perspectives, but given what is known of Uccello’s general mastery of perspectival 
construction this is hardly likely. The more probable explanation is that he wanted to 
construct a relatively flat background in order to afford two ‘incompatible’ views 
within one picture, so that the distant scene is viewed optimally and so is the near 
one. I will show in the chapter on Film that this contriving of optimal viewpoints 
becomes a decisive influence on the construction and use of space in film. The flatness 
of the backdrop also serves to bring the viewer’s attention back to the main subject of 
the painting, avoiding the ‘hole in the wall’ effect which a powerful perspective 
recession would have produced. Such combined motives are probably more common 
than the pure case of a particular spatial device being selected for a single reason.
Figure 3.09.
Active Worlds: Scene in Active Worlds 2.2. 
© 1995-2000 Activeworlds.com, Inc.  
In case such perspectival hybrids seem to be a thing of the past, it is worth noting 
how a simple VR browser like Active Worlds uses two projection systems in a rather 
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similar way (Figure 3.09). The distant landscape scene is a 2-D picture mapped to a 
vertical cylindrical surface. It is always at the same distance however closely the user 
tries to approach it. The near environment in which the user moves employs a 
conventional 3-point perspective projection of real 3-D data.
A pictorial map of the Piccadilly Line of the London Underground (not illustrated) 
makes an interesting contrast with the Uccello painting. Though a fanciful rendition, 
it conforms to a single unified perspective. The railway is viewed from the western 
central area of London looking east: under these circumstances the rules of 
convergent perspective have a somewhat similar effect to the non-linear scaling of the 
Beck map (Garland 1994), enlarging Central London distances and diminishing those 
in the distant outer region. However, the continuous nature of such a unified 
perspective means that the most distant stations are entirely lost in the horizon. Only 
by some degree of ‘flattening’ of the more distant terrain, as in the Uccello, could 
these distant regions have been adequately depicted.12 
Figure 3.10.
De Chirico: The Delights of the Poet, 1913. 
From Rubin, William 1982 De Chirico Museum of 
Modern Art, New York, p144
Once the ‘rules’ of linear perspective have been widely acknowledged, they can be 
subverted. The De Chirico painting (Figure 3.10.) relies on the viewer’s prior 
knowledge, not only of the world (for example in assuming that the basin is 
rectangular and that it is parallel to the buildings of the square) but also of picture-
making, in order to disconcert. A recent virtual environment project has attempted to 
build a virtual city ‘based on locations seen in de Chirico’s works, in which a user can 
freely navigate, simulating the experience of actually walking round the places 
imagined by the artist’ (Druks 1995 p113). Druks hopes that ‘a faithful rendition 
could allow the user full access to the world the artist could only metaphorically 
imply access to.’ He seems oblivious to the parodic nature of de Chirico’s imagery, 
which relies on the abuse of standard perspectival conventions to offer the user a 
difficult choice: either this is a straightforward depiction of an unconventional world, 
or it is a distorted vision of conventional reality (or it is a mixture of both). Either 
way, it is self-consciously about painting, amongst other things: the digital project 
shows a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of picture-making.
12 Tufte (1990 p12-3) shows an unusual Japanese solution to this problem in which a pictorial map gives way at one edge 
to a highly compressed schematic one, so that not only the ‘perspective’ but the mode of representation changes 
abruptly.
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This painting makes an interesting contrast with the Renaissance images which it 
parodies, particularly in the way that the viewer is invited to consider what is to left 
and right of the scene shown. The prototypes of this image were built on centrality, 
even to the extent – in early examples – of using only a central vanishing point, but 
here the odd angle at the foot of the arcade to the left invites the viewer to imagine 
looking to that side, while the enormous shadow cast by something which is invisible 
to the right acts as a similar unresolvable invitation. The invitation and the 
impossibility of its resolution illustrate the way in which authorial prohibition may be 
a vital element of pictorial expressivity, prefiguring the discussion of such techniques 
in film. 
Figure 3.11
Suzuki Harunobu: Woman with a fan at the 
garden fence, 1766-70 
An example of the non-application of linear perspective is this Japanese print (Figure 
3.11.). Not only do parallel lines in the scene not converge in the image, but the whole 
articulation of the space is at odds with the western tradition. This is another example 
of the synthesis of a linear projection system with a particular viewpoint. The 
orientation of the subject matter together with the parallel projection scheme 
constitute what in Western draughtsmanship would be called an isometric view. Far 
from receding into a vortex-like central vanishing point, the scenery seems to rush 
out of the sides of the picture. The surface is simultaneously flat and deep in 
interesting ways. One effect of the meeting of the two oblique planes behind the 
figure is that the woman seems to be pushed forward, nearer to the picture plane 
than the position of her feet would suggest. The depths in the space are not so much 
an imitation of depths in the world, but a making of depth in the picture’s own terms. 
This is, in Gombrich’s phrase, ‘the dominance of making over matching’ (Gombrich 
1977 p248) which recurs throughout this thesis.
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Again considering the Gibsonian cues as a palette of possible effects, it is clear that 
some are used very strongly in this image, while others are omitted. One can see 
where the myth of the flatness of Japanese art comes from: there is no modelling with 
light and shade within surfaces. In addition, texture perspective and size perspective 
are absent. There is only a minimal suggestion of aerial perspective since the local 
colour of objects is used. However this local colour is assigned to parts of the scene in 
such a way that the nearer parts are warmer in colour than the further: again, this is 
as much a tactic to make depth as to depict it. 
Figure 3.12. 
Klee: Figure 44: Once more the Vertical. 
From Klee 1925/1968 p41 
In relation to the house-front depicted in his Pedagogical Sketchbook (Figure 3.12) 
Klee asks:
Why is Fig 44 as representation of a house wall incorrect? It isn’t wrong logically. The 
lower window openings are closer to the eye than the upper ones, which means they 
are larger perspectively. As representation of a floor pattern, this perspective 
rendering could be easily accepted. This picture therefore is not incorrect logically, 
but psychologically. Because every creature, in order to preserve his balance, insists 
on seeing actual verticals projected as such.13 
Klee 1968 (1925) p41
Similarly Gregory (1977 p174) suggests that ‘aiming a camera upwards, to take in a 
tall building, gives the impression of the building falling backwards. And yet this is 
true perspective.’ For Gombrich, writing in 1980, such upward views onto buildings 
are accepted ‘without demur’ whereas he admits to finding the downward equivalent 
(Figure 3.13) ‘a trifle less easy to accept’ (Gombrich 1980 p187). 
Figure 3.13.
Rockefeller Centre from top of Time-Life Building, from Andreas 
Feininger’s The Face of New York (New York 1954). Photograph. 
From Gombrich 1980 p189.
13 The difficulty of this particular image is probably aggravated by the need for the viewing station to be below ground 
level to yield such a view. However, this is not the whole explanation, as Gregory’s and Gombrich’s examples make 
clear.
Media Space 3 Depth perception and depiction  |  Stephen Boyd Davis  |  June 2002 34
The three comments provide an insight into the continuing development of pictorial 
conventions. What was unacceptable in 1925 or even in 1977 is probably widely 
regarded as natural now. Unlike Klee and Gregory, Gombrich is aware that this is 
symptomatic of changing attitudes to the ‘correct’ brought about by exposure to new 
kinds of images. Snyder (1980 p232-4) argues that the design of photographic 
apparatus was guided in the early decades by the example of painting, specifically 
with a view to eliminating ‘distortion,’ but it seems that now the photograph is the 
arbiter of the real. We have become so accustomed to the convergent perspective of 
photographs taken looking up or down rectilinear structures that our perception of 
what is normal has been modified. 
The lack of logical consistency in the former convention is certainly remarkable: 
verticals in a scene are to be made verticals in the corresponding picture on the 
grounds that that are they are known to be vertical in real life, but the same does not 
apply to horizontals, where the whole point of linear perspective is to ensure that 
horizontals are aligned in accordance with the optical image, not in accordance with 
what is known. This conditional visual ‘realism’ is the one to which many kinds of 
pictures conformed from the Renaissance until recently. Though subsequent 
developments have made Klee’s view seem rather archaic, his distinction between the 
logically and psychologically correct is still a vital one to which I return later.
Binocular perspective 
The separation of the two eyes means that each receives a different image. Binocular 
disparity is much more apparent at close range (5m or less) than for distance viewing, 
since it decreases in proportion to the square of the distance (Bruce, Green and 
Georgeson 1996 p140).
Mainstream perspectival painting is notoriously monocular. Brunelleschi’s 
demonstration14 is based on viewing with a single eye, and the history of painting and 
photography has continued in this vein with rare exceptions. Only by using two 
images and making each available to only one eye, can the effect of binocular 
perspective be simulated. The technique has been applied to photography, film, 
drawings and schematics such as stereograms, and is the basis of most VR systems.
Figure 3.14. 
Stereoscopic drawing for viewing through a red and 
green pair of gels (detail). 
From The 3-D Book of Dinosaurs Orbis Publishing 1998 
p241
14 In 1425 Brunelleschi made a picture (now lost) of the Florence Baptistery which was allegedly remarkable for its 
match to the actual scene. Issues raised by this are discussed in the next chapter.
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The heyday of stereoscopy in still pictures belongs to the 1850s. In 1833 Wheatstone 
proposed that the mental fusion of the images from the two eyes was the cause of 
spatial perception (Gautrand 1998b) and created the stereoscope to demonstrate that 
this was so. Wheatstone’s device used drawn graphics, but Brewster combined 
Wheatstone’s invention with photography in 1844 (ibid). A pair of photographs could 
be made with two adjacent camera lenses to record a stereoscopic view. By the mid 
1850s, one version of the stereoscope had sold more than a million in England alone, 
and in 1851 one was exhibited in the Great Exhibition, where it was patronised by 
Albert and Victoria. By the end of the decade the ambition of the London Stereoscope 
Company – ‘no home without a stereoscope’ – was almost fulfilled (Macdonald 1979 
p50). Various exotica were available, ghost pictures, moral tableaux, freaks and 
oddities, and pornography (Figure 3.15). 




From McCauley, Elizabeth Anne 
1994 Industrial Madness: commercial 
photography in Paris 1848-1871, Yale 
University Press, New Haven p179
In general the motivation for using stereographic images seems to have been affective 
rather than informational. In both Figures 3.14 and 3.15 it is the ‘sense of the real,’ or 
the suppression of the unreal, which is the principal objective. In terms of the 
informational expressiveness of static pictures, there is remarkably little more value 
in a binocular view than can be got from the corresponding monocular picture, but 
what is gained is a sense of co-presence. In the case of both these figures it is easy to 
see why this is an important objective.
Only relatively recently have other applications emerged in which binocularity is 
combined with motion, such as the use of virtual environments for aeroplane or oil-
rig simulators, distance surgery and architectural visualisation. Here the information 
function is greater, though it is probably still the case that most of the informational 
benefits come from motion rather than stereopsis. 
Thwaites (Thwaites 1999 p222) traces ‘our 1990s fascination with creating the third 
dimension in two-dimensional space’ from the prehistory of painting, via early 
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stereoscopes, to virtual reality, but this seems to imply a continuum from the 
Victorian stereoscope to stereoscopic virtual environments which is not borne out by 
the facts. After the third quarter of the nineteenth century the stereograph was 
relegated to the status of a child’s toy. Its ability to present the third dimension seems 
somehow to have become superfluous. What might have led to this demise, while 
straightforward photography continued to increase? The great attraction of 
photography lies in its verisimilitude, yet stereopsis becomes neglected. Stereoscopes 
were available quite cheaply, and many were originally bought. Perhaps a means of 
communication which required a mechanical device for viewing could not be 
assimilated into normal life; but the gramophone and the television, both dependent 
on physical machinery, were adopted on a continuing basis. A deduction from this 
decay of the third dimension might be that there is not one realism but several, that 
each has its own concomitant spatialities, and that the different realisms serve 
different objectives. Certainly it seems that the realism generally expected of 
photography is selective and is not expected to amount to full mimicry of the spatial 
perception of the natural world.15 This suggests that there are kinds of realism quite as 
much as degrees of realism and that for different objectives, technologies and contexts 
varying kinds of realism are taken to be ‘realistic’ in a rather general, undefined but 
clearly contingent way. These suggestions are pursued in the next chapter. 
Motion perspective
There is apparently little to be said about motion perspective when discussing static 
planar images, except perhaps to clarify the nature of the movement to which Gibson 
was referring. However, the aspect of time in relation to static images turns out to be 
of fundamental importance and is discussed later. Aspects of motion perspective are 
also pursued in the chapter on Film. 
The two kinds of movement to be distinguished are:
   • saccadic movement of the eye which makes it able to gather optical information: as 
the visual system apprehends a scene, the eye is only stationary for brief moments, so 
that a completely stationary eye is effectively blind. Perception is not well 
conceptualised as the aggregation of a series of static moments. ‘Space cannot be 
apprehended except in time [...] The process of perception cannot rest on the image of 
a single fixation such as yields a momentary visual field. To see more than this takes 
time, and requires a succession of visual images. The product of these successive 
impressions, however, is such that, paradoxically, all awareness of the succession has 
been lost’ (Gibson 1950 p157). This is one of the key ways in which vision and 
pictures are now acknowledged to be dissimilar. This kind of motion is the only one 
necessary for the depth cues enumerated so far, and for most of those still to come. 
   • relative movement between the observer and the scene. This is the basis of motion 
perspective. One of Gibson’s innovations was the concept of the ‘optic flow’ which 
yields substantial information about movement or stasis within a spatial 
environment, direction of movement, orientation of movement, and changes to any of 
these (Gibson 1979 p227-229). Such motion perception has ecological advantages. 
15 ‘3-D’ moving images have also been notable for their failure to achieve more than short term interest among 
audiences, despite continuous technical development since around 1900 (Katz 1994)
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Lansdown points out that ‘it is often more important to detect immediately that 
something has moved rather than to know straight away what that something is (or 
even in which precise direction it has moved)’ (Boyd Davis, Lansdown, and Huxor 
1997 p21). Similarly Gombrich notes that to know in crossing a road where every car 
is, but not its direction or speed, would mean the observer did not survive long 
(Gombrich 1973 p228).
While motion is an important part of the impression of depth in the real world, it 
seems that it should be the enemy of linear perspective in pictures, since for such 
perspective to be optically correct the viewer must look with a single eye and from a 
single optimal fixed point.16 If the viewer moves, the illusion breaks. However, 
movement in relation to a picture, and the adoption of non-optimal viewing stations, 
is surprisingly unperturbing. Even at the height of the Renaissance it seem that there 
was a rather surprising tolerance of such dangers. Work using computer models by 
Hart and Day (1995) has demonstrated that there was no optimal viewing seat in the 
famous perspectival theatre of Sebastiano Serlio – this position was occupied by a 
staircase. Viewing positions which are sub-optimal and subject to change through 
motion are familiar in everyday experience from looking at pictures in books, on 
advertising hoardings or when watching television – indeed in most picture-viewing.
       
a                               b
Figure 3.16a-b. 
Subject are asked to choose from b the shape they had been shown in drawing a. They generally pick a trapezoid 
more square than the correct one.
From Deregowski 1984 p77-8.
Deregowski (1984 p76-8) reports that when given a drawing such as Figure 3.16a and 
asked to pick the corresponding shape from Figure 3.16b, subjects generally pick a 
trapezoid more square than the correct one, as though they were mentally 
normalising the distortion towards a more full-face view under the influence of the 
fact that the box in a is meant to be seen as viewed obliquely. Gombrich (1973 p230-1) 
offers a related example, emphasising that it is the internal relationships within a 
picture as much as their relation to the viewer’s position which construct a space: the 
road receding into a landscape still recedes, even when the picture is viewed from the 
‘wrong’ position. 
Together these observations suggest that it is not objective optical correctness which 
is significant for the viewer, since any image whose geometry diverged from the 
optically correct would presumably fail to make coherent spatial sense, but this is 
clearly not the case. It seems that viewers can effectively compensate for non-optimal 
16 The questions about vision and pictures which this concept of ‘optical correctness’ raises are dealt with in full in the 
next chapter.
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viewing positions and see the depicted scene as though it were viewed under better 
conditions. 
Aerial perspective
Gibson asserts that aerial perspective belongs to a family of cues which is 
independent of both the position and motion of the observer. In fact, as I note below, 
this is not strictly true, but for the purposes of picture-making Gibson’s assumption 
has generally been followed.
According to Gibson (1950 p141) with increasing distance ‘there is an increase in 
haziness, blueness and desaturation of colours.’ Dunning (1991 p43-54), approaching 
the issue from the point of view of painting, prefers to split this category into two: 
atmospheric perspective (dependent on tonal value) and colour perspective 
(dependent on hue). The distinction goes back at least as far as Leonardo. Dunning 
considers atmospheric perspective to have been ‘the most effective method of 
creating an illusion of depth for at least the last five hundred years,’ appearing as it 
does in Ottoman, Renaissance, Impressionist and modern works. He remarks that it 
may have had a wider appeal as a technique because, in his opinion, it does not 
violate the flatness of the picture plane to the extent that linear methods do; this is a 
reminder that the ‘destruction’ of the picture plane is not universally considered an 
objective of picture-making, that a picture is often meant to be seen as a substantive 
object not simply as a means of viewing a depicted world.  
Dunning also offers the observation that, unlike linear perspective, atmospheric 
perspective can be subjected to great exaggeration – often without the viewer 
noticing. The viewer will perceive the depth, but not the method. This suggests a use 
of spatial cues in order to construct a space, rather than to depict it. A cue which 
‘works’ is used in a way unwarranted by perception of actual scenes and, provided 
the impression of the natural is maintained, the illicit encoding remains unnoticed.17 
This is a typical spatial usage which reveals a lot about the artifice of picture-making 
and how – for some kinds of image at least – that artifice must be unobserved by the 
viewer. 
Cutting across Gibsonian categories 6 and 7 (see next), Dunning conflates with the 
tonal effect of atmosphere its effect on sharpness and on apparent volume. He 
proposes that recessive features are: areas with weak contrast (especially contrast 
with the background); loss of detail and definition of edges; and flatness (lack of 
modelling). Salience on the other hand is promoted by objects having strong 
contrasts, sharp edges and detail, and a sense of volume. 
Heidrich et al. (1999 p130) point out that in a geometric perspective representation, 
even aerial perspective is, strictly speaking, subject to geometry. While simple ‘fog’ 
systems in computer graphics use the z-coordinate (the world-distance of objects 
17 It should be noted that photography cannot be a yardstick of realism in aerial effects since the lenses, filters, film stock 
and printing paper all significantly affect the degree of atmospheric perspective in the finished photograph. Such 
variables are discussed in the chapters on Screen space.
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from the picture plane, not their distance from the eye) as the input to the fog-density 
function, these underestimate the distance and therefore the amount of fog for points 
on the periphery of the image. Ironically, such sophisticated renderings of 
atmosphere bring us back to the compulsory central viewing station of geometric 









Calculation of atmospheric attenuation as a function 
of distance. In a, using z-depths, the visibility of the 
objects at distances p and r will be equal. In b, using 
eye-to-object distances, the object at distance p will be 
less obscured than that at distance r. 
Based on Heidrich et al 1999.
a                        b
Figure 3.18
Watteau: The Island of Cythera, 1709 (detail). 
From Posner, Donald 1984 Antoine Watteau 
Weidenfeld and Nicholson, London, p86
Like atmospheric perspective, colour perspective can be usefully exaggerated. 
Dunning suggests (1991 p47) that this helps compensate for the lack of binocular 
vision and movement parallax. This depth phenomenon has a number of causes: 
increasing blueness with distance caused by greater scattering of blue light than red; 
decreasing saturation of colour caused by the intervention of atmospheric particles 
and moisture; and chromatic aberration, the physiological tendency for the eye to 
focus on red as though it were near and on blue as though it were farther away 
causing the visual system to misinterpret difference of hue as that of distance (op cit 
p52). 
In the Hiroshige print (Figure 3.19) both atmospheric and colour perspective are used 
to the full. Strong recession of the distant riverbank is provided by weakening of 
contrast with the background, loss of detail and lack of modelling. In addition to the 
spatial dynamics within the scene, a spatial effect is also provided by the strong red 
of the overlaid text panels. Atmospheric and colour perspective do the work which is 
not done by linear perspective. 
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Figure 3.19 
Hiroshige: Shower at O-Hashi Bridge, 1857. 
From a book on Japanese prints (in Japanese, title unknown), 
Kodansha 1970, plate 134
Figure 3.20
Apple Computer: Windows of the Macintosh 
‘desktop’. 
© Apple Computer Inc. 1983-1999.
Screengrab, March 2001.
Figure 3.20 shows a crude example of ‘aerial perspective’, in which the foremost 
window of the Macintosh graphical user interface has higher contrast and saturation 
than the more distant windows. This may be an accidental outcome of employing 
weaker tones and colours to represent objects which are currently unavailable, but 
has a distinct depth-spatial result, albeit one with only two states: ‘nearest’ and ‘all 
other distances’. The objects within the windows are unaffected by the algorithm.
Dunning points out (op cit p52-3) that tonal value and figure-ground considerations 
have allowed artists to break the colour perspective ‘rule’ of foreground red with 
background blue in the past, for example using cyan as the foreground colour. To a 
certain extent the mere contrast of hues is enough to achieve the effect.
Perspective of blur
I noted that blur can be seen as one aspect of atmospheric perspective. However that 
phenomenon, the loss of definition with distance, is independent of the physiology of 
the eye, whereas Gibson’s perspective of blur is the decreasing sharpness of the 
retinal image before and behind the plane of focus. The relationship of picture-
making to this phenomenon will give clues to the relationship between space, time 
and realism.
The old view that the entire visual field is in focus at once is now modified in two 
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ways. First, the eyeball itself is known to change shape under muscular control in 
order to alter focussing distance (accommodation). Secondly, it is known that only 
that portion of the scene which is opposite the fovea is clearly resolved, and that it is 
through saccadic movements that this part of the eye is directed at different parts of 
the scene. So both in depth and across the scene, it is impossible for all parts of the 
scene to be equally resolved. However, by the nature of the eye’s operation, that 
which is being attended to is generally in focus, and since we are not generally 
conscious of the eye’s altering focus (and never of the saccadic movements) it could 
be argued that a representation which is in focus across its whole surface is true to 
our experience, and the history of painting is dominated by images which are entirely 
focussed both in depth and breadth. The experience represented is not that of an 
instant but is a summation of a period of observation. 
We have therefore two equally valid claims to spatial realism. If differential focus is 
used in a picture, what will be the result? Will it be taken as true to reality or as a 
kind of ‘encoding’ which obtrudes into the relation between the scene and the 
viewer? The answer will be partly dependent on whether or not it is sufficiently 
marked to be noticed, but more importantly it depends on the culture of images to 
which the viewer is accustomed. As with the convergent verticals remarked on by 
Klee and Gregory, the perception of realism – of naturalness – will depend on how 
the viewer expects pictures to be.
Painters have represented differential focus with varied objectives. It seems certain 
that Rembrandt’s self-portraits owe a part of their feeling of presence to his depiction 
of the differential focus of the planes in viewing the face, so that the eyes, the 
hypnotic subject for any painter observing his own face in a mirror, are in sharp 
focus, while the tip of the nose and the distant parts of the head are relatively 
defocussed. In this case what is being evoked is the visual subjectivity of concentrated 
study.
Figure 3.21. 
Chardin: A lady taking tea (detail), 1735. 
From Baxandall 1985 (cover picture)
Baxandall (1985 p80) claims that Chardin (Figure 3.21) uses selective sharpening and 
softening of edges in his paintings, in order to imitate the effect of the eye taking 
certain trajectories across the scene. The painter hopes to lead the viewer’s eye 
through the painted image by increasing the sharpness of certain edges and points on 
a particular trajectory. Certainly Chardin makes frequent use of differential focus to 
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emphasise the central area of his works at the expense of a less well-resolved 
periphery. The paintings begin to represent the process of seeing, though themselves 
static.
Even within the rather tightly constrained practices of lens-based photography, the 
originator has the the freedom to exaggerate or to suppress blur. By choosing a wide 
lens aperture, the depth of field can be compressed, especially for near subjects; 
conversely a small aperture (given sufficient light or exposure-time) allows the depth 
of field to be greatly increased. The use of deep focus has the obvious informational 
advantage that it allows optimal clarity in all parts of the image regardless of 
distance.
In cinematography (and its synthetic equivalents in computer graphics) the depth of 
field can be altered dynamically, and the location of the focal plane can also be altered 
over time. There it has strong narrative potential, and helps indicate the important 
differences between author-controlled and user-controlled moving imagery (see the 
chapter on Film). 
Relative upward location in the visual field
In everyday experience, one looks down at things that are near, and up at things that 
are far away. Experiments recounted by Gregory (1977 p204-211) showed that this 
effect tends to reassert itself even when artificial inversion of vision is imposed on 
subjects using mirrors or prisms.
Figure 3.22 Van Eyck: The Ghent Polyptych, 
c.1432 (detail). 
From Faggin, Giorgio T 1986 The Complete 
Paintings of the Van Eycks Penguin Books, 
Harmondsworth UK, plate XXV
A striking example of elevation-as-distance (together with size, Gibson No.2) is 
provided by this panel (Figure 3.22) from a Van Eyck polyptych. Again the omission 
of some perspective cues is notable. Most obviously absent are any cues of 
diminishing tonal contrast, hue, saturation or detail, so that its spatiality represents a 
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compromise between the demands of geometric perspective and more schematic 
models like that of the stained glass Massacre (discussed above): in modern terms it 
might be said to be both a ‘diagram’ and a ‘picture’, since it affords viewing both as a 
planar configuration and as a natural scene.
 
 
Media Space 3 Depth perception and depiction  |  Stephen Boyd Davis  |  June 2002 44
Figure 3.23
Unnamed Chinese painting. 
From Hogben 1949 p192
In these Japanese and Chinese scroll paintings (Figures 
3.23 and 3.24), it is true that the upper reaches represent 
the further parts of the landscape (as we expect in 
Western art) but there are subsidiary depths which the 
viewer is invited to explore. The articulation of this depth 
is done using a variety of techniques, but the main 
principle is very un-Gibsonian: it relies on the 
identification of particular familiar elements. Only 
because we recognise paths, clearings, buildings and 
above all people are we able to begin tracing an often 
obscured route through the space and to identify the 
depths in the landscape. There are however in addition 
some obvious and familiar perspectival devices, 
especially the diminution of modelling, detail, saturation 
and contrast with distance. The Chinese painting uses the 
reversed colour perspective remarked on by Dunning: in 
the upper reaches the foreground is a cold blue-green 
while the mountains behind are a warm brown. In formal 
terms, this tends to counter any dominance by depth 
effects which might ‘break’ the planar qualities of the 
design, allowing it to be appreciated as a surface – as a 
painting –  as well as a depiction of depth.
Figure 3.24
Aoki Mokubei (1767-1833): 
Autumn Landscape
From a book on Japanese 
prints (in Japanese), 
Kodansha 1970, plate 134.
Hogben (1949 p193) uses the Chinese painting in Figure 3.23 to make a classic 
identification of realism with geometric perspective constructions, eliding (and 
favouring) the two, while treating other spatial cues as somehow beneath 
consideration. He remarks in a disparaging tone: ‘The artist aloof from science, like 
the painter of this Chinese picture, is less concerned with objective reality than with 
the portrayal of atmosphere. His picture [...] reveals no incentive to apply the rules of 
perspective.’ Hogben offers a teleological view of (linear) perspective: 
What was essentially new in the fifteenth century was the investigation of the laws of 
perspective and their application; and the investigation itself was the signal of 
renewed interest in experimental optics. In the Greco-Latin murals and vases of 
antiquity, in Gothic art and in painting of the Byzantine tradition, we meet with 
various makeshifts to suggest depth...
Hogben 1949 p186-8 emphasis added
Similarly, Parsaye and Chignell suggest: 
The use of linear perspective to create 3D images was one of the achievements of the 
Renaissance. One can see just how revolutionary the use of perspective was by 
comparing pre- and post-perspective paintings of the same churches in Italy. It is like 
comparing pictures drawn by children and adult artists. In retrospect, one wonders 
how people could have accepted two-dimensional representations of people and 
objects.
Parsaye and Chignell 1993 page 204
The problem here is that both commentators fail to recognise the purposes for which 
the various perspectives can be used or to appreciate the different effects that each 
produces. For example, I noted earlier that one of the difficulties of the powerful 
recession of traditional geometric perspective is the dominance of the centre: it is 
difficult to prevent the viewer’s eye from succumbing to its pull. By contrast, these 
oriental paintings offer what might be termed an ‘exploratory’ form of perspective 
which offers opportunities to ‘feel’ one’s way into the space. They tend towards a 
paced narrative mode, inviting the eye on a relatively slow journey around the space, 
rather than a rush to the horizon. This is not of course to suggest that these paintings 
are in their turn ‘better,’ simply that different spatial constructions afford different 
kinds of viewing. Figure 3.25 makes a very effective use of exactly the deep space 
avoided by the oriental examples, using strong linear perspective. 
Figure 3.25 
A double-page illustration by John Buscema for Epic 1980 
Marvel Comics. 
From Sabin 1996 p154.
It is not suggested that the makers of each work have a conscious rationale for 
selecting particular forms of perspective. Clearly these choices are determined to a 
large extent by the surrounding culture. However in our own time, though never free 
from the limiting effects of our own culture, we are exposed to a huge variety of 
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different spatialities each affording different potentialities, and to a certain extent are 
free to choose the ones which suit the task in hand.
Sudden shift of texture density or spacing
A valley seen over a cliff is perceived as more distant partly because of the rapid 
change in texture frequency as the eye passes over the edge. The suddenness of the 
shift is an indicator of a possible contour and of differential distance at that contour. 
As with other cues, an alternative explanation for the stimulus might also be correct.
Figure 3.26. 
Van Eyck: The madonna with Chancellor Rolin 1435 (detail). 
From Faggin, Giorgio T 1986 The Complete Paintings of the Van 
Eycks Penguin Books, Harmondsworth UK, plate XLIII
In this painting by Van Eyck (Figure 3.26), one might expect to see both atmospheric 
and colour perspective used to differentiate the distance of the scene beyond the 
window from that of the interior. While both kinds of aerial perspective are used in 
this painting, they are reserved for the still more distant hills beyond the city. Within 
the detail reproduced here, the sudden change of texture scale at the contour between 
the near and the far is the most important cue, separating the scene into three planes: 
the figure, the battlements and the landscape. As in the Uccello Battle (with which it is 
roughly contemporary) the distance is spatially articulated as a painting in its own 
right, using a different dominant perspective cue from that of the rest of the painting. 
Yet to the general viewer of the painting, the fact that the depth cues are 
inconsistently applied is probably not noticeable.
Figure 3.27. Van Eyck: The Madonna with Chancellor Rolin 
1435. 
From Faggin, Giorgio T 1986 The Complete Paintings of the Van 
Eycks Penguin Books, 
Harmondsworth UK, plate XLIII
In the painting as a whole (Figure 3.27), convergent linear perspective is used. This 
has the usual result that the background might seem to rush away from the scene, 
creating a ‘hole’ between the two actors in the scene, if they were not strongly tied 
together by the nearer form of the colonnade and if the strong tapestry-like detail of 
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the townscape did not tend to create a limiting ‘backdrop’. In this respect, the 
flattening at the back of the space caused by the selective use of spatial cues helps to 
maintain the unity of the image.
The angel above the Madonna is an ambivalent object scaled on one reading 
according to distance and on another according to importance. As noted previously 
in Van Eyck’s work, he combines some of the schematic qualities of earlier periods 
with a more optical form of depiction. This is of course to consider the image in 
anachronistic terms: there is no reason to suppose that it was conceived in this way. 
However, I suggest that the different kinds of viewing which it affords can 
reasonably be imputed to the original viewers. 
I noted in the introduction the formative effects of the visual culture of which the 
picture-maker is a part. While personal innovation in many cultures is not necessarily 
a goal in itself, an important source of spatial development may be painterly 
‘difficulties’ such as those in the Van Eyck, leading to ad hoc  adjustments, inclusions 
and omissions. These reactive adjustments may originate new traditions, and may be 
rationalised into a consciously articulated system. Such theoretical systems may in 
turn lead to the development of practice. Gombrich suggests that...
the history of art [...] may be described as the forging of master keys for opening the 
mysterious locks of our senses to which only nature herself originally held the key. 
[...] Like the burglar who tries to break a safe, the artist has no direct access to the 
inner mechanism. He can only feel his way with sensitive fingers, probing or 
adjusting his hook or wire when something gives way. Of course, once the door 
springs open, once the key is shaped, it is easy to repeat the performance.
 Gombrich 1977 p304
With modifications, this is a useful metaphor. It captures the ad hoc aspect of pictorial 
development as well as the importance of prior example and tradition. The danger of 
the metaphor lies in its implication that there is one solution towards which picture-
makers are striving, the one correct combination which will open the lock. This 
would imply a single model of spatiality towards which all picturing is impelled, 
(perhaps that of photography?) and which we should presumably have reached by 
now. This would prevent explanation of the multiple forms of spatiality which I 
document here, which extend both across cultures and across the pictorial genres 
within cultures. The truer picture is of making solutions rather than discovering them.18 
Each depth cue is a key in its own right, and each unlocks a different door. 
Shift in amount of double imagery
If one looks at a distant point, everything between the viewer and the point will be 
perceived as double. The closer to the viewer, the greater the doubling. This binocular 
phenomenon has caused controversy as to which is a truer model, that of two discrete 
retinal images being combined in the brain by a mass of computations which identify 
commonalities between the two images, or, operating in a more primitive way only 
on the invariant information provided by the two images (Bruce, Green and 
18 In relation to linear perspective in particular this view has been controversial. An extended discussion is offered in the 
next chapter. 
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Georgeson 1996 p264-5). I am not aware that this phenomenon has ever been used as 
a cue in its own right in the making of monocular pictures or designs, though it arises 
naturally with any binocular technology such as the stereoscope or head-mounted VR 
device.
Shift in the rate of motion
Whereas Cue No. 5 refers to optic flow considered as a gradual phenomenon, Gibson 
treats separately those distinct differences in the rate of motion which are cues for the 
contour, or edge, of an object. This differential movement of objects is that 
experienced when an observer moves sideways relative to a scene, the closest objects 
moving across the visual field faster than distant ones. In train travel, stations pass 
very fast, while distant villages move more slowly. This is the primary cue used in 
early scrolling computer games such as Sonic the Hedgehog which typically used 
three planes at differential rates. 
 
Figure 3.28. 
MicroManiacs game for Sony Playstation, 
2000, Codemasters. 
The perspective is not convergent, but 
nevertheless very strong depth effects are 
achieved by the relative movements of the 
three layers of the model: in this scene, the 
players, the washing on the line and the lawn 
below.
Even recent games such as Micro Maniacs (Figure 3.28) forego linear perspectives in 
the interests of speed, but make extensive use of differential shifting of planes so that 
the user’s player can be positioned convincingly at any height above a terrain. The 
fact that movement of the planes is essential for this effect is unproblematic in such 
racing games, whereas in a strategy game with extensive pauses the ‘flatness’ might 
be more apparent: instead the vertiginous effect of moving at a height above a terrain 
is accentuated with increase in speed and changes of direction, the essence of this 
kind of game. Again selected cues are chosen for the particular properties they offer.
Completeness or continuity of outline
If the outline of one object interrupts the outline of another, it will be seen as in front 
of the interrupted one. However, as Gibson puts it (1950 p142) ‘a man knows that a 
near object can partially obscure a far object but his retina does not’ and, seeking as 
usual the lowest-level implementation of perception, Gibson suggests that cues 9, 10 
and 11 are the explanation for the ability to identify the edges of objects. However, he 
admits that the shape of objects is also significant. In Figure 3.29, it can be seen that c 
does not suggest occlusion, while a, b and d do. Such effects are explained by 
Hoffman in terms of a perceptual principle which favours generic or stable views 
(Hoffman 1998 p25) – those ‘explanations’ least fragile to changes of viewpoint. For 
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example a is explicable in terms of two short blocks abutting the sides of a longer one, 
but such a view would be obtained only from a unique position and would be lost on 
changing viewpoint. The view at c has the opposite properties: the most stable 
explanation is of two abutting angled objects, since many views onto such an 
arrangement would yield broadly similar images, while other putative configurations 
of objects would yield such a view only under unique conditions.
a b c d
Figure 3.29. Perception of overlap is partly based on shape. Based on Gibson 1950 p142, Figure 62
Figure 3.30. 
Tomb of the Vizier Ramose at 
Thebes (1355-1350 BC) (detail). 
From James, TGH 1992 Egypt: the 
living past British Museum Press, 
p192
The bas-relief in Figure 3.30 comes close to using only occlusion as spatial 
constructor: certainly size and linear perspective are absent. Texture gradients model 
the curvature of the dome of the heads. There are sudden shifts of texture density, but 
these are as strong whether they relate to changes across the surface of spatial entities 
or between entities. As with all bas-reliefs, the light and shade provided by shallow 
modelling stand for deeper space in the world depicted.19 Completeness of outline is 
by far the strongest spatial cue here, and relies to a certain extent on world 
knowledge about the likely shapes of faces and bodies, though also on factors, 
documented by Hoffman (1998 p33-4) such as the occurrence of T-junctions where 
one contour disappears behind another, such as where the top of the further figure’s 
head disappears behind that of the nearer. 
A similar set of issues arises in relation to the perception of transparency (that is, the 
perception that a translucent object or filter overlays an object or scene) which is not 
covered by Gibson. Hoffman (1998 p124-6) makes clear that shape and position 
interact with tonal value in dictating whether a shape is seen as a filter, and a similar 
mix of influences affects the perception of layering and occlusion (ibid p47-51 and 
p156-157). Tufte devotes a whole chapter of Envisioning Information (1990) to 
19 The technique of bas-relief offers the modelling aspects of light and shade, but reliefs are normally too shallow to 
provide cast shadows, which in any case would tend to break the spatial effect rather than to reinforce it, since the 
cast shadows would fall in different places than they would in the world.
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layering, which is often dependent on transparency (for example in Figures 3.31a-b). 




A monochrome digital map for use in air traffic 
control. Note the degree of spatial ambiguity 
caused by lack of depth. 
From Reynolds, Linda 1994 ‘Colour for Air Traffic 
Control Displays’, Displays Vol.15 No.4, p217
  
Figure 3.30b
A version of a using translucent colour. An 
impression of shallow depth is created and 
individual components become identifiable. 
From Reynolds, Linda 1994 ‘Colour for Air Traffic 
Control Displays’, Displays Vol.15 No.4, p217
Bertin commits the common elision of the concepts ‘space’ and ‘geometry’ which 
prevents him giving proper consideration to the kinds of spatial results of interaction 
between colour and shape to which Gibson and Tufte are sensitive. Bertin describes 
these ‘retinal variables’ as those which can be elevated above the plane, but he seems 
to mean this metaphorically: the original has ‘variables rétiniennes que l’on peut 
élever en 3e dimension au-dessus du plan’ (Bertin 1973, p42) but the later translation 
(made in close collaboration with Bertin) puts the word ‘elevated’ in quotation marks 
and omits specific mention of the third dimension (Bertin 1983, p42).20 Perhaps he 
was right in feeling that it was confusing to use a spatial concept which might be 
interpreted metaphorically or literally depending on the reader, but it is symptomatic 
of his resistance to the kinds of depth cues which Gibson shows are so important to 
spatiality.
Transitions between light and shade
Gibson is somewhat confusing when he turns to transitions between light and shade, 
since he only includes this cue among his thirteen in the context of abrupt transitions 
at contours, whereas they should surely (as he seems to acknowledge elsewhere in 
the same work, Gibson 1950) also appear in the form of gradual transitions (as 
texture gradients do). It seems perhaps that his determination to distinguish retinal 
perception of the world from that of pictures (in which the use of shadow 
20 Bertin’s insistence on separating the retinal from the spatial becomes eccentric when he discusses the difference 
between the use of lengths and areas to represent quantities, since it involves declaring length as spatial but area as 
not.
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traditionally played an arguably disproportionate part) led him to play down the 
significance of this factor. Hoffman, despite a predilection for geometry which 
differentiates him strongly from Gibson, acknowledges the importance not only of 
modelling by shadow (Hoffman 1998 p116-7) but also of shadows which are cast (op 
cit p162-5).
The case to which Gibson gives his attention in discussion of the thirteen cues is that 
of sudden transitions between light and shade at a contour, as for example depicted 
in Figure 3.32, where in particular the contrast between the light leaves and the dark 
masonry incites the observer to detect both an edge and a difference in depth. Such 
effects were perhaps less common before painting was influenced by the example of 
photography.
Figure 3.32. 
Bowler: The doubt: ‘Can these dry bones live?’ 1855.
From Wood, Christopher 1981 The Pre-Raphaelites Weidenfeld and 
Nicholson, London, p69
Baxandall (1995 passim) offers an exhaustive analysis of the role of shadow in 
depiction. The three basic forms of shadow are traditionally conceived as illustrated 
in Figures 3.32a-c.
        
Figure 3.32a. Cast shadow Figure 3.32b. Attached shadow Figure 3.32a. Shading
A painter can choose exactly which shadows to depict, omit, accentuate or minimise. 
Computer graphics methods, in their simpler forms, have also made easy the 
presentation of one kind of shadow without others, since the shadows are calculated 
explicitly as individual projections of selected objects. Ironically in more advanced 
techniques such as ray-tracing and radiosity, such selectivity becomes more difficult, 
since shadows arise as a natural outcome of calculations based on the positions of all 
the objects and light sources. At the time of writing, it is still accepted practice in low-
Media Space 3 Depth perception and depiction  |  Stephen Boyd Davis  |  June 2002 51
cost virtual environment browsers and computer games to use shading without cast 
shadows, a liberty taken with spatial articulation for purely practical reasons of speed 
of computation.
Selective use of shadow within pictures is common. The objectives may be formal and 
compositional. Shadows may be deepened to increase drama, or lightened to prevent 
the obscuration of parts of the scene. It is important to note as with other cues, that 
shading and shadow techniques are effective means of constructing space even in the 
absence of some other spatial cues.
Figure 3.33
Robertson, Card and Mackinlay: Cone-tree 
visualisation of a directory hierarchy.
Card, Mackinlay and Shneiderman 1999 
p525.
The synthetic shadows of Figure 3.33 have been designed to fulfil particular 
objectives. In particular, the fact that each shadow is computed independently of the 
others (so that where the shadows of two objects fall there is twice as much shadow 
and so forth) makes the shadows more useful than they would otherwise be for 
helping the user to locate parts of the cone-tree in space.21 
———————————————————
This chapter has been concerned with the range of pictorial methods available for 
suggesting depth, particularly the imitation of the sense of depth arising from looking 
at the real world. It centres on the relationship between the space of the 
representation and the space of the world represented. A number of points have 
begun to emerge which are pursued in the ensuing chapters.
The tendency has been noted in several authors to equate the evocation of depth with 
the techniques only of geometric perspective (linear and size perspectives). At its 
most extreme these approaches treat images which use such techniques as uniquely 
21 With a single light source and a set of translucent objects, shadows will behave as in this system. However that is not 
the main point: the shadow-casting algorithm has been chosen to capture those aspects of the scene which best suit 
the objectives.
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correct; from here it is a small step to equate correct with desirable, regardless of the 
objectives of the image. By contrast, I have argued that selecting particular techniques 
allows particular objectives to be served in the resulting picture. In the work of Van 
Eyck it allowed a picture to be read schematically as well as pictorially. In the oriental 
landscapes it allowed the space to be explored in a longer and more involved process 
than if depth had been more forcibly depicted. Suppression of aerial perspective 
permitted distant objects to be more clearly discerned, and also in several cases 
allowed the picture to be more readily seen as both scene and surface, perhaps to 
make its formal qualities more apparent. In the de Chirico it allowed the ‘game’ of 
spatial depiction to be made a part of the subject. The pragmatic explanation – that 
the selection of depth cues serves the objectives of the image – seems better able to 
rationalise the kinds of figurative images which have been made.
One question which has arisen is of where in the OIMVP model diagrammed earlier 
decisions about depth cues are effected? Many occur in the process of picturing, P, 
when particular kinds of rendering and mark-making are chosen. However many 
also arise in V, the view selected, (as for example when a particular view is chosen on 
the model to afford some depth cues rather than others) and even in M, the model, as 
when Uccello contrives particular subject matter, and positions for that subject 
matter, so as to provide material from which to construct orthogonals. Often there is a 
diegetic excuse for a pictorial tactic. For example, in the Watteau (Figure 3.18) the 
foremost figure ‘happens’ to be dressed in red, reinforcing aerial perspective. In terms 
of the earlier diagram, such manipulation of the depicted matter in order to help 
produce a particular picture might be indicated by various reversed arrows to 
indicate how pictorial decisions feed back to apparently ‘prior’ stages. This symbiosis 
of model, view and picture will be seen later to be fundamental to the spatiality of 





From the Renaissance onwards mainstream perspectival painting seems to move 
towards making the image apparently consistent with natural vision, even when it is 
nothing of the sort (and despite the fact that an increasing range of other kinds of 
images is also made). This difference between graphic images which are designed to 
be taken as unencoded representations and those where the pictorial intervention is 
more overt will also turn out to be important in the discussion of other media. In the 
next chapter I will discuss how images which are clearly on analysis not imitations of 
the optical impression of a scene can be taken to be realistic.
I have begun to show that the selection of depth cues has consequences which are 
Media Space 3 Depth perception and depiction  |  Stephen Boyd Davis  |  June 2002 53
both informational and affective. Sometimes the two are in accord, as when the 
‘flattening’ of a Chinese landscape provides information about distant parts of a scene 
which might not actually be discernible in reality, at the same time creating a 
particular relation to the viewer. Sometimes a particular approach, say binocularity, 
offers little informational advantage but a substantial one in terms of affect. Of course 
as already indicated in the Introduction, the difference between information and 
affect is not a strict one: the use of blur to capture the differential focusing across a 
scene may be conceived as conveying information about a visual experience as well 
as in part recreating that experience in way which alters the viewer’s relationship to 
the image. However one can probably safely say that it it does not provide more 
information about the depicted world; indeed it provides less, since it suppresses 
detail in parts of the image. This question of whether any given picture offers 
information about the world or about the process of seeing the world, forms an 
important part of the next chapter. There the discussion is informed by the difficulties 
raised in this chapter by the rival claims to truth which have been revealed in 
attempting to apply the depth cues of natural vision to pictures. These have included 
possible mismatches of ‘logical’ and ‘psychological’ truth (to borrow Klee’s terms for 
the time being) in relation to size perspective, verticality, focus in depth and focus 
across the visual field. Already it seems possible to detect important inconsistencies 
in the apparently logical space of the archetypal post-Renaissance picture (for 
example that world verticals are to be made vertical in the picture, but horizontals are 
not so treated). However before this can be asserted with confidence it will be 
necessary to resolve some traditional controversies over the claims of certain 
projection systems to be considered correct.
The utility of that correctness, if established, also requires discussion. I have already 
noted that it seems more important for the internal spaces of a picture to construct an 
apparently coherent scene than for the image to match the visual stimulus available if 
the user were present at the scene. It has become apparent that different kinds of 
pictures may have their own claims to be considered ‘realistic’. However, it also 
seems that the ability of any representation to fulfil the objectives intended for it is 
not always increased by the use of greater realism. In the next chapter I will show that 
the mismatch of pictures to optical truth (in so far as it can be established) often 
enhances their expressivity. This will again emphasise the pragmatic approach 
characterised by Gombrich as making rather than matching.
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4 Spatiality and realism
1 Introduction
In any discussion of how the planar space of pictures corresponds to the volumetric 
space of the world, it is often assumed that some kinds of picture have a special 
correspondence to how the world actually looks. Some analysis of the concept of 
realism is therefore unavoidable. Unfortunately the term is habitually used without 
proper definition, based on careless assumptions about matching pictures to scenes.
The argument hinges on two issues (1) whether it is possible to match optical truth 
(which must be defined) and (2) the objectives in attempting or not attempting to do 
so. 
In relation to the first, the argument put forward is opposed to the relativist position 
that no particular kinds of pictures have a better claim than another to be considered 
correct. In particular, by looking specifically at different spatial projection systems, I 
show that one system does have a superior claim to match the scene. In the process I 
highlight some misunderstandings concerning the planar projection of scenes which 
have made the relativist position seem more convincing than it otherwise might.
The geometry of spatial projection is not however the only means by which depth is 
depicted, as indicated in the previous chapter. While a particular projection system 
may have a superior claim to correctness, this does not mean that every aspect of 
some spatial depiction can be indisputably claimed as realistic. The difficulty of 
achieving an unequivocal definition of optical truth discussed in the previous chapter 
becomes important here. If there were a kind of image quintessentially realist because 
it was the visual equivalent of looking at a scene, such an image would necessarily 
operate independently of any sort of codes or conventions of depiction and picture-
making would not be the pragmatic activity I have claimed. If on the other hand it 
can be demonstrated that no picture is a uniquely realist representation because all 
pictures must adopt some particular conception of realism, then pictures are 
essentially designed artefacts which will often require shared prior knowledge on the 
part of maker and user and which are created within a purposive context. As a result, 
by the end of this chapter, the simple concept of realism will have been replaced by 
that of kinds of realism, adopted for the purposes they serve. 
The second objective is to consider what the uses of various spatial realisms are; 
particularly, the reasons why picture-makers may depart from any goal of 
straightforward imitation in the design of pictorial information. If some pictures 
come very close to being ‘right’ as representations of scenes, the question remains of 
what purposes other kinds of pictures serve. I shall propose that forms of realism that 
seem to ‘work’ (they seem real) are as important as those which might be said to be 
‘true’. I contrast attempts to straightforwardly match scenes with another approach to 
spatial realism which I define. This alternative approach to realism particularly 
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reflects the role of time (considered in a variety of ways) in static pictures.1 It is argued 
that departure from a simple notion of realism is potentially more expressive both in 
informational and affective terms. 
2 Kinds of realism
In the attempt to discern what visual realism may be, I do not want to discredit the 
term realism as a useful shorthand for some approaches to image-making. But the 
term has dangers when it is used without being defined and embodies hidden, 
unconsidered assumptions. In both the analysis and making of pictures I suggest it is 
better to replace the vague general idea of realism with a model of multiple realisms, 
some of which are closely tied to the different depth cues discussed previously. 
Some of these might be:
   1 depicted ‘tactile’ qualities such as the bloom on fruit, where the realism is such that 
spectators feel they could pick up the fruit and eat it (Bryson 1990 p28); this is related 
to spatial characteristics, but is not itself essentially spatial.
   2 the sense of ‘objectness’, such as a painted curtain having the concrete presence of the 
real thing (as in Pliny’s account of the competition between Parrhasios and Zeuxis in 
Natural History XXXV p65 quoted op cit p30), or the trompe l’oeil of Cornelius 
Gijsbrechts (op cit p142-4); this is a predominantly spatial phenomenon; it often 
carries a notion of the ‘weight’ and groundedness of the depicted object.
   3 the sense of solidity, produced largely by modelling with light and shade; this can be 
considered for an individual object, to a certain extent independent of context (op cit 
p66); it is a predominantly spatial phenomenon.
   4 a sense of depth produced by an illusion of projection, achieved principally through 
the use of cast shadows and of the positional interrelation between objects (op cit 
p67); this is a predominantly spatial phenomenon.
   5 ‘occupiability’, extending the space occupied by the spectator (op cit p34), often 
through the medium of geometric perspectival construction, but also achievable as 
Bryson notes (op cit p42-3) using colour, tone and scale without linear perspective; a 
predominantly spatial phenomenon.
To this list can be added other impressions of the real, some of which may be assisted 
by particular kinds of spatial representation, but in which there is no simple, direct 
implication for spatiality:
   6 a sense of movement, as when a static image is able to suggest moving water or wind 
in the trees.
   7 a sense of animation, of coexisting with a living being (‘the eyes follow you round the 
room’, ‘she looks as if she’s breathing’).
   8 a psychological engagement as though with another mind.
   9 general recognition, as in ‘that’s a...’.
 10 specific recognition, as in ‘that is definitely an example of x’ when an image is so 
accurate that one can identify, say, a particular variety of tulip (Bryson 1990 p106).2 
1 It might seem that this would make the findings inapplicable to representations in which actual time plays a part – 
film, television and interactive media. However, rather surprisingly, this turns out not to be the case, an issue pursued 
in the remaining chapters.
2 There are really more than two levels of recognition, perhaps an indefinite number from the broadest notion of what 
something is to its exact identification as some highly particular thing, but two levels suffice for the discussion here. 
There are also degrees of certainty of identification.
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The two kinds of recognition 9 and 10 are based on different visual attributes, 
depending on what is depicted. Illusion of spatial depth may or may not be 
significant. For example, in the specific identification of the beer bottles as bottles of 
Bass in Manet’s Bar at the Folies-Bergère (Figure 4.01), the identification is based on a 
logotype: the depth illusion is irrelevant to this recognition. However, the disputed 
general recognition of the scene behind the barmaid as a reflection or an extension of 
the room is clearly primarily a spatial one. I indicated earlier that recognition is itself 
an important secondary cause of depth perception, so a circular relationship is 
implied. 
Figure 4.01. 
Edouard Manet: A Bar at the Folies-Bergère, 1882
From Richardson, John 1982 Manet Phaidon Press, 
Oxford, plate 46.
General recognition forms the principal basis of yet another kind of realism:
 11 being ‘like everyday life’; this is the realism of Courbet (Hanson 1979 p33-34) or the 
Soviet realists of the 1930s (Taylor 1987 p135-6) where there is a sense that what is 
depicted is in a broad but rather particular sense ‘like real life’. Choice of subject 
matter is decisive here, but the manner of representation has often in practice been 
regarded as material to the overall effect.
 12 the final realism is that of causal coherence, which allows the observer to predict 
likely outcomes. This may have a strongly spatial element, as for example, in 
Gombrich’s example (1973 p228) of a picture of a ship, the movement of which is 
anticipated by the observer. Gombrich remarks (op cit p218) that ‘the truth we seek 
with our senses is not the static and eternal truth that interested Plato, but the correct 
assessment of the developing situation with which we interact.’3 
Relations between realisms
These various realisms may be used selectively. For example, the realism of solidity 
may be achieved through modelling alone without the need for cast shadows. 
Conversely a coherent, occupiable space can be pictured using cast shadows but 
where modelling is absent. However, such different spatial realisms are often also 
used together. The case of traditional Japanese printmaking, in which modelling is 
absent, is one where cast shadows are absent too. Masaccio, though he used local 
modelling to create solidity in the absence of a coherent shade model (Dunning 1991 
p57-68) as in the Expulsion from Paradise (Figure 4.02), is also celebrated for 
‘sculpting’ with light, in which cast shadows and relative tonal values articulate an 
      
3 Prediction implies an important role for time in relation to pictures. In this chapter this concept is largely confined to 
the incorporation of time into pictures, while in the next the complementary issue of pictures in time is explored.
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‘occupiable’ space, as in The Tribute Money (Figure 4.03). The absence of local 
modelling here is difficult to imagine.
Figure 4.02 (left)
Masaccio: The Expulsion from the Garden of Eden 1427, 
Brancacci Chapel, Florence. From Dunning 1991 p66.
Figure 4.03 (below)
Masaccio: The Tribute Money 1427, 
Brancacci Chapel Florence. From Dunning 1991 p66.
Peter Greenaway notes the range of realisms which operate simultaneously in 
Holman Hunt’s The Hireling Shepherd of 1851-2 and it seems clear that they do not 
operate independently of one another ‘...the sleeping sheep is heavy, the green apples 
are bitter, the grass in the ditch is wet, the woman’s feet are palpable. With no trouble 
at all you can walk about the painting like you can walk about a landscape – there is 
enough evidence to name all the plants’ (Pascoe 1997 p34). Here we have the sense of 
weight associated with ‘objectness’ and modelled solidity (the sheep), the inference of 
non-visual qualities such as taste (bitter apples), feel (wet grass) and impressibility 
(palpable feet), occupiability (the landscape that can be walked in) and specific 
recognition (evidence enough to name the plants). This seems to raise the possibility 
that there is a kind of realism which ‘has everything’ – a super-realism which 
subsumes all the realisms so far enumerated. However, it must be pointed out that 
the list is still incomplete in an important respect. The realisms listed so far have 
principally to do with a single static moment, so that any element of time-awareness – 
such as the sense of movement in depicted natural phenomena – evokes the passing 
of time in the observed world. None of these realisms captures the fact, noted often in 
the discussion of the Gibsonian cues, that perception itself takes place in time. This is 
crucial in delimiting the extent to which any kind of pictorial visual realism can be 
achieved. The relationship of time to pictures is discussed at some length below. In 
addition, aspects of realism which seem far removed from any discussion of 
spatiality, such as psychological realism, will turn out to be of direct significance to 
spatial depiction when film is discussed in the next chapter.
Using small subsets of realism
There are many examples where only a small subset of realism is invoked, for 
example in graphic artefacts such as the computer interface. In Figure 4.04, the colour 
circle and the colour chips at top right have drop-shadows producing a sense of a 
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‘real’ object but with no corresponding sense of a coherent space which the object 
occupies – some objects have shadows while others have none, or have shadows of a 
different kind. Despite these inconsistencies, a sense of palpability or objectness is 
conveyed. The spatial qualities of the virtual slider below the colour circle are of a 
more conventional kind, depicting a relatively ‘believable’ object in that one could 
envisage such an object existing outside the digital surface. The graduated colour 
strip below it offers a probably unintentional and unwanted depth illusion of its own 
– a reminder that depth cues assert themselves unbidden even when no depiction is 
intended. In an informational sense, the cast shadows provide nothing at all, but in 
terms of affect they help to make the display tangible, more ‘real’.
Figure 4.04. 
Colour picker interface object from 
Apple Macintosh Operating System 
8.1 ©Apple Computer 1983-1999
The same shadow motif seen in the Apple interface is frequently encountered in the 
work of the publisher Dorling Kindersley (Figure 4.05a).
Figure 4.05a.
Book cover ‘Eyewitness Guides: Skeleton’ Dorling Kindersley, 
London 1988, author Steve Parker.
Close examination shows that many of the shadows are digitally originated or edited. 
They do not make coherent sense (Figure 4.05b) but are used to enhance the realism 
of objectness, perhaps with a view to diminishing the remoteness which traditional 
‘bookishness’ otherwise imposes on book illustration. Many kinds of realism are used 
for these affective rather than strictly information purposes.




Does the engraving of the shell float above 
the surface on which the skull casts its 
shadow? Why does the engraving not cast a 
shadow of its own? Why does the dog 
skeleton in R.05a cast no shadow? 
Spatial articulation has been contrived on 
an ad hoc basis to make the book cover 
‘work’ without reference to an imaginable 
coherent spatial referent.
Such contrived spatialities are not new. In a drawing of 1526 by Albrecht Dürer 
(Figure 4.06), much of the internal modelling of the figure is imaginable in a real 
scene, but the halo of yellow is entirely synthetic, being used to make the figure ‘come 
off the page’. 
 
Figure 4.06. 
Albrecht Dürer, Study of a man walking 
in profile to the left, 1526 
From South Bank Centre 1997 The Quick 
and the Dead: artists and anatomy (book 
to accompany National Touring Exhibit-
ion 1997-98) South Bank Centre / Arts 
Council, London, p80
Figure 4.07. 
Cover by Tony Ross for The Falcon’s 
Malteser by Anthony Horowitz, published 
by Walker Books 1986
It is an example of illicit mark-making, constructing space rather than depicting it in 
any straightforward sense, which I discuss later. A similar space, using some aspects 
of realism but rejecting others, is shown in Figure 4.07 – note the cast shadows.
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Figure 4.08. 
Weeping skeleton (Skeleton in landscape) attributed to Stephen Calcar, 
1543 from Vesalius' Fabrica 
From South Bank Centre 1997 The Quick and the Dead: artists and 
anatomy (book to accompany National Touring Exhibition 1997-98)
South Bank Centre/Arts Council, London, p28
In this illustration from Vesalius (Figure 4.08) the sense of the real is created 
differently. A coherent, occupiable space is created by borrowing the conventions of 
landscape pictures. It was presumably done partly (and by many others than 
Vesalius) as the most effective way, in the context of the time, of making things ‘feel 
real’. The scenery was imported with the purpose of making space – and that was 
done to support the sense of the real.
To achieve any particular form of spatial realism, then, differing cues may be called 
into play. In Cotàn’s Quince, Cabbage, Melon and Cucumber (Figure 4.09), tactile realism 
is largely dependent on the texture and shade gradations. The sense of ‘objectness’ 
relies on the same cues, but also on cast shadows. Solidity depends principally on 
shade gradation. Projection is most dependent on size comparisons, completeness of 
outline and tone contrasts at contours. Occupiability is particularly promoted by 
linear perspective. 
       
Figure 4.09.
Cotàn: Quince, Cabbage, Melon and Cucumber, 
1561-1627.
From Bryson 1990 p67.
The cues do not produce the various kinds of realism: realisms are arrived at through 
the interaction of a mutually supporting set of cues with the content (that is, the 
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subject matter) and the context, the expectations and prior knowledge of the viewer 
and the picture-maker. While some of the realisms enumerated are mutually 
supportive some are found to be incompatible. Porter and Susman (2000) note the 
tensions in the making of Pixar’s computer graphics films between subservience to 
visual realism and believability of character (animation and psychological engagement in 
my tentative list of realisms). In this case the need to be selective of realisms and their 
supporting spatiality is acknowledged. However, picture-makers often narrowly 
select the realisms to which they subscribe, while at the same time claiming an ill-
defined general realism for their work: examples from digital picture-making are 
given next.
3 Contingent definitions of realism in digital pictures
In the many computer graphics papers which deal with ‘realism’, explicit definitions 
are rarely offered. Realism is taken as an uncontentious given; yet from each paper 
emerges a different implication of where realism lies. In general, these implicit 
definitions emerge from the purposes for which the image will be used, though in a 
few cases the image is seen as an image per se with no declared purpose.
A recurrent theme in the realism of digital imagery is, understandably, that of 
computational economy. In some cases this has no implication for realism since it 
merely involves eliminating the calculation of attributes outside the human visual 
range (Greenberg 1999 p51-2). In other cases sub-optimal realism is adopted when, 
though the shortfall will be detected, this is considered unimportant. For example 
Heidrich et al. (1999) comment: ‘In flight simulators and other outdoor sceneries, fog 
can significantly contribute to the realism of a scene... [so a formula is used] to fake 
emission and scattering effects.’ (op cit p130 emphasis added).4 
Some means of balancing visual realism and computational economy can be 
considered as offering degrees of realism on which a numerical value can be placed, 
for example polygon count in models or levels of recursion in ray-tracing. However 
others cannot be quantified in this way and it becomes clear that individual visual 
realisms are being selected.
Figure 4.10. Computer modelled harbour blocks, representing Ijmuiden harbour, Holland. 
From Chapman et al. 1998 p572.
4 In relation to the graphics of computer games, popular journalism has a strongly pragmatic attitude to visual realism, 
even though realism is something of a talisman in this community. ‘A big fat, hairy deal has been made out of Tekken 
Tag and the way the grass actually moves on one of the levels. So what? What does this add to the gameplay? 
Nothing.’ (Ellis 2000 p36).
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Chapman et al. (1998) describe an application of seabed visualisation for documentary 
purposes in capturing the movements of harbour-wall blocks (Figure 4.10).
When the authors report that ‘The blocks are texture mapped with pseudo concrete 
and a lighting model is added to the underwater environment to improve the realism 
of the harbour model.’ (op cit p480 emphasis added) there is no indication of what this 
realism is for. It is perhaps to make the simulation more ‘believable’ in some 
generalised way, though this is not mentioned in the text and the project seems to be 
intended for technical experts whom one might expect to be content with the 
unadorned geometry of the blocks. The accurate representation of the geometry of the 
blocks is crucial to the usefulness of this project, but one wonders what the criteria 
are for the selection of these other particular aspects of visual realism.
 
Figure 4.11. 
Original caption reads: ‘High and low oblique, 
computer-generated perspective views of the area 
around Irish Canyon, CO. Source data were 
composed of 20m SPOT imagery and 
polygonalized 10m terrain elevation data that 
were vertically exaggerated by a factor of 5’. 
From Weinhaus and Devarajan 1997 p354
By contrast, the work of Weinhaus and Devarajan (1997) on texture-mapping 3-D 
synthetic models of real world scenes offers a clearer declaration of the aims of their 
particular style of realism, which effectively defines the criteria for its 
implementation: ‘Today, more demands are being placed upon visual simulators to 
achieve yet a higher level of realism. In particular, mission planning and rehearsal 
systems are now striving for truly faithful representations so that ground troops can 
become intimately familiar with important regions of the world’ (op cit p326 emphasis 
added). This amounts to a functional definition of one kind of realism, in which the 
sense of particular place, a feeling for how landmarks in the scene relate to each other 
and to the situated observer, is paramount. Intriguingly, the paper is illustrated with 
a landscape image in which the heights are vertically exaggerated by a factor of 5, 
even though other aspects of the image are broadly photorealistic (Figure 4.11). This 
is not justified in the main text.5 This distortion suggests again an unacknowledged 
interpretation of spatial realism, possibly with a view to resolving a perceptual 
problem of size constancy, discussed later in this chapter.
5 3D geophysical relief maps typically use 10-fold exaggeration of heights, but there are more complex examples. A 
relief map of France by the Institut Geographique National uses a planimetric scale of 1:1,200,000 with a non-linear 
altimetric scale from from 1:80,000 to 1:160,000 (that is, between 15 and 7.5 times the planimetric scale). This 
presumably ensures that low-altitude differences are made visible while keeping the mountains manageably low.
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Some authors offer a largely functional objective for the inclusion of particular spatial 
cues, in which the mimetic motivation is minimised. Schöffel (1997) and Soler and 
Sillion (1998) both justify their work on shadows not on the grounds that shadows are 
observed in the world and are therefore included in the image by right of realism, but 
because of the information they impart about the relative positions of objects, light 
sources and viewer. This is clearly a case of making space rather than matching 
vision.
Though they do not explicitly say so, Granieri, Crabtree and Badler (1995) seem to 
define realism primarily in terms of one particular form of believability. In particular 
they deprecate techniques which lead to high optical realism at the expense of 
believability in human motion behaviours: ‘the visual effect of even the most 
perfectly animated figure is significantly reduced once the viewer recognises that its 
movements are exactly the same each and every time it does something’ (op cit p238). 
They prefer to store less information while allowing motions to be modified on the fly 
to match the context in which they are replayed. They are optimistic about the wider 
application of their techniques. ‘Although today primarily driven by military 
requirements, the general technologies for projecting real humans into, and 
representing simulated humans within, virtual environments should be widely 
applicable in industry, entertainment, and commerce in the near future’ (op cit p223). 
However it is clear that a form of realism desirable for one application is not 
necessarily so in another. The question whether the particular realism which these 
authors have selected pragmatically to serve the needs of their product can be 
generalised to other different genres highlights the contingent nature of ‘realism’.
Diefenbach and Badler (1997 p60) offer techniques for producing ‘realistic images’. 
They use the term ‘realism’ freely without defining it. They are making images for 
their own sake – using realism as the yardstick of algorithmic ingenuity – rather than 
with any particular functional purpose in mind. They must be assumed to be 
equating photorealistic images with the perception of reality, though they also point 
out that some ‘cheating’ is possible, for example: ‘Often, however, shadows are 
desired to simply provide visual cues and some level of realism, and are not required to 
be completely accurate.’ (op cit p68 emphasis added). Like almost all workers in the 
field, they acknowledge that realism can be tempered by economy (op cit p69).6 
A recent issue of a professional magazine for computing specialists7 featuring realism 
in digital images is beset with confusions as to whether the realism to which some 
computer graphics aspire is resemblance to pictures (such as photographs) or 
resemblance to the experience of looking at scenes. Just why it is dangerous to equate 
photographic imagery with realism will become clear in the later discussion.
6 It is ironic that while the pioneers of photography took pains to explain to their public that ‘groups of figures take no 
longer to obtain than single figures would require, since the camera depicts them all at once, however numerous they 
may be’ (from ‘The Pencil of Nature’ by WH Fox Talbot 1844-46, in Frizot 1998 p62), computer graphics workers must 
constantly remind the reader that greater (photo)realism requires more complex and more subtle, and therefore more 
expensive, computing.
7 Communications of the ACM, August 1999, Vol. 42 No.8
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The aim, as introduced by Rosenbloom (1999 p30), is ‘to create images believable to 
the observer – ultimately emulating and predicting reality.’ When he says that ‘the 
framework for realistic image synthesis developed at Cornell University’s Program of 
Computer Graphics maintains fidelity between rendered images and their physical 
counterparts.’ (Rosenbloom 1999 p30 emphasis added), it seems however that these 
physical counterparts are photographs.
At first sight Greenberg’s article on work at Cornell is more clearly defined, referring 
to a goal of making ‘synthetic images visually and measurably indistinguishable from 
real-world images’ (Greenberg 1999 p45 emphasis added) but shortly afterwards a 
picture caption suggests: ‘A scene observer receives the scene radiances and has a 
particular visual experience. Because we want the display observer to have the same 
visual experience, the displayed image is a perceptual match to the scene.’ (op cit 
p51). Now it is the matching of scenes and not the matching of pictures which is 
under discussion. The expression ‘visual experience’, is left undefined.
In most of the literature, realism is assumed to be self-defining. However, Usoh et al. 
(1999) not only declare their criteria in terms of the response of users but assess their 
success against these definitions. Their goal is the development of ‘natural and 
effective virtual surrogates for user interactions with physical spaces and objects.’ (op 
cit p359). They use a number of forms of interaction with the space (theirs is a virtual 
space containing an alarming drop or pit) to achieve a ‘strikingly compelling virtual 
experience’ (op cit p363), and they assess the user’s reactions as evidenced by: 
   • the subject’s awareness of background sounds
   • subjects’ reports of similarity to really looking into a pit
   • subjects’ sensation of vertigo and willingness to walk over the pit
   • whether or not subjects actually traverse or circumnavigate the virtual pit. 
This is, very unusually, a properly defined sense of realism based principally on the 
notion of ‘believability’ – in other words a definition based as much on the relation 
between representation and user as on that between representation and referent.8 The 
subjectivity of the experience engendered is acknowledged in their finding that the 
sense of realism declined in proportion to the subjects’ prior experience of computer 
gaming (ibid). Such recognition that the sense of realism is subject to change over 
time and to context is highly unusual.
Dykes, Moore and Fairbairn (1999) take a different approach. For them, deviation 
from visual realism is judged to be not only expedient for technical reasons but also 
in many cases desirable. Their cartographic tradition perhaps causes them to consider 
more clearly the role of audience and objectives in determining the uses of realism; 
even so, they perhaps regard realism as something that one has more or less of, rather 
than being itself defined by the objectives. For them the making of a representation 
includes ‘selection, classification, simplification, exaggeration and symbolisation...’ 
(op cit p99). Above all, they say ‘cartographic visualisation is not just about authentic 
replication’ (op cit p101), though it is unclear whether or not they believe that 
8 I explain later why the realism of a representation must be defined in relation to the observer as well as to the scene.
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authentic replication is possible. They propose that ‘the argument for replicating “The 
Real World” in the map, by producing authentic versions of reality from which 
individuals can extract pertinent information, is a strong one for use in a variety of 
tasks. The cartography in such maps involves the selection of information and 
provision of forms of interacting with it that are suitable for the intended use’ (op cit 
p103 emphasis added). 
Dykes, Moore and Fairbairn’s view represents a new strand of argument – explicit 
reasons for rejecting aspects of realism even when it is achievable. This brief survey of 
the computer graphics literature seems to suggest three different motives for holding 
back from realism in some respect: economy of computation; distortion or 
exaggeration (such as the differential scaling of heights in a landscape) for reasons of 
expressivity; selectivity for reasons of expressivity, adopting selected realisms suited 
to an intended use. These may combine, so that for example expressivity and 
economy together cause the selection of some particular set of realisms in preference 
to others.
4 Towards a definition of visual realism
Returning to the particular question of the relation between the space of the world 
and the space of pictures, is there some kind of realism which has a special claim to 
be considered truly ‘realistic’ in the sense that it is a perfect substitute for natural 
vision? If this were so, then this kind of realism could be defined solely in terms of the 
referent (which it would perfectly match) without needing to include any 
consideration of the response. 
One of the obstacles highlighted by Gibson – and now generally acknowledged – is 
that natural vision depends on movement. Many of the ways in which spatial depiction 
in paintings departs from that of photography will turn out to be related to this 
problem, as picture-makers grapple with the problem of representing what is 
essentially a time-based process in a static artefact. Because natural vision 
incorporates immersion in, and dynamic response to, the surrounding scene, the 
simple answer to the question ‘is there a kind of picture which matches vision?’ will 
be No. But can a picture (whether painting, photograph or digital graphics) be 
designed to match the appearance of the world in other respects, for example in terms 
of spatial geometry? The answer that will be proposed here is that (1) there is a kind 
of spatial realism which, under highly controlled conditions, can be regarded as 
equivalent to natural vision, but that (2) the many shortcomings of this kind of 
illusionistic picture-making are sufficient to make its special status almost 
inconsequential when choices must be made between kinds of depiction. This will 
help to explain why very few pictures conform to this particular kind of realism, 
which will be referred to as PI-realism (referring to pictorial illusion). The other – really 
a family of related approaches – will be referred to as VE-realism (referring to visual 
experience). In particular I will suggest the VE-realist images are often more expressive 
than their PI-realist counterparts.
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5 Defining PI-realism
Gombrich suggests (1973 p194 passim) that it would be intolerable to limit the 
definition of illusion in painting to the narrow case in which the observer actually 
mistakes the picture on the gallery wall for a window opening on a real scene, but 
this I suggest is a good starting place, a kind of Turing test of realism.9 
Though Gibson tried subsequently to distance himself from it after developing his 
ideas concerning motion and the optic flow (Gibson 1979 p227-229), his conception of 
the ‘faithful picture’ is a useful one:
A delimited surface is so processed that it yields a sheaf of light-rays to a given point 
which is the same as would be the sheaf of rays from the original scene to a given 
point.
Gibson 1954
Gibson sought to disown this definition when he recognised the difference between 
what I have named PI-realism and VE-realism, but as a definition of PI-realism per se 
it still stands. A working definition of PI-realism then is of an image which:
   • is geometrically automorphic: all parts of the image on the retina occur in the same 
places for the picture as they would do for the corresponding scene10 
   • stimulates the same sensations of colour and tone at every point as would be 
stimulated by the scene
   • does not offer any stimuli not offered by the scene. 
The spatial implications of such a form of realism will be dealt with here principally 
in terms of the controversy over rival projection systems, since it has been disputed 
whether spatial projection of the three-dimensional world to the two dimensions of 
the plane is a matter of correctness or of convention.
Alpers claims that the seventeenth-century Dutch did not distinguish seeing from 
picture-making (1983 p27). A descendent of this identification of certain kinds of 
pictures with natural vision is the notion that photography shows how something 
‘really looks’ and I have shown that it is often an aspiration of computer graphics. 
This enthusiasm for perfect mapping of spatial reality to a surface is taken by some to 
be an extreme form of the ‘hegemony of vision’ (Levin 1993) introduced in Chapter 2. 
This hegemony is characterised by theorists as a belief that visual realism is the 
standard of realism in general, that how things look is a supremely important aspect 
of how they are, a point of view said to be unique to Western culture. Lalvani (1996 
p1) co-opts Heidegger, Derrida and Nietzsche in alleging this hegemony and cites the 
opinions of Plato, Aquinas and Descartes as evidence. Vision is said to be prioritised 
as the mode of perception which, ‘more than any other, perceives things in the world 
as objects that are clearly there, present, and available for us to study and use.’ 
(Houlgate 1993 p96). Evans and Hall (1999 p7) claim that we live in ‘a culture which 
is pervaded at all levels by a host of cultural technologies designed to disseminate 
viewing and looking practices through primarily visually mediated forms’. 
9 Alan Turing proposed a phenomenological test for intelligence in computers, in which an observer corresponds with 
an unknown entity using a text terminal. If the entity is mechanical but the observer is unable to discern on the basis 
of its responses that it is not human, then it is is deemed to be intelligent (Hodges 1983 p415-7).
10 I discuss later misunderstandings in the literature about the role of the retinal image.
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Beginning with Panofsky (1991 (1925))11, some writers confuse this attitude to vision 
with one or more categories within visual realism. Lalvani is an example of the first 
confusion: ‘That linear perspective or artificial perspective is a conventional symbolic 
ordering of space, operating within a cultural discourse of what constitutes the real, is 
supported by a number of observers. For instance, several anthropologists and social 
psychologists have promulgated the view that perspective is not innate but a 
culturally learned phenomenon’ (Lalvani 1996 p6). Lalvani’s ‘for instance’ elides two 
ideas: (1) that to choose to use linear perspective is to make a decision informed by 
cultural values and (2) that the perception of realism in linear perspectival images is 
similarly learned. This elision underpins the argument that visual realism cannot 
consist in any kind of pictorial correctness. The attack on such a kind of realism is 
also evident in the index of Crary’s Techniques of the Observer (1990) which has no 
entry for realism, only for ‘realism’ in quotation marks. Crary complains (op cit p32 
n9) at Wheelock’s use of the term ‘truly natural’ in a discussion of the camera 
obscura, calling it a ‘highly questionable notion’, and also at Alpers’ suggestion that it 
made possible a more truthful image.
By subsuming the straightforward question of pictorial illusion into the more widely 
accepted view that a preference for realist images is a cultural phenomenon, Lalvani is 
attacking the idea that for all observers, independent of culture, an image could fool 
them into mistaking a picture for a real scene. Two errors have contributed to 
mistaken answers to this question. The first is to give insufficient consideration to the 
conditions of viewing, and the second arises from the belief that realist pictures aim 
to match the retinal image.
The role of viewing conditions and context
Jones and Hagen (1980) ask ‘What is it like for a person to see a picture for the first 
time?’ as a way of discovering whether those accustomed to looking at pictures have 
learned a convention which allows them to interpret pictures correctly, or whether 
pictures are a natural mapping of vision. On balance they conclude (op cit p195) that 
accounts of subjects having difficulty in ‘attempting to make sense out of the 
shadings on the piece of paper’ – a photograph – are based on flawed comparisons; 
they therefore tend to the view that the objects represented in pictures can be 
successfully perceived by image-naive subjects, suggesting that pictures are like what 
they depict in a simple sense which does not require cultural decoding. Oddly, 
however, Jones and Hagen do not bring into their argument the issue of viewing 
conditions, which is surely crucial to the success of the pictorial illusion. It would be 
hardly surprising that when a photograph is shown to subjects in a culture which 
does not use visual-realist pictures they might have difficulty in interpreting it. They 
are presented with a rectangular, delimited substrate whose tangible and visible 
reality as a piece of paper is clearly evident. It would be strange if the response to this 
circumstance were not culturally determined: image-using cultures expect to see 
segments of dislocated space carried around in wallets and displayed on hoardings 
and mantelpieces, but in an image-naive culture this decontextualisation will 
11 As Panofsky notes, relevant theoretical difficulties of depiction had been highlighted as early as the work of 
Leonardo, discussed later in this chapter.
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naturally be a powerful counter-cue to any form of spatial perception within the 
picture. Failure to recognise an image in incongruous circumstances is not grounds 
for establishing the cultural conventionality of geometric perspective, photography, 
or any other picture-making technique. The context is decisive and as a result an 
important objective of any technology for creating pictorial illusion is to suppress the 
observer’s awareness of the context . When I discuss film and related technologies in later 
chapters it will become clear that keeping the viewer’s attention away from the 
artifice involved is a key device. One of the principal aids to the depth-spatial illusion 
in the Imax cinema for example is that the very large image extends beyond the 
boundaries of the normal visual field, depriving the observer of some obvious 
contextual counter-cues.
In 1425 Brunelleschi made a picture (now lost) of the Florence Baptistery which was 
allegedly remarkable for its match to the actual scene and which has been described 
as illustrating the discovery of the rules of linear perspective (Edgerton 1976 p124-52). 
While it is impossible now to test any claim that observers thought they actually saw 
the scene and not a painting, one can still ask whether it is theoretically possible that 
they might have done. It is necessary to imagine naive observers looking at various 
perspectival images, for example of the Baptistery, and to ask whether one spatial 
projection in the plane matches the scene in a way that all the others do not.
Several ways of controlling the context in which pictures are viewed have been tried 
historically in terms of the physical circumstances. Brunelleschi took three measures 
to support pictorial illusion. He closely controlled the geometry of the viewing 
conditions by forcing observers to look with one eye through a small hole, thereby 
disabling the perspectives of parallax (binocular perspective, motion perspective and 
the shift in amount of double imagery).12 He also depicted a scene (the Baptistery) 
which was not only likely to be there in reality but which indeed was there to the 
prior knowledge of all his observers, so avoiding the incongruity problem noted 
above. Finally he avoided the falsity of static depiction of moving objects by using 
polished metal for the sky, reflecting real moving clouds. 
The trompe l’oeil paintings of Gijsbrechts (Figure 4.12) also control viewing context, 
though by other methods. Subject matter is chosen which would normally occupy a 
shallow depth, such as a board with items pinned to it, or a collection of objects 
hanging on a door. By this means the painting’s failure to offer convergence and 
motion parallax phenomena is, at least temporarily, unnoticed. Gijsbrechts always 
painted inanimate objects, avoiding the problem of stasis. His work also takes 
advantage of cultural conditioning in that the objects depicted are ones which 
viewers would not be surprised to find in such locations: for example, a boarded-up 
window in a wall. (To say that cultural conditioning helps to make the existence of 
the illusory objects more probable for particular observers is not however the same as 
saying that interpretation of perspective is itself culturally determined.)
12 Parallax phenomena would in any case have been unimportant if all the parts of the scene were distant.
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Figure 4.12. 
Gijsbrechts: A Letter Rack with Christian 
V’s Proclamation, 1671. 
From Koester, Olaf 1999 Painted Illusions: 
the art of Cornelius Gijsbrechts, National 
Gallery, London, p23.
Figure 4.13.
Samuel van Hoogstraten ‘Peepshow Box’ late 
1650s 58 x 88 x 63.5 cm; oil paint with some egg 
tempera and glue size; oak box.
The peephole is visible just to the left of the 
nearest vertical edge.
From Cole 1992 p36.
That Hoogstraten’s boxes (Figure 4.13) exist at all is evidence of a fascination with 
visual realist ways of seeing which is part of a particular visual culture remarked by 
Alpers, but equally they are a demonstration of the possibility of PI-realism since they 
can confuse the viewer as to what is real space and what is illusionistic painting. 
Again this is only possible granted tight control of the viewing conditions, in this case 
by use of a peephole.
  
Figure 4.14. The Ames room. 
Gregory’s account of how this illusion works confuses 
cultural influences with constants of perception. 
From Gregory 1998 p186
The Ames room illusion (Figure 4.14, described in Gregory 1998 p185-7) fools the 
observer because of culturally determined assumptions about the subject matter, 
namely that rooms are rectangular (an assumption which surprisingly is able to 
override the observer’s assumption that people are all roughly the same size, and to 
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swamp any sensitivity to focussing phenomena). However, this culture-driven 
assumption about the room, a precondition for the illusion, is again not to be 
mistaken for proof of the culturally determined character of geometric perspective 
projection. 
Under highly controlled conditions (especially when the absence of motion is 
suppressed), there is no a priori reason why an image, considered purely as a stimulus 
in the visual field, should not simulate the stimulus which would be provided (at 
least briefly) by the corresponding real objects. Any failure of the Brunelleschi, 
Gijsbrechts and similar illusionistic images to imitate the stimulus of a real scene does 
not reside in any weakness of their projective geometry, but in the failure of other 
perspectives, particularly binocular disparity and motion parallax, which cannot be 
dealt with by a static planar image in itself but only by extreme control of the 
conditions for viewing.
It might be objected that to control the viewing conditions in order to make the 
illusion work (even in theory) is ‘cheating,’ and certainly one could object to more 
extreme efforts intended to make picture and scene indistinguishable, such as 
diminishing the light levels, or making the subject matter itself planar, but, provided 
the necessity for these controls is admitted and not ignored, the argument for the 
possibility of PI-realism is still valid. There is no onus to produce a representation 
which could fool the observer in all circumstances since then it would have to 
withstand the effect, for example, of the observer looking at a canvas from the back, 
or taking off the VR headset and looking at it from a distance. The only objection can 
be to the extent of control which would invalidate the test of PI-realism, not the 
control as such.13 Goodman for example considers Brunelleschian controls ‘grossly 
abnormal’. However he seems to go too far in suggesting that such representations 
form an ‘odd and futile argument for the fidelity of perspective’ (Goodman 1969 
p13): he is moving without sufficient justification from an attack on the conditions of 
the experiment, to suggesting that it is wholly invalid.
PI-realism does not imitate the retinal image
Some important figures have suggested that a picture represents the retinal image 
and this has produced considerable confusion. Gregory for example has said that 
‘When an artist employs geometrical perspective he does not draw what he sees – he represents 
his retinal image ... A photograph represents the retinal image – not how the scene 
appears.’ (1977 p174 original emphasis). His comment risks being misunderstood. 
What a PI-realist image resembles is nothing within the eye but the visual rays 
converging from the scene onto the eye.14 
13 This need for control of the test conditions is inevitable given that a representation is not the thing it represents. An 
objection to Turing’s test is that it so narrows the opportunities for the observer to detect the illusion that it is an unfair 
test and therefore proves nothing (Searle 1977 p10-13).
14 Gregory (personal communication, 17 May 2001) has clarified the intention of his remark as dealing with subjective 
perceptions of scale (discussed later in this chapter) in which objects are not perceived as having the relative sizes at 
which they occur on the retina because their apparent size is influenced by  psychological considerations. He suggests 
that artists (when they are not using mechanical aids) tend to incorporate similar subjective scaling in their pictures. 
He is thus distinguishing the strictly optical from the psychological (as Klee did). However, it seems to me that 
referring to the optical pattern of the scene as the retinal image invites misunderstanding. His point about subjective 
scaling could more safely be expressed in terms of the external stimulus alone, without implying to the unwary that 
the image on the retina is itself accessible to vision.
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Panofsky claims that ‘artificial perspective’ (that is, linear perspective in Gibson’s 
taxonomy) is based on two assumptions: (a) that ‘we see with a single and immobile 
eye’ (an objection not in dispute here)15 and (b) that ‘the planar cross section of the 
visual pyramid can pass for an adequate reproduction of our optical image’ 
(Panofsky 1925 (1991) p29). The error of Panofsky’s argument becomes clear when he 
says that ‘perspectival construction ignores the crucial circumstance that this retinal 
image [...] is a projection not on a flat but a concave surface’ (op cit p31). So misled is 
he by this confusion between the stimulus and the receiving device that he suggests 
that we see lines as straight because of the conventions of painting and photography. 
His error is to consider at all the shape of the receptor which lies inside the eye. To 
simulate a scene, what is required is a perfect stimulus outside the eye, corresponding 
to the information in Gibson’s ‘sheaf of rays’, to which the internal shape of the eye is 
irrelevant.16 Alberti explicitly stated in 1435 that the operation of the eye itself is of no 
consequence to an understanding of his pictorial construction (Alpers 1983 p53). 
Though Panofsky was writing in 1925, the potential for confusion continues, as 
evidenced by Gregory’s remark of 1977 repeated in later editions (Gregory 1998 
p184).
Curved perspectives and ‘Leonardo’s paradox’
A second incorrect objection to linear perspective lies in another argument for curved 
perspectives. The ground for this argument is that if we face the buildings on one side 
of a street and look left the buildings get smaller with distance, that the same happens 
if we look to the right, and that the only way these impressions can be reconciled in 
the plane is by use of curved lines, as in Figure 4.15. 
Figure 4.15. Panoramic photograph taken in Whitehall, London, from London Times 14 November 1966.
From Gombrich 1980 p197.
Such a supposition however ignores the role of the picture-plane as an interceptor of 
Gibson’s sheaf of rays (or Panofsky’s planar cross-section of the visual pyramid) 
which is itself at a variety of distances from the observer, depending on which part of 
the plane the user looks at. The picture plane is subject to exactly the same 
‘distortions’ as the subject matter beyond (Figure 4.16).17 
15 Richards (1984 p4:8-4:11) points out the need to distinguish between a fixed location for a normal eye free to move in 
its orbit and a truly immobile eye which exposes the retina to an unchanging stimulus, a distinction which, he notes, 
Goodman (1969 p12) fails to make.
16 The Turing test for artificial intelligence rightly does not take any account of how the mind of the observer works, but 
of whether that observer may be fooled by an external stimulus.
17  As indicated at the beginning of the chapter on Depth Perception and Depiction, it is generally assumed in this thesis 
that the picture surface is a plane orthogonal to the line of sight in the centre of the cone of vision. Almost all 
depictions are made on such surfaces. Nevertheless, as the example of panoramas and pictures applied to domes and 
other curved surfaces would suggest, there is no need for the putative surface which intercepts the ‘sheaf of rays’ to 
be planar. The Hoogstraten boxes offer a composite picture surface which is not even contiguous. In terms of focus 
rather than geometry, claims can be made for a spherical surface whose centre is at the eye, since all parts of its 
surface  can be apprehended without the need for the eye to adjust to different distances. This is not an argument for 
using curved geometries in planar pictures.
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Figure 4.16. 
The solution to the controversy over curved picture planes 
and to Leonardo’s Paradox. 
From the viewing station e the further a part of the scene is 
displaced from the central axis of vision, the further also from 
the eye is the corresponding mark on the picture plane. This 
corrects the alleged distortion. Other viewing stations for the 
picture will lead to incorrect proportions, but this is not an 
objection to the geometry of PI-realism.
Original drawing.
 
Dubery and Willats (1983 p84-93) make a related error when dealing with Leonardo’s 
Paradox, an alleged problem of spatial representation first identified by Leonardo 
(Figure 4.17a-b). A row of identical and equally spaced columns runs across the 
observer’s view and, using the rules of geometric perspective, the image of these 
columns is cast onto the picture plane. The result is, as Leonardo pointed out, a 
distorted image, since the columns at the ends of the colonnade (which are further 
away and therefore should be smaller) are manifestly larger in the image.
 
                     
Figure 4.17a
A perspective projection of a row of columns, 
using ‘normal artificial perspective’. The 
columns which are further away make a 
shape in the representation which is wider 
than the central column which is closest.          
Figure 4.17b
The use of a curved projection to ‘correct’ the 
anomaly seen in R.16a
From Dubery and Willats 1983 p84 and 85
From this, Dubery and Willats deduce that the linear perspective system has no 
special claim to validity (op cit p86). Unfortunately they also have forgotten that the 
image is itself viewed in perspective. That is, if the image is positioned correctly – at 
the same location in relation to the viewing station that a sheet of glass between the 
original viewpoint and the colonnade would have been – the further columns in the 
scene will also be further away from the observer’s eye in the image so reducing their 
apparent size and restoring the correct proportions (Figure 4.16).
As Arnheim has pointed out (1956 p233), linear perspective does have a special 
relation to the visible world, since mechanically it can be a tracing of it. However, as 
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already indicated, the practicalities of enforcing the single correct viewing station are 
another matter. The misunderstanding of which Dubery and Willats work is an 
example arises because pictures are normally seen hung on walls or printed in the 
pages of books, where control of the observer’s viewpoint is impractical. This has 
indeed created practical difficulties, evidenced in the work of Saenredam and 
Vermeer for example (Dubery and Willats 1983 p86), but this in no way negates the 
optical correctness of images when considered as a stimulus substituting, under 
controlled conditions, for a view of the real world. Strangely, Dubery and Willats 
acknowledge that a compulsory viewing position is the solution (op cit p87), but rank 
this with choosing narrow fields of view and avoiding geometric subject matter as 
simply one contributory practical solution, rather than acknowledging that it 
undermines their case fundamentally.
As Alpers points out (Alpers 1983 p244, n39) Panofsky’s view of the subjectivity of 
linear perspective has been attacked by Gombrich and Pirenne among others. Pirenne 
sums up the position:
The picture in perspective of a scene or a set of objects is not a replica of the retinal image 
produced by the objects in the artist’s eye. It is rather a substitute for the actual 
objects themselves, so constructed that it sends to the eye a distribution of light 
similar to that which would be sent by the actual objects, with the result that, for any 
given eye, the picture produces retinal images similar in shape and dimension to 
those which would be produced in the same eye by the actual objects. 
Pirenne, MH 1948 Vision and the Eye, London, p15 
quoted in Edgerton 1976 p163, emphasis added
What is required is to organise the pictorial surface to stimulate the retinae in a way 
which matches looking at a scene, and control the conditions of viewing to ensure 
that the illusion is not undermined.
At this point it may seem that this special correctness of linear perspective counts 
fatally against the main arguments of this thesis in which I frequently suggest that the 
construction of visual representations is a pragmatic matter of making rather than 
matching: now I seem to be endorsing the opposite position. However the ongoing 
argument hinges not solely on the claims of geometrical correctness of PI-realism, but 
on the impossibility of deciding other aspects of the truth to be depicted (introduced 
in the previous chapter) and the practicality and usefulness of PI-realism. These last 
are now considered.
6 Difficulties of PI-realism
For convenience I shall from this point call PI-realistic those images which are 
designed with a view to approaching true pictorial illusion, even though as discussed 
they can only offer an illusion of natural vision under highly controlled conditions.
Difficulties of attaining PI-realism
One historical explanation of why not all pictures are PI-realist is that image-making 
cultures other than our own (that is, from the Renaissance onwards) were incompe-
tent either in terms of perception or execution. In Hogben’s commentary on oriental 
art noted earlier, there is an assumption that societies prior to, or geographically 
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remote from, the Renaissance did not make PI-realist images because they were 
unable. Renaissance literature tends to support this view by particularly emphasising 
the issue of the competence of various artists in constructing illusory spaces and 
objects. Thwaites belongs in this tradition, suggesting that ‘Greek and Roman art 
reveals that artists had a vague notion of perspective...’ (Thwaites 1999 p222 emphasis 
added). Similarly he suggests that ‘the creators of the paintings at Lascaux and 
Altamira used a primitive method of portraying distance: they drew figures in different 
sizes...’ (op cit p221 emphasis added). 
In opposition to this argument, cultural theorists such as Crary and Lalvani have 
argued that competence is not the key issue. This is where the concept of visual 
culture is useful: it highlights the possibility that the construction of PI-realist spatial 
illusions may in many cultures have elicited little or no interest. Given the 
widespread sophistication of both artistic and technological practice in many 
cultures, and the fact that their pictures often come close to (but do not become) PI-
realist images, the balance of probabilities is surely in favour of this view that cultures 
had (and have) other concerns, turning their attention away from this supposed 
‘goal’, rather than that they were unable to reach it. After all, though our own society 
is noted for its ability to produce PI-realist images, it also produces and uses 
innumerable kinds of pictures which are not of this kind, without the makers being 
accused of incompetence. This alone suggests that there are other reasons to make 
images which fall short of, or substantially diverge from, PI-realism.
This argument could lead to a view that picture-makers in all cultures could have 
made PI-realist images but chose not to. However this view is not easy to defend. It 
implies that making such images is a fairly straightforward and natural activity and 
therefore something likely to occur in any image-making culture. This seems 
unconvincing: although I have been arguing that the PI-realist picture has in one 
sense a uniquely ‘natural’ relation to the viewing of actual scenes, I do not argue that 
the making of such images is equally ‘natural’. On the contrary, the making of PI-
realist images seems distinctly difficult. A simple characterisation of the problem, that 
it is easier to draw what one knows than what one sees, seems borne out by the 
problems experienced by novices in drawing.18 The errors which occur (for example, 
incorrect estimation of the trapezoidal shape of rectangles when seen obliquely) are 
just as one would expect when the picture-maker is having great difficulty in 
suppressing the knowledge of how things ‘really are’ – that is, how they look when 
seen from other angles such as canonical points of view19 and how they seem or 
would seem to the sense of touch. Though the objective PI-realist image convinces 
when we see it, it is something impossible for the picture-maker to apprehend pre-
pictorially by introspection (to look at the retina from within, as it were). This seems 
to explain the proliferation of techniques and devices (the camera obscura and 
Dürer’s machines for example) which aim by external means to aid the capture of the 
PI-realist image. 
18 These observations are partly based on my own experience in teaching drawing over many years.
19 There is evidence that some views of objects are more significant than others, probably because they differentiate the 
object with greater efficiency, summarised in Bruce, Green and Georgeson 1996 p224. Canonical views are further 
discussed below.
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 Practical difficulties of using pictures to simulate vision
I have already noted how any shortfalls of picture-making from full optical realism 
must be concealed in order to achieve a true illusion of looking at a scene. If a 
binocular system is used, then binocular perspective and shifts in the amount of 
double imagery at contours are achievable.20 However, time-based cues (those 
dependent on motion or on the dynamics of the visual system) are difficult or 
impossible to solve in a static picture (I have noted how Gibson came to consider the 
absence of motion in pictures to negate any attempt to replicate vision pictorially). 
What cannot be achieved in the image itself may be compensated for by controlling 
the content and the context, the conditions under which the image is seen, but there 
will usually be real practical difficulties in enforcing these conditions, in which case 
the realism is no longer one where the image can be mistaken for an actual scene. 
Every other situation is ‘second best’ in which, whatever form of visual realism is in 
use, it is not defined by illusion as such. 
Other practical difficulties arise from the nature of the media in use. These may 
involve a minor shortfall from optical verisimilitude, for example the smaller tonal 
gamut of a picture compared with natural vision (though this may be compensated 
for by the comparative rather than absolute nature of many aspects of the visual 
system). Also there may be a fundamental lack of capability in the chosen medium, as 
for example in pencil drawings or wireframe computer graphics. This problem is 
often side-stepped by the use of what I have named illicit marks – marks which have 
no corresponding presence in the scene. The ‘halo’ of yellow around Dürer’s figure is 
an example (illustrated earlier in Figure 4.06), but perhaps the commonest is the 
drawn outline. So ubiquitous is it in pictures of all kinds that one could easily forget 
that it has no basis in the scene. What does it depict? It seems to stand for an aspect of 
the world after it has been perceived, after the scene has been processed by the visual 
system: it is certainly incompatible with PI-realism, which must be confined to a 
wholly external stimulus to vision.21 The use of outline is one of many pictorial 
attempts at VE-realism, the presentation of a stimulus which in some degree evokes 
the visual experience of looking at a scene, not simply the optical pattern of the scene 
which is looked at. I discuss such illicit marks further below.
Practical difficulties are not in themselves sufficient to account for the widespread 
creation of pictures which diverge from PI-realism. It is necessary now to consider 
ways in which PI-realism may fail to fulfil the functions intended for a depiction. 
Functional mismatch of PI-realism to the objectives
There are many reasons why the closest possible approach to PI-realism may simply 
not be suited to the task in hand. Even since the advent of photography, there has 
20 However, Vince (1995 p53 and 59) points out that while in natural vision the eyes converge on a point of interest in 
the scene and the location of the doubled imagery is therefore affected, in binocular computer 3D simulations the two 
views look out parallel to each other: ‘Ideally, the geometric model used for computing the stereo pair requires to 
know the fixating point, then it can rotate the virtual eyes and their respective projection planes to mimic 
convergence.’ This may be why the depth seen in binocular pictures often seems false, as though it were a succession 
of planes rather than fully volumetric.
21 Marr’s model of vision (1982 p37) proposes that mental constructs equivalent to outlines are a primary means of 
segmenting the scene at a very basic level, but this does not alter the fact that the lines are post-optical, not in the 
scene.
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been a continuous outpouring of images which do not use the spatiality of PI-realism. 
The representations favoured by architecture, product design, engineering, magazine 
advertising and many other image-using trades and professions use convergent 
perspective only as one among a range of possible projections. This is partly because 
it is not always as expressive in informational terms as the alternatives. In place of 
linear perspective, orthographic, axonometric, isometric and hybrid projections offer 
benefits such as constant scale or greater clarity about the interrelationship of 
multiple viewpoints. In the previous chapter, many disparate reasons emerged why 
the full depth cues of natural vision might be suppressed, distorted or subverted in 
order to convey information more effectively.22 
In addition to these objections on the grounds of informational function, there are 
reasons to question PI-realism when the image is considered as part of a process. As 
Baker (1993 p30-1) emphasises in relation to computer graphics, pictures perform a 
role in personal and social activity. Sketches for example are used for externalisation 
and reflection, as well as communication to others; technical drawings to convey 
unambiguous instructions to others; highly pictorial renderings to persuade 
colleagues, clients or planners. An image which closely matches natural vision has by 
its nature a character of completeness and non-negotiability (Schofield 1996), and 
several authors have pointed out the benefits of avoiding such characteristics in some 
circumstances. When a sketch is an element in a process, it is clear that there are 
merits to imprecision and tentativeness in depiction. Arnheim (1993) calls sketches 
‘guiding images’ whose role as externalisation facilitates the design process. As long 
as the guiding image is still developing, the sketch remains tentative, generic, and 
vague and this vagueness is not a negative quality. The sketch stands for a whole 
range of possibilities without being wholly committed to any one of them. This is a 
striking example of the concept of affordance in which the representation is chosen 
because it is less dictatorial of the mental visualisations which the user derives from it 
than in a more fully worked out picture. Scrivener and Clark (1994 p98-9) also 
suggest that the sketch operates by affording multiple mental images rather than 
being confined to one, and that the lack of specificity evokes greater imaginative 
work on the part of the perceiver. This is an argument for the limitation of visual 
realism in the interests of expressiveness. Their characterisation, like Arnheim’s, is 
essentially an operational one, in which the picture-maker puts down marks which 
afford interpretations, a process quite different from mapping Gibson’s ‘sheaf of rays’ 
or Pirenne’s ‘distribution of light’.
Another departure from simple realism is that of the illustrator who suppresses parts 
of a machine in order to reveal concealed mechanisms (Figure 4.18). The whole is a 
hybrid of two views, one a lively portrait of a car in action, the other a static depiction 
of its anatomy. The approach to realism is driven by the purpose.
For the cutaway car, the inclusion for informational reasons of normally invisible 
segments of the subject matter creates considerable extra work for the picture-maker, 
22 The word ‘reasons’ might seem to imply that these decisions were always deliberate – perhaps even a personal 
decision by a particular picture-maker – but this is not intended, as explained elsewhere.
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Figure 4.18. Cutaway visualisation of a car, 1952. 
From Sabin, Roger 1996 Comics, Comix and Graphic Novels: a history of comic art Phaidon, London p47
but in other cases informational demands and implementational constraints may 
coincide. In Figure 4.19 implementational constraints dictate that size perspective is 
suppressed since this enables views to be pre-imaged rather than calculated on the fly 
from model data. However such a projection also has the advantage of ensuring that 
all parts of the city are equally resolved and that the foreground is not unnecessarily 
favoured. As computer power increases, implementational constraints will decrease, 
but the functional argument will not. Nevertheless, a search for a greater sense of 
realism may on balance cause a change of practice: users may prefer the realism of 
convergent geometric perspective. It is important to note that such realism would not 
be informational, but affective: it is concerned not with giving the user more 
information about the scene, but a different relationship to it.
Figure 4.19.
Screen-capture of Sim City 2000.
© 1993 Sim-Business.
Published by Maxis, London, 1993
Mismatch of PI-realism with symbolic functions
An interesting issue of realism is raised by Richards (2000) who suggests a three-
dimensional relation between types of graphic communication (though here I deal 
only with two of his dimensions23). These are the mode of correspondence ranging from 
the literal to the metaphorical, and the mode of depiction ranging from the abstract to 
the figurative (Figure 4.20)). Richards describes these as ‘independent variables’ 
(Richards 2000 p97) which is clearly correct in the sense that the picture-maker may 
alter each without altering the other, but I suggest that to the viewer or user of a 
graphic the mode of depiction affects the perceived mode of correspondence and that 
23 The other dimension is concerned with modes of organisation such as grouping and linking.
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this represents another of the limitations on the functional usefulness of strong forms 
of realism. Pedersen (1998) found that imagery with a high level of realism caused 
symbols to be taken literally. Strong figurativeness tends to denote strong 
correspondence: thus if users see a picture which looks very like, say, an engine, they 
are more likely to interpret the configuration of the parts as showing how the parts 
really are in an actual engine than if there is low figurativeness leading them to think 
that it is a diagram or a symbol and should not be taken literally. If the London 
Underground map looked like an aerial view of a city – was towards the realist pole 
of the axis of depiction – users would assume that the map was more topographical 
than it actually is (they would be estimating its position as near the literal pole of 
Richards’ axis of correspondence). The role of imputed intention complicates the 
issue: a photograph and a highly realist non-photographic picture will be interpreted 
differently. The photograph will be regarded as accidentally specific (and irrelevant 
specifics therefore be ignored), whereas the other will be regarded as intentionally 








Modes of correspondence 
(horizontal) and modes of 
depiction (vertical) in graphic 
representation. 
Derived from Richards 2000, p97 
(The original model is three-
dimensional, the axis omitted 
here being ‘modes of organ-
isation’. The label ‘metaphoric’ is 
‘non-literal’ in the original, while 
‘non-figurative’ in the original is 
here called ‘abstract’).
Using the example of depicted trees, the extremes represented by a, b, c and d can be considered as follows:
   a an image with strong visual resemblance to a tree and intended to convey information about trees, perhaps an 
illustration in a field guide. There is no doubt that it is a picture, within the definition used in this thesis.
   b a perhaps identical image of a tree, but one which is intended as a metaphor for, say, the major divisions and sects of 
a religion. It is not a picture of the religion but is still undoubtedly a picture of a tree. 
   c an image which is intended to convey information about trees, but not through strong visual resemblance to an actual 
tree. For example it might diagram the flow of nutrients through the parts of trees. It is likely that in the nutrient-flow 
diagram the top of the tree is at the top of the diagram, but bark, leaves, etc. will probably be absent. This is perhaps 
still within the definition of a picture. 
   d an image which might exactly resemble the diagram at c but which is about, say, the flow of messages through a 
computer network. It is not a picture (unless the branches of the ‘tree’ are organised to correspond to the actual spatial 
relations of the network’s parts, in which case it ceases to be in any useful sense a picture of a tree but starts to become 
a picture of the network). 
Hogben (1949) suggests that the principal gains from the use of geometric perspective 
accrue to scientific communication, where the ability to convey a precise and 
relatively unambiguous depiction of what things look like to an original observer (for 
example in a study of a dissected body) is of extreme importance for the development 
of empirical science.24 For him this is of greater functional benefit to science than it is 
24 It is ironic that even realist pictorial images are (theoretically) infinitely ambiguous yet they have in practice been 
important for their informational expressiveness. This arises in part from the fact that the things depicted are 
generally not abnormal objects (this greatly decreases the range of possibilities of what may have been depicted) and 
from the fact that optimal views are chosen to maximise informational expressiveness. This theme is taken up in the 
next chapter in relation to film.
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for symbolic activity, for which he acknowledges the third dimension is an aspect of 
the perceived world which may conflict with other needs and purposes. Ivins (1953 
p127) notes the significance of the accurately repeatable illustration: ‘...without prints 
we should have very few of our modern sciences, technologies, archaeologies, or 
ethnologies – for all of these are dependent, first or last, upon information conveyed 
by exactly repeatable visual or pictorial statements.’ Edgerton (1976 p164) similarly 
argues that without the conjunction of printing and linear perspective the whole 
subsequent development of modern science and technology would have been 
unthinkable. Arnheim, following Ivins, suggests (1956 p233) that the 
contemporaneous emergence of prints as reproductions of a graphic original and 
pictures as reproductions of the world is not accidental. He regards the importation 
of a ‘scientific criterion of correctness’ into the visual arts as ‘a dangerous moment in 
the history of Western thought’ (ibid).
Marr and Nishihara (1978) describe vision as ‘a process that produces from images of 
the external world a description that is useful to the viewer and not cluttered by 
irrelevant information.’ This strictly functionalist characterisation of vision transfers 
poorly to the uses of pictures, because it leaves no role for the affective uses of 
pictorial realism. It could account for the realism of a scientific illustration, but not for 
that of a holiday photograph, since the latter seems to be full of ‘irrelevant 
information.’ Birrell, arguing (1999 p328-9) against the obsession with visual realism 
in computer graphics, suggests that ‘we should consider virtual objects by what they 
are and what they do, not what they look like’ but this is to beg the question of what 
depictions are for and to reject without reason the mimetic representation of visual 
scenes. The question remains, What is strong realism for, when it is not intended to 
fulfil some practical purpose? 
Baker has described the aim of realist computer graphics as being to map a three-
dimensional world to a plane surface in a ‘convincing and effective manner’ (Baker 
1993 p33 emphasis added) and this seems exactly right. In most cases either the demand 
is an operational one of effectiveness, in which case the realisms and concomitant 
spatialities chosen are those which support the practical functions which the pictures 
serve (as for example in the military training applications cited earlier), or the 
pictures must merely convince. In the former case complete truth is not required 
(even if it were achievable) since only those realisms required for the task are called 
into play, and in the latter case truth is not required at all – it is not necessary that 
something be true for it to be convincing. The requirement is an affective one, not 
informational. Such images must evoke in an apparently natural way the subjective 
character of lived experience. This will turn out also to be the criterion for most film-
making.25 
25 In dealing with these affective issues, the position is complicated by the user’s ambivalence about illusion. An 
awareness of the fact of illusion is in many cases itself a part of the user’s pleasure (as in Coleridge’s ‘willing 
suspension of disbelief’, Coleridge 1817 ch.14 ) an appeal like that of magic in that it creates something from nothing 
and is able to transmit pieces of reality from place to place.
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It is fundamental to the concept of ‘convincingness’ that realism does not reside 
solely within the artefact. The viewer brings to a picture an awareness of the context 
in which it is displayed and the technology which was used to make it, and this also 
leads to many different kinds of ‘being convinced’. When Sontag says (1977 p86) that 
‘the flat, usually rectangular, images which are photographs make a claim to be true 
that painting can never make’ she is referring to conviction about what is depicted in 
which the awareness that the medium is photography alters the context irrevocably. 
While strict PI-realism can be defined purely in terms of the relation between the 
image and the scene, all other forms of realism must take into account the context, 
including the viewer. 
For convincingness, PI-realism is not necessary. However, if a sense of ‘just seeing’ 
the scene is to be promoted, any conscious awareness of encoding or convention 
needs to be suppressed. Crucially, this does not mean that convention is not there, 
but that it is not noticed. In this sense the simulation of unmediated viewing may be 
better defined by absence than by presence. It is the lack of a sensation of encoding or 
convention in the image which makes a picture seem close to vision. This leads back 
to consideration of how the spatiality of pictures may be tailored to offer a more 
broadly defined visual experience.
7 PI-realism compared to Visual Experience
I have enumerated numerous difficulties which stand in the way of PI-realism, 
though acknowledging that technologies such as those of virtual environments have 
the potential to eliminate many of them, and have drawn attention to the functional 
purposes which pictures may serve, for which strong visual realism will only in some 
cases be appropriate. 
It is necessary now to contrast the PI-realist picture with the alternative approach to 
realism which I named earlier: VE-realism, which aims to evoke visual experience. 
Since the latter aims to capture subjective aspects of the situated experience of seeing, 
and since those aspects will be chosen differently in the light of whatever the picture-
maker intends, there clearly can be no one VE-realist picture which corresponds 
truthfully to the scene. VE-realism can therefore only be defined in terms of a general 
approach, while PI-realism by its nature could be defined once-for-all and explicitly.
I will discuss three drawbacks of PI-realism considered as a possible means of 
conveying visual experience: (1) its projection system (even though I have argued its 
optical correctness); (2) its relationship to time; (3) its being limited to the imitation of 
retinal stimuli. I deal with each of these in turn. A point which will emerge concerns 
the relation which I introduced earlier between the model or scene M, the view V and 
picturing P. It will become clear that only in the case of PI-realism can the clear-cut 
distinction between them be maintained.
PI-realism’s projection system
There are grounds for selecting alternative projections when the intention is to 
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capture the subjective experience of a space. I have already indicated how the 
‘flattened’ depth of oriental landscape painting promotes a different kind of 
exploration of the landscape. The form of such paintings might in some ways 
replicate more accurately the visual experience of looking at landscapes. For example, 
the phenomenon of subjective size constancy has been noted by Gregory (1977 p174): 
‘distant objects look too small in a photograph – it is a common and sad experience 
that a grand mountain range comes out like a pitiful row of molehills.’ When looking 
at an object in a scene there is a tendency to scale it to a size nearer to its local size, so 
that features on the horizon are effectively brought nearer. There seems good reason 
to suggest that the particular spatial construction of the oriental painting might – in 
this respect – have a better match with the experience of space than does the PI-realist 
image.26 
Figure 4.21. 
Van Gogh: Vincent’s Bedroom at Arles, 
September 1889
From Uhde, Wilhelm 1972 Van Gogh, 
Encyclopaedia Britannica, London, 
Plate 48.
Dubery and Willats (1983 p92) claim that Van Gogh may have painted his room in the 
way he did (Figure 4.21) as the result of the use of a measuring-stick such as a 
paintbrush or pencil in capturing a wide-angle view, which will always tend to result 
in a curved perspective. Their view assumes that this distortion took place as it were 
under Van Gogh’s nose without his noticing it.27 However the most convincing 
explanation for the painting’s appearance is that the painter was not trying to capture 
the optical image of the room but to make an artefact which affords some particular 
visual experience. Viewers ‘sense’ their own location in relation to the scene: the room 
feels like a small, intimate space because of the ‘distortions’ imposed on it. Whether 
the artist reached this result through the initial use of a measuring device producing a 
result which he liked and developed, or whether the whole image is constructed from 
the outset with the effect in mind is, for current purposes, irrelevant. The point is that 
the final decision was a pragmatic one based on an assessment of the effect on the 
observer. 
26 A similar dilemma arises in relation to colour constancy. When an object in a scene is observed – say a white tablecloth 
under trees on a sunny day – several factors causes it to be seen as white. But in the scene the tablecloth may actually 
appear quite dark and have a distinct non-white hue, a phenomenon that particularly captured the interest of the 
Impressionists. Which colour should the tablecloth appear in a picture? The ‘right’ answer will depend on the 
purposes of the picture-maker and the expectations of the picture-viewer, partly formed by the experience of other 
pictures. 
27 Dubery and Willats’ theory is made more questionable by their admission that Van Gogh made other pictures of his 
room using both more and less curved projections (Dubery and Willats 1983 p122 n8.5). 
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The relationship of space to time
Under this head are subsumed many different ways in which the experience of a PI-
realist picture may fail to accord with the experience of space considered over time. 
Willats offers a summary of the problems of relating what I have called PI-realist 
images to subjective experience:
But in fact photographs, or pictures which look realistic in a photographic way, only 
give one kind of truth: truth to appearances. Another kind of truth, equally important 
both to artists and to architects and engineers, is truth about the shapes of objects as 
they really are, independent of any particular viewpoint. This is the truth that 
Cézanne and later the Cubists were after: the kind of description of objects that we 
arrive at in our minds after the visual system has processed and collated the 
immediate and transitory sensations available at the retina. David Marr, attempting 
to describe this end-point or goal of the visual process, called it the ‘3-D model’ and 
described images of this kind as ‘canonical’.
Willats 1990 p237
This summary conflates three things:
   • ‘truth about the shapes of objects as they really are, independent of any particular 
viewpoint’; this is the problem of representing what is known about an object rather 
than what can be seen at a single moment from a single point of view: for example 
indicating aspects of the further side of a body which are not actually visible from a 
particular view.
   • canonical views: these have some overlap with the ‘truth about the shape of objects’ 
of the previous category but they are a subset of it in that they represent the most 
discriminating or iconic view: for example drawing a table-top more like a square 
than a trapezoid.
   • ‘the truth that Cézanne and later the Cubists were after’ which is a synthesis through 
accumulation of multiple particular, discrete observations.
In the previous chapter I discussed another aspect of time’s relation to pictures, the 
representation of cues such as changes in focus arising from the time-based operation 
of vision. There is yet another aspect which I acknowledged could not be directly 
captured in a static picture, namely motion in the scene, which I deal with now.
Capturing some aspect of motion in the scene
For the pioneers of photography, instantaneity was a goal28 – but vision takes place as 
part of continuous experience. Early commentators on photography were intrigued 
by the way the long exposure times of the period seemed to empty the streets of 
moving figures: anything which travelled through the space became invisible (Frizot 
1998 p28). We ‘know’ that a person who moves through a space is a coherent form 
and not a ghostly impression stretched through the environment. But when 
something moves, how should it be represented? Between the waterfall which might 
in an early photograph be a white streak or later a frozen crystal sculpture, which is 
closer to visual experience? This seems a problem which the moving image of film 
can solve, but to which the static picture cannot offer a definitive answer. Any 
photograph has a particular relation to continuous sense-impressions and so is an 
28 Nièpce’s thirty minutes in 1829 gave way to Nadar’s approximately 20 seconds in 1860, so that Disdéri could write 
‘What remains to be done, I think... is to speed up the process further: the ideal solution would be to obtain 
instantaneity’ (Virilio 1994(1988) p21) and by 1878, snapshots of 1/25 of a second were possible (Gautrand 1998a 
p233).
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artefact contrived to afford certain aspects of visual experience. It is designed to 
evoke selected aspects of natural vision, both less and more than could be apprehended 
by vision itself in the same brief time. 
Other forms of constructed image employ different analogies to the workings of the 
human visual system. One of the crudest attempts to make space stand for time 
appears in the work of the Futurists and in some works by Duchamp. Probably 
influenced by multiple-exposure photography, they painted multiple ‘echoing’ 
images in a single picture to show the successive locations of a moving object. The 
most interesting aspect of these is that they seem quite unacceptable – unrealistic – as 
‘natural’ representations of visual experience: the element of ‘encoding’ is highly 
apparent. In this they contrast strongly with both the frozen instant and the smeared 
impression of the photographic styles just discussed, either of which seems much 
nearer to naturalism. Part of the reason perhaps lies in the collapse of automorphism 
in such images. Object constancy in natural vision ensures that a single moving object 
is apprehended as just that, a single object. In these ‘multiple-exposure’ images 
however the object is multiplied. This draws attention to the artifice of picture-
making which breaks any illusion of ‘just seeing’.
A related spatial device is the use of two or more separate images of the same person 
or thing in a representation. Figure 4.22. shows a part of a page (drawn in 1340) in 
which Noah appears twice. 
Cole (1992 p9) notes that Figure 4.23, which shows a protagonist at two different 
stages in a narrative, is on the cusp of two different approaches to representation: the 
mediaeval convention of combining two episodes of a story in one scene and the 
early Renaissance fascination with new perspective techniques. The first can be 
thought of as representing informational expressivity – economically conveying 
several times in one image – while the other gives priority to the relation between the 
picture and the viewer – the affective aspect of picture-making. While the later 
history of painting shows the dominance of the latter, pictures with other purposes 
continue to use the informationally more expressive form: illustrations of assembly of 
machinery for example routinely show multiple time-states (Figure 4.24). 
Media Space 4 Spatiality and Realism  |  Stephen Boyd Davis  |  June 2002  84
Figure 4.22. 
The Velsilav Bible: Noah 
Building the Ark, in a Bible 
made in Prague circa 1340. 
From Unger, Richard W. 1991 
The Art of Mediæval Technology: 
images of Noah the shipbuilder, 
Rutgers University Press, New 
Brunswick NJ, plate 31.
Figure 4.23. 
Giovanni di Paolo: St John the Baptist Retiring 
to the Desert 31x39 cm; egg tempera on poplar. 
From Cole 1992 p9.
Figure 4.24. 
Illustration of the operation of a toy. 
Two time states in one image. 
From instruction leaflet for Lego Technic product 
no. 8511, © 2000 Lego Group, p19.
The issue is one of apparent naturalism in which elements unacceptable in the kinds of 
picture which imitate natural vision are accepted in pictures where overt ‘encoding’ is 
considered reasonable. What matters is not that realism should be complete but that it 
should lack any evidence of convention.
Representing what is known about an object (rather than a single moment and point of view)
Alberti asserted that ‘the painter has nothing to do with things that are not visible. 
The painter is concerned solely with what can be seen’ (Alberti 1435, quoted in Park 
1997 p135).29 Hogarth acknowledges the difficulties of reconciling what is seen and 
what is known, in his practical advice to new painters:
in the common way of taking the view of an opake object, that part of its surface, 
which fronts the eye, is apt to occupy the mind alone, and the opposite, nay even 
every other part of it whatever, is left unthought of at the time: and the least motion 
we make to reconnoitre any other side of the object, confounds our first idea, for want 
of a connexion of the two ideas, which the complete knowledge of the whole would 
naturally give us.
Hogarth 1753 Analysis of Beauty London, First Edition, p8 from Podro 1998 p111 
In the Albertian tradition Gombrich (1980 p197-200) proposes a test for the validity of 
linear perspective based on its omission of anything which cannot be seen from a 
single viewing station.
29 Park comments on the radicalism of Alberti’s statement in contradicting the Scholastic tradition in which ‘visible form 
is only one index, often faulty, of the true nature and substance of whatever one wishes to portray’ (Park 1997 p135). 
This is just the kind of change in cultural attitudes to vision which the concept of visual culture usefully captures.
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It is clear that the ability to give more form, structure, depth and so forth than PI-
realism allows, in short to be more expressive, encourages many kinds of picture-
making which are not limited to what can be seen in a moment from a single 
viewpoint. This also helps explain the multiplicity of different kinds of images, the 
‘sensory chaos’ of the world of pictures (Hagen 1980 p9), since each type of picture 
prioritises the affordances which are best suited to the particular aspects of form 
which it is intended to convey. Picture-makers often study their subject from many 
more angles than they depict, or investigate its underlying structure. This is a 
tradition which connects painters such as Leonardo and Stubbs to computer graphics 
researchers such as Waters (1987) or Scheepers et al (1997). It is not necessarily 
incompatible with a PI-realist image: the underlying model may simply lead to a 
more accurate mimesis of appearance. However, this merges into a kind of illicit 
mark-making where aspects of this other evidence are actually incorporated in the 
picture.
Faced with the limitations of PI-realism, picture-makers have invented numerous, 
variant techniques for incorporating in pictures what is known as well as what is 
seen. Yet at the same time they have generally retained the basic automorphism of 
visual realism. VE-realist picture-making pretends to be ‘like seeing,’ but the seeing 
which it resembles is augmented by the pragmatic incorporation of data derived from 
multiple views.
Capturing canonical aspects of objects in the scene
This is a form of VE-realism which often tends toward the symbolic or iconic –  
though still undoubtedly pictorial – and some examples might not be considered 
‘realistic’ at all. What matters here is ‘simple object identity without attention to 
momentary appearances’ (Hagen 1980 p13) – not so much the capturing of time-
based perceptions in pictures, but the elimination of time. I have already noted that in 
strongly realist styles it is possible for a representation both to picture something 
particular and stand for a generic concept, but it is a fundamental aim of many visual 
representations that they should eliminate the particular. Such pictures frequently 
adopt canonical views and suppress accidentals, for example in the images used for 
road signs, airport signage and icons in the digital interface. To achieve such images, 
omission from the optical image is not in itself enough: the scene or object must itself 
be configured in a canonical state. Not only P and V, but M, must be designed for the 
purpose. 
Ethnographers have observed how in the case of magic carried out on images, the 
images do not display any likeness to the man who is bewitched: there is nothing 
resembling a portrait, merely ‘a very schematic representation, a poorly executed 
ideogram’ (Taussig 1993). These images are recognisable as people, because a 
canonical pose is depicted. Such images have just enough realism (very little) to afford 
the operation for which they are designed. The maker of the magic identifies the 
representation with a particular individual and this individual therefore does not 
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need to be visible in the representation itself. Model, view and context (including the 
user) taken together comprise a sufficiently expressive system.
The idea of the ‘most characteristic aspect’ helps to explain representations such as 
children’s drawings which seem to negate the need for a concept of a viewing station 
altogether – as though the transformation was M Õ  P rather than M Õ  V Õ  P. If there 
is automorphism it is not of the kind discussed so far: now it is the connectedness of 
objects which is represented visually and not their spatial relation when seen from 
any place. The topology of what is depicted begins to dominate its topography. 
Burton has developed a computer simulation to explore some of the processes he 
believes are involved in children’s drawing (Figure 4.25). He contrasts his algorithms 
(in the program Rose) with the process which would define a viewpoint on an object: 
‘A projective interpretation would describe the human as drawn as seen from the 
front, and the horse as seen from the side. It is important to realise that for Rose this is 
not the case. Rose uses the secondary axis to identify the most informative way to 
differentiate between opposite sides of an object’ (Burton 1995 pC167).
Figure 4.25. A viewpoint-based picture and a viewpointless view of three animals. Burton rather misleadingly 
captions the first ‘experience of three animals’ a title which would probably be better applied to the second drawing. 
From Burton 1995 pC169 Figs. 15 and 16.
Drake (1986) discusses the balance of picturing and non-pictorial methods in 
conveying scientific information. In Figure 4.26, as with many diagrams having visual 
 
   Glucose Fructose
Figure 4.26. Diagrams of glucose and fructose molecules. Redrawn from Drake 1986 p153.
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referents, a pragmatic combination of the pictorial and the schematic is used. A 
disadvantage of a more pictorial representation such as a ‘ball and stick’ model 
rendered as a picture would be that it invites the user to misinterpret the image as 
though the ‘ball and stick’ were not metaphorical but literal (as in the interference 
between Richards’ modes noted above). In this more schematised representation it is 
highly unlikely that the user will make this error. Yet it is still able to benefit from 
some of the ‘just seeing’ characteristics of pictures. As Drake puts it, these diagrams 
make it easy to ‘find one’s way about in a molecule, so to speak’ (Drake 1986 p153).
Representing multiple aspects of a space derived from a series of observations
While the previous section touched on an enormous population of images, the 
representation of multiple particular aspects in a single image accounts for far fewer 
examples. 
In painting, the aggregation of multiple views is important in the work of both 
Cézanne and the Cubists, yet there is little resemblance between them. The two 
interpretations of the same idea are perceived in very different ways, one being seen 
as pictorial, the other as distinctly schematic. 
Figure 4.27. 
Paul Cézanne: Vase of Tulips, Oil on Canvas, 1890-94. 
From Elgar, Frank 1969 Cézanne Thames and Hudson, London.
Cézanne’s Vase of Tulips (Figure 4.27) has a superficial resemblance to a conventional 
linear perspective picture. Yet Cézanne rejects the depiction of a single moment 
implied by PI-realism. For example, the two segments of the far edge of the table fail 
to ‘line up’. The edge of the table at left is defined in relation to the left edge of the 
vase, that on the other side in relation to the right.30 Cézanne frequently explores such 
anomalies because he aims to use the planar image to recreate the exploratory visual 
experience of looking at a three-dimensional space. The spatiality of Cézanne’s work 
is designed to allow him to articulate the aspects of visual experience which interest 
him.
30 This phenomenon also occurs in the work of incompetent picture-makers, but is acknowledged to be deliberate in 
Cézanne’s case.
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Figure 4.28. 
Georges Braque: Soda, Oil on canvas 1911. 
From Hughes 1980 p33 Fig 16.
The work of the Cubists does not tend (as Willats claims it does) towards the 
elimination of viewpoint, but rather towards its detailed exploration. In the Cubists’ 
case it is principally concerned with using painting to make a record of observations 
over time (Figure 4.28). They are almost non-pictures, since, unlike the Cézanne, they 
are even less automorphic representations of a scene then the futurist paintings which 
offered multiple instance in a single canvas: they are shifting from the pictorial to the 
schematic. It is important to recognise however that automorphism is a matter of 
degree. Even Cubist paintings do not require the viewer to refer to some external 
legend in order to decode them. The ‘legend’ here lies in the shared understanding of 
pictorial representation itself, without which these paintings would be 
incomprehensible. Again a spatiality has been developed which is finely adjusted to 
the intentions of the picture-makers and the prior knowledge of the users. 
PI-realism limited to the imitation of retinal stimulation
The marks which appear in a PI-realist image must by definition imitate the source of 
the sheaf of rays which is received at the eye. Gregory (1970 p33) points out that 
nevertheless such images fail to specify unambiguously the shape and position of 
objects. Most of the ways of dealing with this problem which I have documented so 
far involve the use of alternative projection systems or some other means of including 
aspects of the scene which would not be visible in a PI-realist image, in order to 
provide greater clarity of information. They are interventions in V, the view. 
However, these did not necessarily imply the addition of marks not authorised by the 
scene, the illicit marks to which I have several times referred, which clearly belong to 
P, the depiction itself. 
When Gell (1998 p165) says as part of an extended argument about the differences 
between language and visual art that whereas the ‘d’ in ‘dog’ does not stand for part 
of a dog, any line which is included in a drawing of a dog does represent some part of 
a dog, he is only partly right. It is true that the automorphism of pictures guarantees 
that the mark appears in approximately that place in the picture which corresponds  
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Figure 4.29
Jane Walmsley: postcard of a woman 
in the costume of the 1840s 
© J. Bartholomew 1988
to the location of that part of the animal in the ‘sheaf of light rays’, but the line is not 
necessarily a delineation of some piece of the referent. The line may also, or instead, 
function as an affordance of an analogous visual experience. This is a fundamental 
difference between PI-realist and VE-realist picture-making.
As indicated earlier, the commonest case of the illicit mark is the drawn outline. 
These are rarely a crude delineation of the edges of objects. Even in Figure 4.29, 
where the delineation of objects is mechanical in character, a heavier outline is used 
around the figure to ‘lift’ it off the page. Though an analogue of depth perception, it 
of course has no direct optical equivalent in the scene. It is used to construct the space, 
however coarsely.
A related technique is used in some cartoon drawings, where a shape outlined in 
black is additionally separated from the background by a white outline (Kurlander, 
Skelly and Salesin 1996 p229, Figure 4.30). It is also used in graphical user interfaces 
to make the cursor ‘float’ over all other displayed elements.
Figure 4.30
The use of an ‘illicit’ halo to help characters 
stand out from their background. 
From Kurlander, Skelly and Salesin 1996
Such illicit marks have a long history. Deregowski (1984 p42) shows Bushman 
petroglyphs (not illustrated) from South Africa, of ‘ancient but unspecified date’ in 
which the more distant horn of antelope is clearly drawn as separate from the head of 
the depicted animals. The illicit gap is there to ‘make’ space, not to match the optics of 
the scene.
Media Space 4 Spatiality and Realism  |  Stephen Boyd Davis  |  June 2002  90
A common technique for creating depth in drawings is to draw lines ‘onto’ surfaces, 
for example tracing round a cylindrical form or across a rectangle. Such marks may 
indicate the direction of surfaces converging on (or in some other way relating to) a 
vanishing point (Figures 4.31 to 4.33). The way some marks trace around a surface is 
analogous to touch (Figures 4.33 to 4.35). In neither case do they correspond to traces 
in the optical image. They make a space which is analogous to the perceived scene. 
Such illicit marks are clearly conventional: though they build upon the basic depth 
cue of linear perspective, the viewer should interpret them as codes to show depth, 
not as actual marks on the surface of objects. Illicit marks are dependent on shared 
culture which enables the viewer to interpret the marks in the correct way and in so 
doing to see ‘through’ the codes without being aware of them as such.
Figure 4.31.
From a letter from Evelyn Dunbar to Charles Mahoney, 
September 1935 © Estate of Evelyn Dunbar.
From Fine Art Society catalogue of exhibition ‘Charles Mahoney 
1903-1968’ at Fine Arts Society, London 10 March -14 April 2000, 
p13 Fig.R.
In Figure 4.31 the angle of the marks in the various cross-hatched shadings conveys 
the depth-spatial direction of surfaces, most notably for the changing angles where 
surfaces of the topiary bushes meet.
Figure 4.32.
Agnes Miller-Parker: Woodcut illustration for HE Bates 1979
Down the River Victor Gollancz, London (reissue of publication of 1937), 
p139.
In Figure 4.32 the angles in depth of the surfaces of the rock are created by illicit use 
of cross-hatching, mainly executed using marks parallel to the edges of rectangular 
surfaces.
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Figure 4.33.
François Boucher: Young man sitting, Study of Head and Hands (detail)
From Royal Academy of Arts/Metropolitan Museum of Art catalogue for 
exhibition Chardin, Royal Academy of Arts 11 March - 29 May 2000, p93 
Fig.13.
The lines drawn ‘around’ the surface of the face in Figure 4.33 have no basis in the 
optical image. They illicitly ‘borrow’ cues of linear perspective and are also rather like 
the traces of an exploring touch.
Figure 4.34.
Marjorie Knowles: Ceramic mosaic Minerva (detail).
From Cheek, Martin 1998 Design Sourcebook: Mosaics 
New Holland, London, p87.
Much of the work of constructing the depth-spatial form of the figures in Figure 4.34 
is done by the linearity of the mosaic tesserae which travel across and along the 
principal directions of surfaces.
Figure 4.35.
Van Gogh : Boy with Sickle, crouching, black chalk and 
watercolour, October 1891 (detail).
From Harris, Nathaniel 1982 The Art of Van Gogh The 
Hamlyn Publishing Group, London, for WH Smith, p20.
The legitimate linear cues provided by the creases in the back of the boy’s waistcoat 
in Figure 4.35 are supplemented by many other linear marks which help to ‘explain’ 
the shape of the surface. The viewer tries to decipher the marks as evidence of the 
manual, perceptual and constructive processes which produced it, ‘reading’ the 
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intentions of the picture-maker. Note also the exaggerated shadow on either side of 
the nearer arm which helps to ‘make’ space between it and the body behind. 
Picture-makers do not adopt a rigorous logic in their use of illicit marks: such marks 
are usually combined with optical data in an ad hoc pragmatic way, which as noted 
earlier may be driven as much by the ongoing solution of pictorial problems as by 
any preconceived system. This also is something that the acculturated viewer is able 
to interpret. Wollheim refers to the picture-maker building up analogies between the 
medium and the object of representation, seeking an ‘ever more intimate rapport 
between the two experiences’ (Wollheim 1980 p224) and Podro offers specific 
examples: 
...we recognise a figure in the lines of a drawing and when it is a figure in movement 
we may recruit the apparent impulse of the line – imagine the impulse of the line – to 
fill out our sense of the movement [...] in such cases the line relates itself to the figure 
twice over, once by its shape and once by its apparent impulse. The line connects 
shape to movement as they can be connected only in drawing. Shape and movement 
become projected onto each other, so that while making recognition more replete the 
image takes on a structure which has no equivalent outside depiction. 
Podro 1998 p9
Only in the case of the PI-realist representation can the model M and the 
transformations of viewing and picturing V and P be distinctly separated. As soon as 
one departs from strict PI-realism the two begin to interact – the how begins to 
become the what.
In the digital image the development of rendering algorithms has largely been 
devoted to resemblance to an idealised version of photography and little has been 
done to explore alternative relations between the evidence in the scene and the marks 
in the image. Lansdown and Schofield (1995) however list some examples, including 
Schofield’s own Piranesi renderer. Attempts have been made in both 3D rendering 
and paint systems to replicate the materials traditionally used by artists, but the 
authors point out that this is in its own way a limiting view. What is required, they 
argue, is not just the facility to imitate familiar rendering styles, but techniques to 
make more expressive representations. These would be drawings which ‘speak’ to the 
viewer more directly of the forms they depict – mark-making as a form of 
explanation, even though it maintains much of the automorphism of ‘pure’ pictures. I 
have shown how almost all pictures other than photographs incorporate additional 
marks, or suppress optical information from the scene, with the pragmatic intent of 
articulating the space (and other aspects of the model) rather than simply re-
presenting optical data. Illicit marks are a clear illustration that both V and P are 
representational interventions, not straightforward translations. They make it 
possible for the picture-maker to ‘tell’ about the scene graphically rather than simply 
to ‘show’ it, favour the affordance of certain perceptions over others. To create only 
PI-realist pictures is to forego this possibility.
Media Space 4 Spatiality and Realism  |  Stephen Boyd Davis  |  June 2002  93
8 Maturity
An aspect hardly discussed so far but implied throughout, is that picture-making has 
become a mature form, in which spatial practices have evolved to allow a close match 
between the particular spatialities adopted for an image and the objectives which it 
serves. Renaissance linear perspective offers an instructive example of transition from 
a problematic new technology at odds with the pictorial practices which it invaded to 
a thoroughly integrated informational and affective device. Greenaway has 
complained of the damage caused by the move to using size perspective in place of 
semantic sizing based on significance: ‘All those other things that the Renaissance 
taught us to forget – that Christ is this big [spreads arms] and the apostle is this big 
[much smaller], which a twelfth century Amiens peasant wouldn’t have had a 
problem with, but subsequent to the Renaissance we all have a problem with because 
the Renaissance taught us about illusionism and realism and all those other irrelevant 
phenomena’ (interviewed in Melia and Woods 1998 p30). Despite Greenaway’s 
objections, geometric perspective has been so absorbed into spatial practice that a 
‘double game’ can be played in which the ‘accidents’ of perspective can be used as 
part of the articulation of meaning. This is apparent in Ucello’s Battle (Figure 3.08) in 
the way that the orthogonals point at the empty space into which the Duke’s horse is 
about to leap – a more dramatic composition than if the orthogonals had simply 
directed the eye straight to the Duke in situ. An example of both the problems and the 
potential is offered by the Crivelli Annunciation (Figure 3.07). On the one hand the 
dictates of 3-spatial coherence have demanded the absurd introduction of an arched 
aperture in order that the divine ray can pass unobstructed from the heavens to the 
Virgin. On the other hand there is a subtle use of orthogonals as two-dimensional 
devices, for example to connect the distant gazing man who shields his eyes to the 
aperture just described. Speaking of the Rape of Helen by Paris by a follower of Fra 
Angelico, c.1450 (not illustrated), Bann suggests that the painting presents a kind of 
redundancy, in which those elements which are most important in the narrative are at 
the same time most important to the construction of the space (Bann 1987 p87-9). 
Importance, which had been represented schematically, came increasingly to be 
represented perspectively. Linear and size perspectives which had originally been 
difficult to put to use and risked undermining the expressivity of the medium, 
became part of a mature, integrated spatial articulation. Instead of the space 
operating at odds with the meanings of the painting it comes to enhance or even 
multiply the meanings. It also enables new meanings to be created which were not 
capable of being uttered previously, as for example in the much discussed 
perspectival play of Velasquez in Las Meninas of 1656 (Searle 1980 p247-258 and 
Foucault 1974 (1966) p3-16). Such maturity will be seen in the next chapter to be an 
important characteristic of the spatial character of film and to a large extent of 
television. However I shall argue that no such maturity has yet emerged in the 
spatiality of digital interactive media.  
———————————————————
Media Space 4 Spatiality and Realism  |  Stephen Boyd Davis  |  June 2002  94
In this chapter I have analysed the notion of realism in spatial terms. I have shown 
that the idea of realism is often invoked without clear definition and as though it 
required none. In place of this vague concept I have proposed that many different 
kinds of realism can be discerned in pictorial artefacts, often arising directly from the 
selective employment of the depth cues which were discussed in the previous 
chapter. 
I have defined one theoretical realism, PI-realism, which would give the illusion that 
a picture was not a picture but a view of a real scene. By definition such a picture 
need not take account of the cultural context, only of universal characteristics of the 
physiology of the human eye. I defended this concept of PI-realism against relativist 
views of picture-making which question the special superiority of one projection 
system by claiming that it has a wholly cultural basis.
I then discussed the many difficulties which PI-realist depiction raises. These 
included practical difficulties of execution and of controlling the conditions of 
reception. I also discussed several ways in which pictures which attempt to conform 
to PI-realism may be less expressive than if they aimed to capture aspects of visual 
experience more broadly conceived, which I termed VE-realism. I showed that this 
failure of expressivity may involve both information and affect: the PI-realist image 
may not function well as a vehicle for spatial information, and it may fail to afford the 
user the particular relation to the image which is wanted. It also cannot reflect the 
purposes of the image considered as part of a process and (as sketches show) excess 
of information may limit expressivity. PI-realism is in one sense a definitive theoretic 
realism, but also a limited interpretation of the concept.
VE-realism might be regarded as a subset of PI-realism on the grounds that it falls 
short of offering an illusion of looking at a scene. However, the arguments of this 
chapter suggest that they are better conceived as overlapping approaches (Figure 
4.36) since VE-realism is able to capture aspects of experiencing volumetric space 
which are not accessible to PI-realism. It includes aspects such as non-optical 
projections and illicit marks which would be excluded from the PI-realist image. 
PI-realism VE-realism
Figure 4.36 Neither PI-realism nor VE-realism should be conceived as a subset of the other.
In many cases PI-realism and VE-realism are incompatible: in order to better 
present some aspect of visual experience, an aspect of PI-realism is abandoned.
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A true PI-realist image would make no use of pictorial convention (it would not 
need to). In trading PI-realism for VE-realism, the freedom from cultural convention 
which PI-realism offers is sacrificed. VE-realist images work to a considerable extent 
by being natural to the extent of automorphism, but also partly by appearing natural 
even when they are actually using conventions. As a result, to one observer a 
particular VE-realist picture may appear the exact counterpart of natural vision 
while to another it may seem strongly conventionalised. Different cultures at 
different times, and to a certain extent different individuals, will either see through, 
or be conscious of, these encodings. When Klee or Gregory look at an image having 
convergent verticals, they are struck by its oddness; they are looking at a picture 
which seems aberrant from natural vision. This apparent aberration is admitted by 
both to be in some sense correct, but the damage has been done: because both are 
accustomed to verticals being ‘corrected’ in both painting and photography, it 
seems to them that an unnatural encoding has taken place. This is the key to 
‘realism’ in depiction. It is not the match of the depiction to the scene which matters, 
measured in objective terms, but the perceived naturalness of apprehension. It is 
defined not so much by the presence of any particular qualities, but the absence of 
one, namely by the absence of any apparent encoding. It matters little whether some 
aspect of a depiction operates through visual encoding (apprehended with the 
assistance of cultural convention) or through some kind of direct mapping of the 
scene to the plane, provided that the methods of the picture and the culturally 
influenced expectations of the viewer together produce this absence. It is the 
sensation that encoding is not present, not the actual absence of convention, which 
creates the impression of a natural, realistic picture. The following chapters will 
show that whether or not a depiction seems transparent in this way also 
differentiates spatial practices in screen-based media.
I have developed a model of picture-making as pragmatic in two senses: a picture is 
situated in a context of intentional activity and its appearance is moulded to its 
objectives; in addition picture-making is characterised by pragmatic pictorial 
decisions in which the elicitation of a response is as important (often more 
important) than the matching of an external referent. The marks which constitute a 
realist picture are best thought of as stimuli intended by the picture-maker to afford 
an experience analogous to natural vision, rather than necessarily being a copy of 
anything. The picture-maker offers data which, for the viewer informed by prior 
and current context, afford the ‘perception’ of more than is on the picture-plane.
In this chapter the difficulty of matching static pictures to the dynamic experience of 
natural vision has been highlighted several times. Film seems an obvious solution to 
this problem. However in the next chapter where filmic and related spaces are 
analysed it will once again turn out that the concept of making rather than matching 
is the key to understanding the spatiality of these media.
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5 Screen Space I: the Spatiality of Film
1 Introduction
This section of the thesis, comprising three chapters on screen space, begins with an 
analysis of the spatiality of mainstream fiction film. The contrasting spatial practices 
of factual television are then discussed, forming the groundwork for a study of the 
spaces of interactive pictorial media.
I argue that film illustrates very clearly how the expressivity of a medium, as with 
pictures, is based on the ways in which spatial representations do not match vision, 
once again questioning any simple notion of realism. As before, this expressivity has 
two aspects – the ability to convey meaningful information and the ability to promote 
a particular relationship between the viewer and the representation. By 
understanding how the screen genre of classical fiction film makes characteristic use 
of space, one can begin to see which aspects of film can – and which cannot – be 
adapted to other genres.
There is a danger that I may seem to treat film as though it were a matter of formal 
design – as though the elements of sound, of narrative, and of drama were secondary. 
However the aspects of narrative and drama are crucial to the argument. Bordwell 
suggests (1985 p50) that ‘Hollywood cinema subordinates space to narrative 
causality’ and I shall argue that this relation between spatiality and narrative in film 
is so fundamental that it makes difficult any simple re-application to interactive (that 
is, less strongly narrative) media. 
Outline of the chapter
The chapter begins with an analysis of the components of filmic space which is 
broadly divided into the space depicted within shots and that created between shots. 
Spatial properties within the frame are then considered in some detail, emphasising 
as in previous chapters the variables of viewing and picturing. To this is now added 
variation over time. Whereas one might have expected that the addition of motion 
and other time-based properties such as dynamic focus to depiction would lead to 
closer imitation of natural vision, I show that it is in fact used quite differently.
Though I make clear that the picture within the film frame does not straightforwardly 
capture an objective optical truth, it is clearly in some broad sense realistic because of 
the high level of automorphism which photography offers. Consideration in spatial 
terms of the relationship between shots reveals a quite different situation, and much of 
the chapter is devoted to analysing this aspect. I show how film-making, like the 
making of still pictures, adopts and rejects kinds of realism on the basis of its 
objectives. For the fiction film this is, above all, narrative. 
Returning to the model of depiction proposed earlier, I demonstrate the mutual 
relationship of viewing V and picturing P to the model M, in particular rejecting any 
view of film-making as the capturing of pre-formed scenes. I discuss the principal 
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influences on shot selection and introduce the concept of the optimal view, that shot 
which, crudely speaking, gives in context the greatest information, and which for that 
reason is the shot which the viewer most wants (or needs) to see. This simple concept 
is refined and its limitations considered. In particular I emphasise the importance of 
authorial denial of the optimal view for narrative purposes.
Gance remarked of filmic innovation that ‘what now appears the simplest of things 
may once have seemed the most incredible of inventions’ (Brownlow 1968 p528) and 
the hundred year history of film is filled with examples of both sudden and subtle 
refinements to existing spatial practice. I consider how the spatiality of fiction 
narrative has diverged from that of non-fiction screen genres using the example of 
two historical films, Citizen Kane and Napoléon to emphasise spatial techniques which 
have at one time flourished but subsequently been expunged from mainstream film-
making. I show how this follows from the fiction film’s objective of appearing 
unmediated despite the cavalier authorial way in which space is treated. These 
abandoned spatial techniques are shown later to have found their place in some 
specialist film-making and in factual television, suggesting that it is genre, rather than 
media or technology, to which spatial practices belong.
Though I emphasise how analysis reveals the artificiality of film, it is essential also to 
deal with the powerful sense of directness, of ‘just seeing’, which film promotes. 
Harrington points out (1973 p10) that film shows things rather than explaining them. 
Reeves and Nass claim (1998) that people react to on-screen stimuli such as a face in 
the same way that they react to actual faces. Sudden movements or vertiginous 
scenes produce a visceral response. Much of what film shows has this direct, 
apparently unmediated quality and it would be a poor theory of spatiality which 
failed to deal with this sense of the real. The issue of film realism is addressed in the 
same terms as for pictures in the preceding chapters, considering both correspondence 
to aspects of natural vision and the functional arguments against attempting to imitate 
vision. As before I argue that, even if it were possible to confine the design of 
representations to the imitation of natural vision, this would involve a disastrous loss 
of expressiveness. Nevertheless the illusion of unmediated vision is of the greatest 
importance.
To point up the spatial practices of mainstream film-making and to introduce the 
contrasted spatial practices of factual television, I discuss the contrasting spatiality of 
the films of Greenaway, showing how this too is an outcome of the objectives of the 
artefact, objectives quite at odds with the mainstream. This close fit of spatial practice 
to objectives is argued to be an aspect of film’s maturity: what film-making attempts 
to convey and the effects that it attempts to exercise on the audience are well served 
by its spatial forms. This contrasts strongly with pictorial interactive media which 
have yet to find spatial forms appropriate to their objectives, partly because in most 
cases those objectives are unclear. Interactive media also suffer from the characteristic 
problem of any immature medium that there is a lack of shared knowledge of a body 
of conventions between makers and users of each multimedia genre. I show how 
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film’s spatial codes by contrast rely on substantial prior knowledge shared between 
film-maker and viewer, an advantage not yet possessed by less familiar genres. 
Apparent limitations have been turned to strengths: the fact that the camera is not an 
eye allows it to do things the eye cannot do (just as in the previous chapter the fact 
that a picture was not a replica of natural vision allowed many possibilities to be 
exploited). 
An indication of maturity is the degree of omission made possible by the extent of the 
knowledge shared between makers and users. Film has been gradually paring away 
the structural devices it uses, so that the simple cut is now dominant, its 
interpretation relying on what precedes and follows the cut and on the shared 
understanding of film ‘language’. While it may be attractive to produce a tidy theory 
that structure p means x and that whenever y is meant it should be indicated by q, in 
practice spatial devices will always be more prone to ‘messiness’ than such theories 
allow. This ‘messiness’ arises from the pragmatism of spatial development, in which 
innovations become absorbed into general practice if they seem to work, regardless of 
whether they fit a neat theoretical model. I emphasise again the role of ad hoc 
solutions created during the execution of works, solutions which may be abandoned 
or absorbed into general practice and which take the film-maker into territory both 
more rewarding and more problematic than attempts at ‘straightforward’ 
representation – and I continue to show that representation is never straightforward!
Terms used
I use the term film-maker in order deliberately to leave open whether the decisions are 
taken by the director, the cinematographer, the editor or someone else. As with the 
previous terms designer and picture-maker, I do not suggest that one person is solely 
responsible. In film-making it is more likely than not that the finished artefact is the 
product of decisions by many individuals.
The phrase ‘classical Hollywood cinema’ was coined by Bordwell, Staiger and 
Thompson (1985) for their exploration of the relationship between the form of film 
and the context of its making. Here I use ‘classical fiction film’ as shorthand for a 
collection of filmic practices associated with mainstream commercial cinema. 
2 Film space
I showed in the last chapter that what seems a naturalistic representation in one 
context seems ‘encoded’ in another. This arose partly because of the difficulties of 
achieving a definitive visual realism and partly because such realism was at odds 
with many other objectives of making pictures including the offering of other, 
incompatible kinds of realism. 
The high level of spatial naturalism which photography gives to the individual film 
frame is not carried over into the spatial qualities of film considered over time. This is 
at first surprising, since it was apparent when considering pictures that a key factor 
militating against the illusionistic imitation of vision was the absence of motion. One 
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might expect that with the reincorporation of the missing time component most of 
these ‘problems’ would be solved. This turns out not to be the case.
Obviously motion confers practical benefits. It is no longer necessary to fix the viewer 
to a single viewing position in order to prevent the breaking of certain pictorial 
illusions: the impression of solidity can now be generated by moving the camera 
viewpoint around the model. Nevertheless there is still a problem of visual illusion 
being undermined by the intrusion of unwanted context. This is traditionally partly 
solved in the cinema by projection in a darkened room.1 Viewers virtually reorient 
themselves to the correct viewing station to an extent sufficient for a general 
sensation of visual realism, even though there is no possibility of being deluded that 
the screen is a window on a real scene.
The components of film space
The essential characteristics of filmic spatiality which differentiate it from previous 
technologies of the moving image are (1) its use of photography, with all that that 
implies about both actual visual realism and perceived authority, and (2) the use of 
movement orthogonal to the picture plane. Previous technologies had allowed 
movement parallel to the picture plane but it was orthogonal movement that made 
the Lumières’ arriving train so startling (Brownlow 1968 p4).
In discussing pictures I noted the difference between the extent of the model M and 
that of the view V, which in film is one of the principal means of articulation. It is also 
of course one of the ways in which even the most realistically inclined film fails to be 
like natural vision, replacing the gradual transition from focused to peripheral vision 
with a strictly bounded view which is normally narrower than the natural field of 
vision. 
The film-maker controls the actual physical spaces chosen or constructed (that is, the 
model M), the disposition and motion of people and movable objects within the space 
(the action, also an aspect of M), and the view V. Though the photographic basis of 
film denies the filmmaker some of the control over picturing (P) which painting 
allows, it will be seen that even photography allows a surprising degree of control 
over how a view is rendered, and the use of these variables yields specifically spatial 
outcomes. 
Movement of characters and objects in and around the space has the same 
significance it would have in real life, but in addition the movement takes place 
relative to the viewer’s line of sight which alters how it is interpreted. Model, action 
and view are intimately related. Actors are positioned to afford the best view for the 
purpose. Sets will normally be constructed with particular shots in mind. In this sense 
it unwise to think of M, V and P as independent, or even of M as preexisting: they are 
designed in relation to one another. In one sense V and P produce the only space that 
1 However for Singer (1998 p45) ‘these conditions explicitly preclude our confusing the image with any prior reality: 
the flatness and two-dimensionality of the surface, the enormous size to which the objects have been magnified, the 
artificiality of the shimmering light in the darkened hall.’
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matters, in that the resulting picture is the only visual evidence the viewer has. This is 
quite unlike a virtual environment in which the user might choose to look anywhere: 
the film-viewer may look only where the film-maker allows.
Spaces within spaces
The views seen by the film-viewer have a relation to the larger spaces of which they 
are a part (Figure 5.01). The diegetic space a is the inferred total space in which the 
action is understood to occur, including the space beyond doors which are never 
opened and round corners which are never explored. The viewer does not expect to 
see every part of this space. 
d. fragmentary views of the space
c. optional long-shot or establishing shot
b. viewable space
a. diegetic space
Figure 5.01. Schematic representation of the spaces within spaces in film. 
A subset of the diegetic space is the viewable space b which the viewer can infer on 
the basis of the shots shown. Viewers will generally have the impression that they 
know what the viewable space looks like, even when they may not have seen it all. 
The shots of the viewable space may be very localised, such as close-up views d, or 
may include a long or establishing shot c.
Viewers believe that the images they see are views onto a larger spatial whole even 
though the views may never amount to more than a fragmentary presentation. They 
infer the internal spaces between the viewed portions and also believe in the existence 
of both a viewable and larger unviewable diegetic world which extend beyond the 
boundaries of the sum of all the views. This ability is assisted in film viewing by the 
resemblance of photographic pictures to the real world – the automorphism within 
pictures ‘spills over’ into an assumed automorphism of the relation between shots – 
so that the viewer brings to it an understanding of how the real world works and 
looks. In addition the viewer is greatly assisted by convention: it is partly practice in 
film-viewing that enables the viewer to assemble discrete shots into a coherent space.2 
These points are further developed later in the chapter.
3 Variables of viewing and picturing
Films are normally considered to comprise a hierarchical time-wise structure in 
which the smallest unit is the frame. A shot consists of frames in uninterrupted 
sequence; a scene is a series of shots that the viewer understands to be taken at the 
2 However Hochberg (1987 p604) suggests that this integrative process poses challenges for theories of visual 
perception conventionally rooted in vision of the natural world. 
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same location during a particular period of time; scenes in turn comprise sequences, a 
series of scenes related in location, time, generating action, point of view, or cast 
(Harrington 1973 p8-19). Since the viewer is not conscious of individual frames, the 
shot is the minimal significant formal unit in time.
Though the contents of the frame may broadly map Gibson’s ‘sheaf of rays,’ the film 
considered as a whole does not, and even within the frame many techniques are used 
to control just how the image maps the scene. Each of these affects the space 
constructed. For Thrift (1996 p279) video and film are ‘still essentially mimetic media 
that correspond to the optical wavelength of the spectrum.’ This remark belongs to 
the school of thought that regards photography as wholly ‘automatic drawing’ as 
though the photographer or cinematographer were somehow powerless to affect the 
result. Though the automatic and effortless capture of appearances is one of the 
merits of photography for the film-maker, there are many ways in which the 
cinematographer can intervene to control the relationship of the shot to the natural 
scene, even before the use of more than one shot is taken into account. These 
interventions involve controlling the variables of the view V and how it is rendered in 
pictures P. 
Such variables include the viewing position and the target of the view (and thus the 
angle between the two), movement of the view in relation to the scene, characteristics 
of the lens (especially the angle of view), focus, the use of effects such as 
superimposition, lighting (arguably an aspect of the model rather than the view, but 
designed entirely with the specifics of viewing in mind) and the choice of filters, film 
stock and processing. All but film stock and processing may be altered continuously 
within a shot, so most of these variables can change with time.
View and viewing angle
Basic variables are the decision from where and towards what point each shot is 
aimed. Perspective painting and drawing imply an original observer (though I have 
discussed how in non-photographic picture-making the image presented to the 
viewer may not be geometrically consistent with a single viewpoint), and in the case 
of lens-based film-making, this original observer really exists, in the form of the 
camera. The view presented to the user in any given shot is definitely a view from 
one particular place. The same applies to views computed for a synthetic camera in a 
three-dimensional digital environment.
Even when a shot does not itself alter over time, it still takes place in a context of time 
and this is enough to make a significant difference. A series of suitable fragmentary 
shots will, in the absence of contra-indications, be seen as representing different 
aspects of a coherent space: angle of shot is a key means of achieving this. For 
example a view upwards to a person in a high window may be followed by a view 
through a window down into a garden: the spatial relation between them is 
constructed by the viewer on the basis of the coherence of these angles. Shot angle 
here is used principally as an informational device. In addition, shot angle has a 
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relation to the film-viewer: it is this for example which causes an upward view of a 
character to imbue that character with authority. This is the affective aspect. As 
Harrington puts it (1973 p77) a film-maker ‘tells the viewer how to feel about a 
character or an action by a shot angle,’ one of many examples of how film’s authorial, 
narrative character dictates its spatiality.
Generally there is an expectation by the film-viewer of a certain ‘normality’ to each 
variable of the shot, and the further the deviation from that norm the greater is the 
sense of individualised feeling and attitude. This may be interpreted as a subjective 
quality arising from the disposition of one or more of the characters (‘subjective 
camera’ is discussed below) or as part of the feel of the film. For example, a view 
which exaggerates the steepness of a flight of steps may suggest a subjective view by 
a character, or may be part of the film-maker’s own conception. It should be noted 
that there is an unestablishable dividing line between making a flight of steps look 
steeper than it ‘really is’ and shooting it so as not to accidentally diminish its natural 
steepness. I noted in the last chapter the problem of subjectivity in relation to the 
heights of distant hills and pointed out that a view which makes the mountains look 
very small – as they ‘really are’ in optical terms – is not necessarily a good match for 
subjective visual experience. 
The film-viewer must know how to discern visual subjectivity. Reed repeatedly uses 
oddly angled shots in The Third Man (Reed 1949) as a kind of expressionistic analogue 
of the distorted values of the world depicted (Figure 5.02a-c). The film-viewer 
understands that this does not represent the subjective impression of any of the 
characters (nor that the buildings have themselves been built askew). Convention is 
vital here, as is the inference of the film-maker’s intention – what Hochberg (1987 
p608), following the ideas of Searle (1969), refers to as ‘the viewer’s legitimate 
assumption that the film sequence was created with a coherent narrative or 
expositional purpose’.
                             
Figure 5.02a-c. Carol Reed: The Third Man, 1949, shots at 0h 07m; 0h 20m; 0h 56m 
Other aspects of angle of view are the use or avoidance of symmetry and the 
tendency to prioritise the centre of the screen. Gone with the Wind (Fleming et al 1939), 
though it has one or two unusual spatial features of its own, can stand as typical of 
traditional commercial film practice. Bordwell suggests (1985 p50-1) that Hollywood 
prioritises the centre of the screen while avoiding symmetry, and certainly this film 
conforms to type in that respect. The centralising tendency in film is a naturalistic 
trait, because it keeps the viewer’s attention away from the artificial frame of the 
image. It imitates the way in which in natural vision the subject of interest is without 
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fail located in the centre of the field of view. There are no scenes in Gone with the Wind 
in which any significant action or aspect of a situation occurs outside the central area. 
It may seem surprising to characterise the spatiality of the classical fiction film as 
‘naturalistic’ given Hollywood’s reputation as the ‘dream factory’, but I distinguish, 
as in the last chapter, between different kinds of realism: it is other realisms, not 
whether a scene is believable as a piece of real life, which are significant for spatiality. 
The relationship of spatial representation to vision need not be different between 
making film match real life and making it match an imaginary scene. Indeed it is one 
of the principal objectives of the classical film’s aspiration to visual naturalism that 
the imaginary should be made to seem real.
Asymmetry in the plane, and a corresponding tendency to organise views of moving 
subject matter in a three-quarter view, seem almost an obsession of the classical 
Hollywood film. Clearly when filming a moving troop of horsemen there are 
informational benefits, in that more characters can be fitted into the screen than if 
they were to travel across the picture plane, and there is less occlusion than if they 
were to travel orthogonal to the picture plane. However, the dominance of diagonal 
movement, typically from near-left to far-right, seems to imply additional motives. I 
suggest that it is an urge for naturalism, which in this case takes the form of avoiding 
anything which either reminds the viewer of the planar image as such – Harrington 
(1973 p26) points out that vertical and horizontal movements of characters remind the 
viewer of the limits of the picture’s dimensions – or reminds the viewer of the 
conventions of the theatre which by tradition and partly for practical reasons are 
strongly based on symmetry. 
Figure 5.03. 
Victor Fleming: Gone with the Wind, 1939. 
The approach to the Wilkes’ ranch, asymmetrically 
viewed despite the inherent symmetry of the subject. 
0h 18m
Even when the subject matter is itself highly symmetrical, as it often is in the classical 
building and cityscapes of the Deep South in Gone with the Wind, it is rarely presented 
symmetrically, so that even the avenue approaching the Wilkes’ ranch is filmed at a 
slight angle, which seems almost perverse (Figure 5.03). 
Bordwell remarks (op cit p53) on the avoidance of orthogonals, and again Gone with 
the Wind is typical. The depth of the spaces occupied by the main characters is 
generally indicated by one of two methods. One technique views the set in three-
quarter view so that it forms diagonals behind the character, rather like the 
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trajectories of the moving characters described above (Figure 5.04). The other 
eliminates geometric perspective as far as possible in favour of receding planes. This 
is further augmented in Gone with the Wind as in most films of its type by the use of 
shallow focus, so that the background becomes abstracted by the lack of resolution 
(Figure 5.05). 
Figure 5.04. 
Victor Fleming: Gone with the Wind, 1939. 
Asymmetrically viewed backgrounds to many scenes, 





Victor Fleming: Gone with the Wind, 1939.
Close-up of Vivien Leigh with defocused background. 
0h 08m.
 
Bordwell suggests that such separation of planes is fundamental to Hollywood space. 
Part of the motive for this usage, I suggest, is the same as that for the elimination or 
‘flattening’ of distant scenes in many of the paintings described in the last two 
chapters: it serves to prevent the eye being ‘captured’ by the spaces beyond the 
characters and to return attention to the foreground action (Bordwell himself remarks 
on the ‘frontality’ of the classical Hollywood space, op cit p51-2). But in addition, 
orthogonals and their associated deep spaces projected back from the picture plane 
would not serve the purpose they do in the Renaissance wall painting, partly to 
extend the space of the actual room. That would be counter-productive here: there is 
no desire to make the cinema screen seem like an extension of the cinema (even if it 
were possible given the sub-optimal views available to most of the audience) but 
rather to make the depicted space seem like an extension of the personal, possibly 
imaginary, vision of the individual situated in no particular place.3 The criterion is 
whether or not a given technique succeeds in disguising the planarity of the image 
and the presence of technique itself. 
3 Elsaesser quotes two items of advice from the cinematic trade press, in the first of which in 1908 the cinema-owner is 
told to size the projected image so that figures in it are life size and in the latter in 1915 to size the picture according to 
the size of the auditorium. He sees this as evidence of a shift from regarding the screen as a virtual window in the 
cinema to seeing it as related only to the viewer (Elsaesser 1990 p28 n24). 
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Figure 5.06. 
Victor Fleming: Gone with the Wind, 
1939.
The burning of Atlanta. One of the rare 
examples of a full-face view of a scene, 
perhaps intended to act as a tableau. 
1h 24m.
Very occasionally in Gone with the Wind a scene is presented parallel to the picture 
plane, such as briefly at the burning of Atlanta (Figure 5.06). There the purpose is 
perhaps to emphasise its iconic role as a kind of summative tableau before the film 
action proceeds.
The lens
The characteristics of the lens affect the overall character of the image but also specific 
spatial relations within it. Longer lenses offer a narrower field of view and a 
correspondingly larger picture of the scene, which is not equivalent to positioning the 
camera closer (Figure 5.07). Since in the fiction film the camera can generally be 
placed anywhere the film-maker chooses, lenses are seldom chosen for distance 
requirements but for their effect on perspective (Harrington 1973 p55). 
a b
Figure 5.07. Comparison of the he long lens and close-up.
An enlarged view from a distance (a) is not the same as a close view (b): both the relative distances of the objects from 
the lens and the degree to which objects occlude one another are different. 
Lenses affect many aspects of the representation of a scene. Harrington’s list of 
characteristics of the wide-angle lens includes: that it can provide more information 
than a longer lens since more objects appear on the screen; objects appear to be far 
apart; anything approaching the camera will appear huge and out of proportion; 
movement towards and away from the camera seems very rapid; as a result, action 
may be surprising or threatening; and though people seem more isolated and distant 
when seen through a wide-angle lens, they come together at a startling rate 
(Harrington 1973 p66). By contrast the long lens is more selective; compresses depth, 
forcing a subject against its background; eliminates all but a few key details (ibid). 
The qualities of a scene viewed with a wide lens, especially during camera 
movement, tend towards the sculptural while the flattening effect of the long lens 
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produces a more painterly aspect. Such perspectives offer trade-offs in informational 
expressiveness: the wide lens captures more across the scene but makes distant 
objects relatively small, while the long lens loses information in the plane but 
presents a relatively larger view of distant objects. Informational and affective aspects 
are both important, so that wide-angle allows more to be seen but it is also potentially 
‘more threatening’ – it alters the relationship of the viewer to the space.
Harrington (op cit p55) uses the concept of naturalness in a lens – ‘an image 
approximating what the eye sees naturally’ – corresponding to a 50mm lens on a 35 
mm camera. Certainly extreme lenses produce effects which most film-viewers 
notice: long lenses cause extreme foreshortening which may even seem to reverse 
linear perspective while very wide-angle lenses cause noticeable curvature. The 
character of the lens may thus impinge on the ‘transparency’ of the representation. 
While a fisheye lens will probably seem abnormal to every viewer, the increasing use 
of long lenses may well have altered the threshold at which the viewer notices 
‘distortion’ in this direction. 
In addition to offering a rather fixed conception of ‘naturalness’, Harrington seems to 
underestimate the subjectivity of natural vision itself. For example when an observer 
concentrates on a detail in a real scene, this subjectively seems to enlarge detail and 
eliminate the surroundings (Hochberg 1987 p608). A long lens may imitate this 
phenomenon (Sutcliffe 2000 p80-81). Harrington also ignores the difference in the 
responses of natural vision to different kinds of stimuli: movement is detected in 
natural vision far outside the limits of focussed perception, meaning that the effective 
viewing angle for moving stimuli in natural vision is much wider than for static 
imagery. It is as though the natural visual system could subjectively support multiple 
focal lengths at need, a facility which the fixed boundary of the film frame fails 
altogether to imitate.
Zoom
Gance’s Napoleon (1927) used a wider variety of lenses than had been used before in a 
single film, from 275mm to 20mm (Brownlow 1983 p54). Subsequently, the use of a 
great variety of lenses, and of adjustable lenses which can be zoomed from one focal 
length to another, has become commonplace. Zooming in on a subject serves the 
practical need of revealing greater detail within a small part of a scene without the 
cut which would be inevitable if two or more different lenses were used, but it is also 
an analogue of the psychological process of increasingly concentrating one’s attention 
on part of a scene.4 However, the relationship of camera zoom to natural vision is a 
problematic one and points up the difficulties which arise when an external 
mechanical device, whose effect the viewer may consciously notice, is used in 
imitation of a natural process within vision of which the viewer is normally unaware. 
As a result, the zoom lens, which might seem a good match for the subjective 
properties of natural vision, is in practice little used compared with the standard 
technique of accumulating impressions through discrete shots separated by cuts, 
4 Similar techniques are used in sound for film, where a sound to which viewers should attend is increased in volume 
relative to the background, imitating the natural ability to discern those sounds on which one is concentrating.
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which one would expect to seem considerably less natural. Whether this arises 
because the cut-punctuated accumulation of shots is in fact a better match for 
subjective vision or for other reasons is a question which in the end I believe is 
probably undecidable, but it raises the basic question – like that asked about pictures 
earlier in the thesis – of what (if anything) film imitates, which I discuss below.
Again, tolerance of filmic techniques is not a constant: views which would have been 
found odd at one time are now used unnoticed. A technique of recent years, which 
may perhaps become normalised if more widely adopted, combines tracking (camera 
movement parallel to the line of sight) with zooming, so that the character of the 
perspective changes through the duration of a shot. The closing shot of La Femme 
Infidèle (Chabrol 1969) used  zoom-in matched with track-out (Callaghan 1972 p74) 
and in Goodfellas (Scorsese 1990) the same technique is used in filming two characters 
who sit facing one another at a cafe table. They are seen in profile with a window 
behind, through which is visible a street with buildings and traffic. During the shot, 
though the two characters remain the same size, the street-scene behind them 
gradually moves nearer as they speak. Currently, while it is still unfamiliar, this 
technique is rather noticeable, yet increasing use might lead to its becoming 
‘transparent’ as other techniques have done.5 Another convention will have become 
apparently natural.
Focus
I discussed the problematic nature of focus in relation to pictures, highlighting the 
difficulty of deciding which aspects of vision are to be imitated. As with zoom just 
discussed, the key difficulty in film is the attempt to use a technique to imitate 
phenomena of natural vision whose mechanism is not consciously perceived. As with 
all the variables of the shot, there is the issue of control – the fact that it is the film-
maker, not the film-viewer, who decides, and whose decisions may affect not only the 
way each shot is apprehended but also may dynamically affect that apprehension 
during the shot. Since it is so bound up with the fact that film is authored, this is 
clearly a characteristic which will require careful reconsideration when designing for 
systems which are controlled instead by the user.
Focus actually comprises two variables: that distance from the lens which is in 
optimal focus (the location of the focal plane); how much of the available depth in the 
scene is in focus (the focal range or depth of field). The film-maker can choose both 
focal plane and focal range, and increased technological capability has brought 
greater choice. At one time it was difficult to achieve full focus over a deep scene 
because early slow film-stock required larger lens apertures which in turn allowed 
only shallow depth of field. Later I explore the measures which were taken to 
overcome these problems, and their significance for any general understanding of 
filmic spatiality.
5 The technique was also used in a film of Puccini’s Tosca by the Italian national broadcaster RAI, so that the 
architectural background behind Baron Scarpia increasingly lowered over his image as he walked forward. My son at 
six years old asked ‘Why is that man walking backwards?’ However, this should not be taken as an indication that 
such a technique is necessarily less natural than others which now pass unremarked. It may be simply that it is 
unfamiliar. 
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A technique which alters in meaning depending on whether it is used selectively or 
throughout a film is that of ‘soft focus’ where no part of the image is fully focussed. It 
is used in a sustained way for idealisation or romanticisation, but when used 
selectively is associated with the subjective view through a character’s eyes, for 
example to imply semi-consciousness. Unless very slight, soft focus will be noticed by 
the viewer; it must seem ‘right’ in the context of the situation and narrative if it is not 
to be taken as an error. In Harrington’s words, ‘focus gives a filmmaker an additional 
measure of rhetorical control over where a viewer looks’ (Harrington 1973 p66 
emphasis added). This goes to the heart of the relationship between the maker and the 
viewer. The film-maker attempts to control the perceptions of the audience. Yet it will 
become increasingly apparent that there are constraints on what the film-maker may 
‘get away with,’ which have to do with concepts of naturalism and reasonableness in 
the film-maker’s decisions.
Pulling focus
Combining time and a shallow focal depth, the cinematographer can manipulate the 
focal plane dynamically. Commonly the intention is to transfer clear definition from 
one actor or significant object to another, as an analogue to the process of shifting 
one’s attention (either deliberately or through the act of noticing), similar to the uses 
of zoom just discussed. Such ‘focus through’ or ‘pulling focus’ is an authorial 
technique for forcing the viewer to attend first to one thing, then another. Towards 
the resolution of Who’s Afraid of Virginia Woolf? (Nicholls 1966) the camera zooms or 
tracks towards Burton and Taylor, closing in on their clasped hands, but the focus is 
then shifted to a glimpse of daylight in the world outside. Not only is the viewer 
affected by the obvious phenomenon that something out of focus is more difficult to 
discern, but psychologically it is impossible to resist having one’s attention captured 
in this way. Cause and effect are in reverse: normally shifting one’s attention in depth 
leads to a change in focal plane; here a change in focal plane leads to a shift in 
attention. The film-maker’s will is irresistible: the viewer can hardly choose to ignore 
this authorial edict. However, generally this technique will be unnoticed by the 
viewer if it corresponds to the change in attention that the viewer would have made 
autonomously if the scene had been real. Under these circumstances the film-maker is 
making decisions as it were on behalf of a powerless viewer. This motive informs 
many other authorial choices in film space. It is crucial to the balance between giving 
viewers the view they want or need in their exploration of the situation and the 
narrative, and denying them such a view.
Superimposition
Superimposition, where two images are overlaid on screen by double exposure of the 
film in the camera or by post-processing, also has both static and dynamic forms. In 
dynamic use, it is principally used to effect a transition from one scene to another. As 
usual, the content of the two shots and the overall context influence the 
interpretation, so that the one technique has many meanings. Similarly in static use, 
where two scenes are superimposed for a large part of the duration of a shot, various 
meanings are available and are inferred by the viewer on the basis of other cues. 
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Since the photography on which mainstream film relies is largely tied to the depiction 
of the concrete, the use of double exposure has appealed to film-makers as a way of 
showing the inner workings of the mind. A typical use is to show at the same time 
someone thinking and what they are thinking about. It may be used dynamically to 
move from a character recollecting to the recollection itself. Historically it has also 
been used in a rather literary way to imply metaphorical identification, such as the 
head of Napoleon overlaid on that of his pet eagle in Gance’s Napoleon (1927), but this 
is a form of spatiality which has all but disappeared from film presumably because it 
is so perceptibly artificial: there is no question here that the film-maker is simply 
helping viewers to look at what they are already motivated to seek. The decay of such 
devices from the fiction film is investigated more fully later.
There are obvious questions of informational expressiveness concerning 
superimposition. On the one hand it is possible to show two related scenes at once, 
but on the other two overlaid images are more difficult to discern than either is alone. 
In addition it is a technique with no apparent analogue in natural vision, though 
arguably it might correspond psychologically to the way in which one can be looking 
at one scene while imagining or recalling another.6 In practice, the use of 
superimposition is minimal compared with time-wise juxtaposition (above all the 
simple cut) and has declined relative to other techniques during the history of film. 
Certainly the literary metaphorical style has declined compared with more 
naturalistic forms.
Lighting
Theatrical lighting changed partly under the influence of advancing technology in the 
work of theatrical designers such as Gordon-Craig (Bablet 1966 (1962) p126). The 
flooding of the stage with as much light as possible gave way to selective use as a 
way of articulating both set and action in service of the drama. Cinematic lighting has 
developed along similar lines, again through changes in technology as well as design 
practice. Psychological effects which are not specifically spatial have become attached 
to particular styles of lighting, from the low-key in which most of the setting is in 
shadow, associated with gloom and mystery, to the high-key, bright and relatively 
shadowless, associated with optimism and cheerfulness. High-key lighting is 
spatially flattening compared with the chiaroscuro of low-key lighting. All this was 
familiar to painters over centuries.
The angle at which light falls, particularly on faces, has acquired conventionalised 
meanings as well as having a straightforward effect on what can be perceived. Front 
light softens contrasts and is routinely used to make faces smoother and softer while 
side light has the opposite effect. Back light idealises a face if used in conjunction with 
front light but on its own makes it sinister. Bottom light is used for evil and top light 
for freshness and spirituality. The debt to the traditions of painting is obvious.
6 Hochberg (1987 p608) regards superimposition as ‘mere convention’ on a par with the use of calendar leaves to 
indicate elapsed time, but clearly it is not conventional in the same way. Hochberg is assuming that film’s referent is 
vision, but if instead it is visual imagination (as Currie 1995 p179 suggests) then Hochberg’s assertion would not hold.
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Any form of lighting may change to another for dramatic effect as well as simply to 
alter the informational content of the image. In keeping with the naturalistic 
tendencies of the classical fiction film, there is generally some ostensible diegetic 
reason (however specious) for the lighting conditions: it will seem as though the 
lighting arises out of the natural characteristics of the scene, not from an authorial 
whim. 
This relationship between the scene and the resulting picture is a clear illustration of 
the tight bond in film between view V, picture P and model M (in presenting an idea 
I to serve objectives O). If a filmmaker decides that some image should be 
dramatically lit, for example, then the set, the action and the lighting will be contrived 
in order to yield such an image. The process is not a pipeline in which M is designed 
and then subjected to V and P. This ‘backtracking’ could be characterised as shown 
(in red), where the objectives demand a particular picture, which has implications not 





This puts film-making firmly in the traditions of picture-making such as painting, 
and contrasts with non-authorial systems where a space is designed before the user 
decides how to view it. This relationship of model, view and picture becomes 
complex in interactive pictorial media, in which different genres are beginning to 
adopt their own characteristic practices.
Filters, film stocks and processes
I noted in the previous chapter that the tones and colours of photography cannot be 
regarded as a standard of what is real, since different film stocks and processes can be 
used to achieve different pictures of what is before the camera. As with the filmic 
representation of the physical geometry of a scene, it is a moot point when the 
selection of any given film stock etc. makes the resulting image ‘more like’ nature or 
exaggerates some aspect of it. Similarly to the problems with differential focus, in 
natural vision the observer is unaware of the adjustments to the iris of the eye which 
allow both a bright sky and a dark landscape below it to be clearly seen, whereas 
unmanipulated photography favours the definition of one or the other. Filters can be 
used to help overcome this, making looking at the picture more like the experience of 
looking at the scene, even though it is a departure from the ‘natural’ mapping of the 
darks and lights of the scene which the photograph would have otherwise produced. 
Such attributes have a directly spatial quality when the use of a filter, for example, 
seems to bring a sky forward because it is more strongly defined, or a detailed, 
modelled surface is turned into a silhouette.
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4 Space in time: shot selection and editing
I have shown that, while the photographic image imparts a high degree of 
automorphism to the individual shot, there is considerable scope for the film-maker 
to manipulate the depiction of space for narrative purposes by controlling the 
variables of viewing and picturing. I turn now to the spatial relationship between 
shots (which seems to depart further from realism) in order to discover the rationale 
for the spatiality of the fiction film. It will become clear that its objectives are decisive 
in determining its spatial form.
Shot selection takes place at all stages of film-making. As already noted model M, 
view V and picture P are conceived as a whole: the design of sets is normally based 
on prior decisions about shots represented by the script and storyboard. Occasionally 
library shots are also cut into the film. The finished film is an assemblage of this 
material through the process of editing. Not since the very early years of the cinema 
has mainstream film-making consisted of pointing a camera at a scene and then 
showing the resulting material unedited to an audience. The time-wise juxtaposition 
of separate shots, intended to be interpreted as part of a single narrative or drama, 
became established within a few years of the Lumières’ first public film-showing of 
1895. 
Anything which can be said about space in film can perhaps be said in terms of time – 
and usually is. I have been repeatedly struck by the attention paid to the non-realistic, 
or at least subjective, representation of time, compared to that given to similar 
representations of space. Because photography is broadly realistic, film as a whole is 
regarded similarly, despite the fact that photography has more the character of an 
ingredient in film’s construction of space than itself being film. Lothe remarks that ‘film 
displays space superbly’ (Lothe 2000 p52 original emphasis) but this is a very odd claim. 
Shots display space more or less adequately, but the wealth of extra-photographic 
innovations made over the years of film’s history suggests considerable difficulties 
with the depiction of space: anyone who has ever made a film can vouch for the way 
in which simply pointing a camera at various parts of a scene in succession produces 
an inadequate and even misleading representation of the space. 
It would be wrong to suggest that the purpose of editing is to construct and articulate 
space. In almost no film is the space itself the subject. The successful construction of 
‘just enough’ space is all that is normally required. In addition there are many more 
constraints on shot selection and editing than the presentation of the diegetic space. I 
briefly enumerate these because they give clues which help answer the question of 
what film depicts and what the criteria are for its articulation of space.
Formal characteristics
Englander is a film practitioner rather than a professional theorist,7 and suggests three 
criteria for selection: a shot should be interesting, necessary and reinforce the dramatic 
situation (Englander and Petzold 1976 p103). Such summary criteria raise many 
issues.
7 Englander is described as having ‘an illustrious career ending as Senior Film Cameraman at the BBC’.
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For a shot to be interesting requires that it be interesting both in itself and in context. 
The latter is more significant. Interestingness is one aspect of the need to be satisfying 
or engaging to the viewer in a formal aesthetic way as well as in terms of narrative 
and drama. Hochberg (1987 p604) includes the provision of visual rhythms analogous 
to those of poetry and music as one of the functions of editing and Gessner (1968 
p263), using the word ‘orchestration’, describes the formal structuring of the 
‘relentless stream of fluctuating lights and shapes’ as one of the imperatives of film, 
with a view to interest and engagement, even irrespective of the story. He quotes 
David Lean: ‘Actually I begin editing my films as I work with the writer on the script, 
getting a series of balances – light and dark, slow and fast, boredom and shock’ and 
suggests that ‘the aim is for effective combinations, the mixing of contrasts, 
differences and varieties’ (Gessner 1968 p272). Callaghan (1973 p77) offers an entirely 
formal view of screen composition: ‘when looking at a shot through the viewfinder, 
the cameraman must learn to interpret the action he sees in terms of the two-
dimensional representation on the screen. What he is shooting is not two people 
running about in a meadow, but a red shape and a blue shape moving about on a flat 
background of green.’
Of course formal criteria and narrative objectives interact. For the relation between 
shots, Reisz notes a need for ‘smoothness of presentation’, a formal aesthetic 
requirement but one which is often also associated with naturalism. Complementary 
to smoothness is its breaking: ‘a series of rapid close-ups is used: coming after an 
extremely long, slow-moving shot they make a striking effect’ (Reisz and Millar 1982 
p54-55). Reisz (like Englander a practitioner) recounts the decisions involved in 
filming five repetitions of an action, in which it is clear that the reason for filming 
every repetition differently is partly to create formal variety but at the same time to 
facilitate a gradual increase in pace. 
Hochberg (1987 p604) emphasises the role of editing in recapturing visual attention 
once the content has been identified and the viewer’s visual interest has waned – an 
interplay between the depiction and the depicted. DW Griffith was probably the first 
to cut actions scenes at an accelerating pace in this way. Pace in cutting is an 
equivalent of illicit mark-making in pictures, in that the pace of the shot-movement and 
editing is independent of the pace of the depicted action – it is not derived from its 
appearance – but affects how it is perceived. In any figurative film there will be an 
interplay between the formal patterning of film and its depiction of situations, 
characters and events; this is analogous to the relationship between the formal 
qualities of a picture and the depiction it offers discussed in the previous chapter. 
‘Necessary’ shots: informational economy
Clearly the requirement to be interesting will sometimes be in conflict with the 
requirement for economy of expression suggested by the word necessary. Perhaps 
surprisingly, the demands of functional information efficiency are very important in 
determining the overall spatiality of film. In particular this relates to the concept of 
the optimal view which I describe later.
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Englander’s ‘necessary’ is useful in emphasising the pragmatic nature of film-making 
in which some totalising kind of ‘capture’ is irrelevant. Relevance is a strong 
influence on shot selection and hence on film’s spatiality – no shot appears which 
does not serve a purpose. This immediately makes it unlike natural vision. The 
viewer’s time is used as economically as possible: what in information science terms 
Card, Pirolli and Mackinlay (1994) called the ‘cost of knowledge characteristic 
function’ is just as relevant here, largely because of the need to maintain the viewer’s 
motivation. For example, extensive filmic perusal of the setting is excluded unless it 
serves some specific purpose. King comments ‘...the set is nothing but a set. To me it 
is completely wrong to photograph it just because it’s lavish. We are telling a story’ 
(Brownlow 1968 p109). This raises another aspect of necessity: the need for every part 
to fit into an overall scheme of articulation, the idea of ‘keeping something in reserve’ 
so that the film is considered as a whole to which each part is contributory. For 
example, Callaghan offers the argument (1973 p73) that ‘the more powerful a 
cinematic device, the less frequently it should be employed, especially within one 
film’. 
Coherent space as an illusion
When shots are put together through editing, this affords spatial interpretations of 
the relations between them. This has a relation to error rather like the creation of 
depth illusion in pictures. The film-maker’s task is to hoodwink the viewer into 
constructing a coherent space from a series of glimpses. Provided the film-maker 
works within certain constraints (some conventional), this ‘deception’ is easy to do, 
rather as it is easy to convey a sensation of depth in the pictorial plane using some of 
the many depth cues discussed previously. The film-maker offers fragmentary 
evidence, organised with a view to affording certain assumptions and interpretations, 
and the film-viewer (partly on the basis of shared conventions) duly makes those 
interpretations. The opportunity for error of another kind, in which the viewer infers 
alternative spatial relations which the film-maker did not intend, is of course always 
present. Hochberg points out (1987 p606) that most examples of what a film-maker 
considers bad editing seem to show movement when none is intended or conversely 
show no displacement where a large displacement in fact occurred. Convention can 
assist correct interpretation, such as in the ‘180º rule’.8 
In a picture like Cotàn’s Quince, Cabbage, Melon and Cucumber (Figure 4.09, previous 
chapter) the kinds of cues chosen supported, among other realisms, the realism of 
causal coherence so that the viewer was able to say exactly how the objects 
interrelated and what would happen if the objects were disturbed: the spatial 
relationships were shown by use of the cues of linear perspective, modelling and cast 
shadow. However between cut-punctuated shots, as distinct from within them, such 
direct showing is impossible: the viewer does not see the connectedness of the space 
but infers it. Hochberg (1987 p607) believes that many or even most motion picture 
8 As the film-maker cuts back and forth when showing, say, a conversation between several characters, the viewer 
expects all shots to be taken from one side of an imaginary line through the centre of the action. Violation of this rule 
leads to the wrong interpretation, namely that the characters have moved or even that they have begun talking with 
their backs to one another (Harrington 1973 p131). The 180º rule gives further clues to the pragmatic nature of 
viewpoint positioning. It is clear that the conventions of viewing position do not say which viewpoints may be used 
but only which may not (on the grounds of their leading to misapprehension). Otherwise any view is acceptable.
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cuts occur between views that do not overlap at all, and calls on perception studies to 
explain the viewer’s inference of coherence given that some forms of awareness 
which support the inference of coherence in natural vision are not available in film,9 
but he probably underestimates the benefit given by convention and by the viewer’s 
assumption of intentional utterance on the part of the film-maker. 
Though space can be treated cavalierly, it needs to be tolerably well understood by 
the viewer as a coherent place in order for the story to make sense: if an event is to 
occur within a physical space at some point in the narrative, the viewer must be able 
to place it within the set of spaces so far seen at the time when it occurs. In practice 
this often means establishing in advance the presence and location of objects which 
later will become significant. At best this may act as subtle premonition of an 
impending event, at worst as grossly obvious. In either case, it is clearly an authorial, 
narrative technique: if users were free to look anywhere, there is no guarantee that 
they would have the necessary information.
The trajectories of moving objects, such as cars or planes moving from one location to 
another, or actors moving from room to room, must seem to take place in a space of 
which – to a certain extent – the viewer has a coherent model. The realism of 
photography is an aid in affording coherent space between shots. If the action of a 
film takes place in a street, much of the film-maker’s task of achieving coherence is 
taken care of by prior knowledge about how streets are in the world. As Currie points 
out (1995 p104) once film begins – as it does from at least DW Griffith onwards – to 
mix scales of view in an arbitrary way, this use of familiarity with the world is 
necessary even just to enable viewers to know the relative scale of what they see, let 
alone any more complex spatial relationships.10
With real-world subject matter, to some extent the film-maker’s job is a negative one: 
to avoid confusing the viewer and allow the familiarity of the subject matter to do its 
own work of establishing coherence. This is perhaps one of the reasons why the 
visual realism of photography, a realism which is actual in Arnheim’s sense of being 
a ‘tracing’ of the scene, is often taken to imply a similar realism, which emphatically 
does not exist in the Arnheim sense, in the film overall. 
Familiarity with the kinds of space depicted also allows the film-maker to make 
authorial play with the perception of time which would otherwise be impossible. This 
may amount to supporting simple omission, such as that of the plane journey 
between two places, which derives from the viewer’s knowing a variety of things 
about travel: the viewer’s understanding of the real space which is alluded to allows 
the liberty with time to be accepted. But it may also enable incongruities to be created 
for dramatic effect, since knowing how the world is in spatial terms enables 
anomalous presentations of time to be detected. In Hitchcock’s Suspicion (1941), 
intercutting between a character who stands still and one who approaches is done 
9 For example, viewers’ knowledge of where their eye is directed cannot help tell how the successive views are to be 
put together as it can in natural vision (Hochberg 1987 p604).
10 As a result, when the film-maker wishes to show objects of an unusual size such as miniature people the only method 
available is to insert in the scene other objects of large relative size: in Lilliput, Lilliputians are normal.
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such that the approaching character seems at times to make little progress across the 
floor, while later he has covered a remarkable distance since he was last seen. 
Familiar space is used to create anomalous time: another illustration that the 
spatiality of film is intimately bound to its narrative character.
Other influences on filmic space
Another aspect of editing, which lies at the point of interrelation between the form 
and the content, the story and the plot, is its use in dramatic juxtaposition. Like many 
formal devices this is capable of yielding different meanings depending on the 
content and context. It may be humorous, playfully or painfully ironic, or take the 
form of a visual conceit intended simply to charm or intrigue. 
These styles of editing are not intended to provide evidence on which the viewer 
constructs a space, but to highlight difference and disjuncture. Eisenstein’s idea of 
montage as a collision – ‘From the collision of two given factors arises a concept. [...] 
Montage is conflict’ (Eisenstein 1977 (1949) p37, 38) – continues in mainstream film-
making, although generally in a more naturalistic and less literary way than in his 
films, a development which parallels the changes in the use of superimposition 
commented on earlier: it is one of the naturalistic traits of the classical film that the 
appearance of each shot should seem to be internally motivated by the action, even 
when, as I have noted, it is in fact a gross authorial intervention for the purposes of 
dramatic narrative. 
Since they are not intended to be seen as other parts of a coherent space such 
montages are irrelevant to film’s spatiality in the obvious sense, but they often make 
use of the planar space of the image in order to achieve their purpose. Whereas the 
transition from one shot to another is by convention matched such that ‘tonality, 
movement, and the centre of compositional interest shift enough to be 
distinguishable, but not enough to be disturbing’ (Bordwell 1985 p55), in the case of 
montage as conflict, it is clearly some kind of disturbance which is sought. 
Occasionally this is done by choosing shapes which are formally similar but which 
depict different objects. In Peeping Tom (Powell 1959) coffee pouring into a cup in 
one shot becomes whisky pouring into a glass in the next. This draws attention to the 
film-maker’s role, and is at odds with the modes of view used elsewhere in the film. 
Though I shall emphasise the naturalistic spatial tendencies of the classical fiction 
film, this is a reminder that no categorical assertions can be made about how film 
space works: only tendencies, not rules, can be discerned.
5 The concept of the Optimal View
Influences on shot selection and editing identified so far include: formal aesthetic 
appeal; interaction between the form and the story; informational economy; the 
construction of apparently coherent spaces even when these do not really exist; 
dramatic juxtaposition of various kinds. I look now in greater detail at one aspect of 
informational economy: the concept of the optimal view. This is a concept which helps 
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to explain the special character of film space and draws attention to the difficulties of 
transferring the spatial practices of film to non-narrative media.
In the display of textual and schematic configurations on screens, the optimal view of 
the configuration for any particular purpose is made available through the provision 
of zooming and scrolling devices or in some cases by the use of multiple panes to 
offer multiple views or different scales of view. In one sense the configuration is its 
own optimal view since it is designed in the plane in such a way as to best represent 
its content and internal relationships, and this planar organisation is then simply 
mapped to the plane of the display. In the case of pictures, as I noted in the previous 
chapter, the model and the view interpenetrate: how the model is shown becomes a 
substantive part of what the model is and optimal expressiveness is achieved through 
adjustments to the model, the view, and the relationship between them. In film, the 
tendency for the how to become the what is still more marked, since, while there may 
be in some sense a pre-filmic model of which the shots are pictures (albeit possibly 
not all in one actual unified space), the only evidence is (a) partial and (b) affected by 
the surrounding shots.
Editing as omission of the irrelevant
A basic criterion in editing, already noted, is the omission of the irrelevant. Film 
makes extensive use, partly for practical reasons such as lack of space within the 
frame or even the cost of sets, of synecdoche – a periscope may be all that is needed to 
imply the presence of a submarine (Harrington 1973 p26). Editing can simply omit 
irrelevant material: it would be ridiculous to show an entire plane journey if shots of 
the departure and arrival are sufficient. To what level of granularity may this 
principle of omission be carried? – in mainstream film practice, it seems, to any level. 
It is the basis of the reaction shot, for example, in which the film-viewer sees the two 
significant parts of a situation – the observer and the observed – in two separate 
shots, without the film-maker having either to show both parts of the scene in a single 
shot or to pan the camera from the observer to the observed and back again.
Editing as construction of the relevant
Though this characterisation of editing as omission is one possible model, it has two 
weaknesses as a description of how editing works. First, it supposes a pre-pictorial 
space which actually exists and from which the film-maker selects, whereas this is not 
necessarily the case since, as already discussed, the film-maker offers only enough 
evidence for the viewer to construct a space adequate to the purpose and no more. 
The film-maker is better thought of as composing a filmic space rather than capturing a 
pre-pictorial one. And the notion of omission does not give sufficient clue to the 
criteria for selecting those views which are shown. To say what decides these criteria 
requires the concept of the optimal view.
The optimal view: initial definition
Crudely stated, the optimal view of a scene or action is the one which provides the 
greatest information about the situation or event. No single viewpoint is likely to 
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fulfil the requirement, since a shot which conveys the overall situation may have 
insufficient size to show important detail while a close-up shot will reveal insufficient 
of the overall configuration. In comparing film to theatre, Furnham (1999 p55) 
suggests that a rationale for film’s close-up shot of an individual character – perhaps 
the most common form of optimal view – is that it is equivalent to a component of 
live theatre missing from film, namely stage presence. There is no doubt that close-
ups do have a special immediacy (an affective characteristic), but a more prosaic 
explanation is that they provide better information about the actor than would a 
distant view (a difficulty for which the stage actor compensates by enlarged gestures 
and other conventional devices). As always, history is instructive: Brownlow 
documents the difficulties which early audiences experienced with close-up views of 
faces: 
They couldn’t understand how people were walking around without legs. In the 
theatre they were accustomed to seeing the whole body, and what it was standing on. 
But to see a head moving around, cut off at the neck, just wasn’t acceptable. 
Alan Dwan interviewed 1964 (Brownlow 1968 p98)
Gance was ordered by an executive of his film company in 1913 not to use close-ups 
(Brownlow 1968 p524). This indicates the important difference between a technique 
being unproblematically realistic and therefore immediately acceptable, and its 
coming to seem natural through a process of acculturation. 
The optimal view: modification no. 1 (context)
The information value of a shot – the characteristic which makes it optimal – is 
contextual. A shot may offer very little information when seen alone, but when 
inserted in a sequence may provide just the information which viewers need – what 
Hochberg (1987 p607) calls the answer, in one shot, to a ‘visual question’ posed in the 
shot preceding. In a typical fiction-film scene, when Vivian Leigh falls down stairs in 
Gone with the Wind, six camera positions are used in eleven seconds, each providing 
the optimal view when seen in context (Figure 5.08a-f). Aside from its affective 
qualities it can be regarded as the most informationally expressive articulation of the 
event and the reactions of the participants. Patently there is no position which could 
be adopted by an actual observer situated in the scene which would yield these views 
– an issue to which I return later. 
 
a-b Gable and Leigh at the top of the stairs arguing: mid-shot and close-up c Leigh falls: high-angle mid-shot
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d Leigh’s head on the floor: close-up e Gable alarmed: close-up f Gable runs down: long shot.
Figure 5.08a-f. Victor Fleming: Gone with the Wind, 1939. Vivien Leigh falls downstairs. Six camera positions are used 
in eleven seconds, each providing the optimal view of the current action in context. 3h 19m.
Whereas in some genres it is acceptable to solve the problem of showing both detail 
and context by displaying more than one image at once, in the fiction film it is not. 
This is one of the principal spatial differentiations between genres, and it will be seen 
how even within a single technology such as television, different genres have 
developed their own distinctive spatialities.11 In the classical film, only temporal and 
not spatial juxtaposition of separate views is permitted.12 
The first refinement of the definition of the optimal view, then, is that it is the view 
which is the most informationally expressive when seen in the context of the other 
views, not that it in itself is necessarily particularly information-rich.
The optimal view: modification no.2 (the psychological component)
Carroll (1996 p125-138) proposes a theory of point-of-view editing based primarily on 
the way in which humans, and indeed other mammals, acquire vital information by 
looking at what others look at, a behaviour with high survival value. In these terms 
there is a transfer to film of the everyday ‘need to see’ which governs observers’ 
looking behaviour as they attempt to discern what others are thinking and intend to 
do. One benefit of this ecologically grounded theory is that it emphasises the aspect of 
need and inner compulsion: it is not a matter of idle curiosity, of wanting to see, but of 
needing to see. 
A group of realisms which I introduced in the previous chapter concerned the 
empathy of the viewer with animate beings in the depiction. One such realism was 
basic, that of movement, and is taken care of by film’s ability directly to show moving 
images.13 Another was a sense of animation, of coexisting with a living being, while a 
third was psychological engagement, as though with another mind. This is a strong 
determinant of the use and articulation of film space, and adds another aspect to the 
notion of the optimal view. Whereas I defined it initially in general terms as the shot 
which conveys the most information about an action or situation, I now extend and 
qualify that definition to be the shot which, when the psychology of the individual or 
the interrelationships between characters is important (and there are few occasions in 
the classical fiction film when they are not) best allows the psychological scenario to be 
11 Of course some innovations lead to no genres and remain minority practice.
12 I discuss later the decline in split-screen and other multi-image uses of screen space in film (and its continuance in 
other screen-based media).
13 Currie (1995 p34-42) expends considerable effort in arguing that the movement of objects seen in film is real 
movement in the same sense that movement is seen in real objects, whereas others (he says) have argued that the 
movement is illusory, perhaps on the grounds that the film consists of a series of still pictures. For the purposes of this 
thesis I shall assume with Currie that the movement of on-screen objects is real movement. 
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understood. What makes the optimal view optimal is the contribution of such a shot, 
not to the understanding of the narrative per se (let alone the space), but to the 
understanding of the psychology of the depicted scene as a component of the 
narrative.
The optimal view: modification no.3 (the right view and the optimal view)
So far it would seem that for any given scenario or action, we could say which shots 
will prove optimal, and these could be selected according to a formula (indeed many 
lesser films are probably shot and edited in this way!). This would make fairly easy 
the development of algorithmic approaches to shot selection and editing. However, 
there are significant constraints, arising partly out of the formal characteristics 
discussed above, and, even more importantly, out of the fact that film is authored 
narrative.
Armes (1994 pvii), arguing against the concepts of the screen-as-picture and the film-
as-narrative, reasserts film’s role in presenting and articulating drama (that is, the 
depicted dramatic events in M). At its crudest, such a characterisation would require 
that the optimal view be presented at all times. This is the position taken by He, 
Cohen and Salesin (1996) in devising an automated cinematography system for use 
with virtual environments. However, as Armes uses Williams14 to point out: ‘The film 
is in one way a single recorded performance, but in another way, and more 
significantly, it is in itself the dramatic production: the actual shaping of the work’ 
(Armes 1994 pvii emphasis added). 
Clearly the selection of optimal views does not operate independently of the criteria 
discussed previously, such as formal patterning: a shot may still be selected for its 
contribution to the film’s formal qualities as much as for its information value. I have 
noted how the viewer’s interest may be elicited by a shifted relationship between the 
depiction (V and P) and the depicted (M). Armes (op cit p42) suggests that while 
some action may ‘seem to demand to be seen in close-up’ – a phrase which strongly 
evokes the notion of the optimal view – only the weakest film-maker will follow such 
a conventional matching and that the slippage between the events and the depiction 
will usually in itself have significant interest for the viewer. This is the single biggest 
qualification of the concept of the optimal view. The selection of shots does not arise 
naturally out of the action: in many cases, the film-maker deliberately denies the film-
viewer the very shot which would provide maximum information. 
Authorial control: denial of view
In a sense all filming could be seen as a denial of the viewer’s will at the expense of 
the maker’s, since it selects a little aperture on the world, but as I indicated before in 
most cases the choices made are the ones the viewer would also make: in Hochberg’s 
terms, the answer to the visual question is provided. Now I am concerned instead 
with the kind of denial which is experienced as such (though not necessarily 
consciously) by the viewer. The means of denial involve various combinations of shot 
14 Raymond Williams 1991 (new edition) Drama in Performance, Open University Press, Milton Keynes, quoted in 
Armes 1994 pvii.
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selection, the use of variables of viewing and picturing and of editing, and is 
fundamental to narrative media.
In shot selection a viewpoint may be chosen which in some way conceals the object of 
interest, such as by internal occlusion within the shot – a relationship contrived 
between the model and the view. In Rosemary’s Baby (Polanski 1968), Ruth goes to 
use the phone in an adjoining room. Polanski uses the doorway as a frame for this 
action, so that Ruth’s face is concealed from view – the viewer yearns (and expects) to 
see her expressions, but cannot. 
The opening sequence of Touch of Evil (Welles 1958) plays several similar tricks, 
denying viewers the chance to keep track of the very thing they most want to see, by 
filming the main characters taking a journey round several blocks and down several 
streets, so ensuring that the view of them is repeatedly interrupted by buildings, 
traffic, passing hand-carts and other obstructions. The effect of the repeated 
occlusions is to create an atmosphere of anxiety which, as in other examples I have 
cited, spills over from the formal difficulties of negotiating with the medium into the 
perception of the story itself. It is quite unlike natural vision, in that the camera path 
is such that no person could possibly experience such views in normal experience. On 
the one hand an impression of unmediated viewing is offered by the unbroken 
crisply focused photographic stream of information, while on the other it is authorial 
in the extreme. It repeatedly denies the viewer the optimal view, in the service of 
narrative, and its spatiality arises out of the demands of narrative drama. Naremore 
calls the frustrations the camera encounters in Citizen Kane (Welles 1941), such as a 
door closing or a light clicking out, ‘affronts to the audience’s curiosity’. Their 
purpose is affective – to create a sense of mystery and subtle anxiety (Naremore 1978 
p71) – but this is achieved by the denial of information.
Other variables of the shot are also used to create some form of visual denial, 
concealing the detail the viewer most needs to see. Some are specifically pictorial 
techniques such as focus, while others adapt theatrical articulations of space such as 
lighting. In the first category is a scene from Lawrence of Arabia (Lean 1962) in which a 
character approaches from a distance on horseback across the desert. The shot 
deliberately begins far too soon for the man to be clearly discerned, due to his small 
scale and the effects of dust and heat-haze. The Third Man (Reed 1949) offers an 
example of the second category where selective lighting – justified internally by the 
changing lights cast from upstairs rooms – allows at first only a view of Harry Lime’s 
shoes. 
Editing also is routinely used to deny the optimal view. At the time when the viewer 
is expecting to see something, the scene shifts to another aspect of the story. This 
may, like the variables of viewing and picturing, be disguised as having some 
internal cause. For example perhaps two characters pass through a door which they 
then close and the camera simply fails to follow them: the next shot is the start of a 
new scene. 
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Often the illusion is created that the denial of optimal view has an internal diegetic 
cause since in the real world doors do indeed prevent viewing, heat haze does make 
things difficult to identify, and deep shadows do conceal things. However since the 
early history of cinema, far more extreme methods, with no diegetic justification 
whatsoever, have been used to support narrative at the expense of naturalistic views 
of space. Whereas the innovative use of editing by Porter at the beginning of the 
twentieth century cut from one scene to another principally for the practical objective 
of showing what was going on simultaneously in two or more places – it had become 
impossible to accommodate the events he wanted in a single shot – Griffith did so 
with design: ‘the viewpoint is changed not for physical but for dramatic reasons...’ 
(Reisz and Millar 1982 p22 original emphasis).
At this point, instead of showing the assassination, Griffith interrupts the action of 
[shot] 36, which was probably shot as a continuous take with 38, to give a glimpse of 
the stage (37). [...] The view of the stage in 37 adds nothing to our knowledge of the scene. 
It is inserted for purely dramatic reasons: the suspense is artificially kept up a while 
longer and Lincoln’s complete unawareness of Booth’s presence is indirectly stressed.
Reisz and Millar 1982 p23 emphasis added
The cutaway is inserted for purely dramatic reasons. It has nothing to do with simple 
depiction (which would always offer the optimal viewpoint) and everything to do 
with narration. Seen simply as narration of course this is not innovative at all –      
Murray (1997 p29) for example documents the nineteenth-century literary 
antecedents of filmic technique in Brontë, Dickens and Tolstoy.15 Griffith’s 
contribution was to see that the inherent naturalism of photography within shots 
could be combined with an arbitrary approach to space between shots.
Film viewers and the intentions of film-makers
The conventionalised character of point-of view, reaction shots, and other views 
which allow the psychology of a scene to be apprehended by the viewer raise the 
issue of intention. Viewers want, or more correctly (following Carroll) need, to see 
something; but in addition, viewers know on the basis of convention what shot they 
should be seeing at any moment. If it is denied them, they are not only denied 
information, but are aware that they are wilfully denied it by the film-maker. The 
denial is doubled: once on the grounds of information withheld and again on the 
grounds of expectation confounded. It is clear that the spatiality of film is not just 
subordinate to Bordwell’s ‘narrative causality’ (if that were taken to mean simply 
15 There are much earlier examples: the narrative poem of the late 14th century, Sir Gawain and the Green Knight, 
deliberately describes its subject in a different order than any observer would see it naturally:
His loins and limbs were so long and great
That he was half a giant on earth, I believe,
Yet mainly and most of all a man he seemed, 
And the handsomest of horsemen, though huge at that;
For though at back and at breast his body was broad,
His hips and his haunches were elegant and small,
And perfectly proportioned were all parts of the man,
As seen.
Amazed at the hue of him, 
A foe with furious mien,
Men gaped, for the giant grim
Was coloured a gorgeous green.
Clearly the first thing the internal observers would have noticed was that there visitor was green, yet this fact is 
withheld until eleven lines of description have elapsed. (Sir Gawain and the Green Knight, anonymous, late 14th 
century 1964 translated by Brian Stone 1959 and 1964 Penguin, Harmondsworth UK) . The translation preserves the 
line order of the original.
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considerations of comprehensible storytelling) but to many other aspects of film 
intimately bound up with its being not just narrative but also dramatic and 
psychological, and that it is experienced in the context of other films. This also will 
make problematic any simple transfer of its spatial practices to other media genres 
with different characteristics. 
 
6 Historical divergence of fiction and non-fiction genres
I have argued that space is treated cavalierly by the film-maker in the interests of 
authorial narrative. However I have also argued that mainstream fiction film aspires 
in general to seem like natural vision. Part of the evidence for this lies in the historical 
elimination from this genre of spatial practices which might excessively draw 
attention to the fact of representation.
Classical fiction film Non-fiction newsreel
all material is photographic, or in the case of 
matte paintings, computer graphics etc, is 
intended to be mistaken for photographic
drawn and other clearly planar material is used 
together with photography, including rostrum 
camera exploration of such artefacts
textual titles are avoided wherever possible, to 
the extent that their inclusion is nowadays often 
found humorous, a somewhat embarrassing 
intrusion from a different genre, and an 
admission of failure on the part of the film-
maker
textual titles are extensively used, in some cases 
on a plain, non-cinematographic background
every shot is motivated, with no inclusion of 
material which is gratuitous
there is frequent lack of motivation for 
individual shots, which are presented 
gratuitously rather than in response to a desire 
or need created by the narrative
transitional effects are kept to a minimum, so 
that dissolves are brief, most shot changes are 
cuts, and no special effects are used which draw 
attention to the planar character of the projected 
image
transitional effects between shots are extensively 
used, including horizontal and vertical wipes, 
iris-open and gratuitous dissolves
optimal views are generally provided, such as 
close-ups of the principal characters, unless the 
narrative demands that they be withheld
optimal views are absent where they would 
normally occur (in a real newsreel this arises for 
practical reasons but is imitated in Welles’ 
pastiche)
the locus of interest is centred in the frame framing often leads the object of interest 
departing from the centre of the picture (again 
from practical causes)
any graphic material such as letters, newspapers, 
and so forth is situated in the diegetic space; 
when such material must be legible it is 
preceded by a view establishing its diegetic 
credentials and is then usually shown at an angle 
to imply some sort of ‘natural’ viewing
planar animated graphics are used
didactic graphics are never used, nor are 
distortions of timescale (that is representations in 
which the non-realism of the elapsing time is 
made patent)
graphics and other sequences animate in non-
real-time
symmetry, frontality and the shallow space of 
the theatre are deprecated while oblique 
asymmetrical views are favoured
the symmetry, frontality and shallow space of 
the theatre are commonly used
generally the presence of the camera is 
concealed, so that hand-held camerawork is 
confined to the imitation of very specific 
phenomena such as first-person and point-of-
view shots, and is even then often kept as fluid 
and free from vibration as possible.
hand-held camera is common where accidental 
movements are strongly apparent (again this 
accidental phenomenon is imitated by Welles)
Table 5.09. Differences between the space of the fiction and non-fiction film as exemplified by the main narrative and 
embedded newsreel of Citizen Kane (Welles 1941)
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The divergent spatialities of two cinematic genres are both conveniently present in a 
single film, Citizen Kane (Welles 1941), which offers a pastiche newsreel within the 
main fictional narrative. For Bordwell (1976 p106) the newsreel sequence ‘virtually 
recapitulates the technical development of cinema from 1890 to 1941.’ But these 
developments, which had at one time been in general use in all film-making, had 
become characteristic of a particular genre which, fifty years into the history of the 
cinema, differed significantly from the spatiality of the fiction film. This allowed 
Welles to play ‘games’ exploiting the difference between the genres. The spatialities 
of documentary and fiction have followed divergent paths arising out of their 
different objectives – one to show, and one to seem like seeing. Key differences are 
summarised in Table 5.09.
The wide range of filmic techniques used earlier in Gance’s Napoleon (1927), some of 
them innovative, also show techniques now abandoned in mainstream fiction film-
making. Some of the film’s difficulties (as we would now regard them) arise partly 
from its status somewhere between fiction-like narrative and documentary. Spatial 
practices such as split-screen and the use of non-photographic interventions in the 
image lie at the point of divergence between these two genres, so that what is now 
unacceptable in a fiction film is standard practice in modern documentary work, such 
as factual television. Other outmoded techniques, such as the use of literary 
metaphorical superimposition (extensively used in this film) have been dealt with 
earlier.
The demise of split-screen
Brownlow (1968 p23) suggests that the first use of triptych may have been by Phillips 
Smalley in Suspense of 1913 (Figure 5.10), showing three simultaneous interrelated 
actions at one time. Gance used a triptych for the first time in Barberousse of 1916.
Figure 5.10.
Possible first use of triptych in 1913 by Phillips Smalley for 
Suspense. 
Taken from Brownlow 1968 p25.
In his Napoleon – another film which shows many techniques now occulted from the 
mainstream – the hero is presented in the centre panel of a triptych (not illustrated) 
while the flanking panels offer contextual views of a battle. At the close of the film, in 
the original screening, three projectors were used in order to suddenly triple the 
width of the image. This involved sequences in which the three images were different 
shots, and one in which they formed three parts of a single panoramic shot.16 Earlier 
in the film a pillow fight in Napoleon’s school dormitory splits into four and then 
16 At the close of the film the flanking images were tinted red and blue to produce a tricolour. Colouring of mono-
chrome imagery and any other overt interference with natural appearance has been abandoned by mainstream 
cinema but is fairly common in factual television.
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nine panes, partly with the functional aim of showing many actions in one screen, but 
also presumably to add visual patterning for its own sake (Figure 5.11a-c). 
 
Figure 5.11a-c.
Abel Gance: Napoleon, 1926. 
Pillow-fight. The unitary view splits first into four 
panes and then into nine.
0h 23m.
        
Split screens are not the only form of multi-pane presentation to have been 
abandoned by the fiction film. Salt (1990 p32) describes how GA Smith’s Santa Claus 
of 1898 displayed parallel action using an inset image, picture-in-picture, in part of 
the main scene. Musser (1991 p224) shows the opening scene from Porter’s Life of an 
American Fireman of 1902 (not illustrated) in which a scene which is being imagined 
by the fire chief, whom we see, is included in a circular picture-in-picture. 
Modern mainstream film practice is quite different. Split screen is anathema, being 
generally only used in light comic films for example to show simultaneously the two 
parties in a telephone conversation. Significantly, the aim in such cases is to objectify 
the scene, drawing attention to its parts by distancing the viewer. It is not used in 
dramatic narratives where the viewer must be deeply engaged. By contrast, the use of 
multi-pane images is increasing in factual television, where ‘transparency’ of viewing 
is not a concern.
Captioning and other non-photographic interventions
Being a ‘silent’ film, Napoleon is obliged to use intertitles, but it also uses captions in 
other ways. At one point (Figure 5.12) a title informs the viewer that the filming on 
Corsica was done in the locations of the actual historical events. This would be 
acceptable in a modern documentary, but not within a dramatic narrative. This title is 
an intrusion from another mode of representation which, quite literally, draws 
attention to the fact that this is a film.
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Figure 5.12. Abel Gance: Napoleon, 1926. 
A title vouches for the authenticity of the filmed 
scenes.
1h 06m.
Figure 5.13. Abel Gance: Napoleon, 1926. 
A reproduction of a letter is captioned ‘Historique’ to 
indicate that it is not fictional.
0h 18m.
Similarly, a letter written by Napoleon is shown in diegetic context – he is seen 
writing it – but when presented frontally so that the viewer may read it it is captioned 
‘Historique’ to assure the viewer of its authenticity (Figure 5.13). In breaking both the 
spatial and representational coherence of the film this is to modern eyes 
counterproductive, another case where the spatial practices of historical dramatic 
narrative and documentary have diverged: such extra-diegetic textual commentary is 
regularly used in non-fiction work on television, never in film.
 
Figure 5.14.
Abel Gance: Napoleon, 1926. 
An animated schematic representation of military 
forces moving across a terrain is introduced into the 
narrative. in a diegetic context: the viewer sees 
Napoleon and the other officers look down at this map.
2h 08m.
Figure 5.15.
Abel Gance: Napoleon, 1926. 
On the map are superimposed scenes of battle and 
schematic representations of conflict.
2h 09m.
In one scene Napoleon and others look at a map, on which an arrow moves signifying 
the French forces (Figure 5.14). Later the map, some live-action scenes and various 
schematic representations of conflict are all superimposed (Figure 5.15). As late as 
1942, in Casablanca (Curtiz 1942), such an animated map is superimposed on scenes of 
travel (Figure 5.16) but significantly this is in the newsreel-style introduction (that is, 
like the newsreel in Kane it is imitating another genre), not in the main body of the 
narrative. It appears again in 1981 in Raiders of the Lost Ark (Spielberg 1981 not 
illustrated) but this also is intended to evoke another, by then historic, style of film-
making (Vaz and Hata 1995 p129). Animated graphics are entirely acceptable in 
factual television, but not in a narrative fiction. 
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Figure 5.16.
Michael Curtiz: Casablanca, 1942. 
Superimposition of two modes of information: 
animated map and live-action scenes of travel.
0h 01m.  
Styles of camera movement
Genre also now dictates how cameras may be moved. In Gance’s Convention 
sequence there is an extraordinary swooping tracking shot above a crowd, which is 
effective in being vertiginous, but seems to have too little relation to natural vision – 
even to imagined or remembered visual experience (Figure 5.17a-b). It draws 
attention to the technology.17 
Figure 5.17a-b. 
Abel Gance: Napoleon, 1926. Parts of the swooping sequence over the crowds in the convention. 1h 46m. 
Similar techniques survive in the unmotivated zoom of some music videos, little if 
ever used in mainstream cinema. A clear differentiation of spatiality on the basis of 
genre is made by Englander:
There are two kinds of zoom shot which, in the BBC, we call the ‘light entertainment’ 
zoom and the ‘drama’ zoom, respectively. With the first you must zoom straight in or 
out regardless of what is is suggested by the subject or scene. But the drama zoom is 
governed by the tensions within the scene and what is going on in it.
Englander and Petzold 1976 p112
The techniques used in Napoleon are opposed to those of the subsequent 
mainstream. Though Harrington claims that the classical film is based on showing, it is 
designed not to be perceived as telling, in the end not even as showing, but aspires to 
resemble unmediated seeing.
17 The extensive use of swooping and flying camera in Imax films is gratuitous in the sense that its main purpose is to 
incite a visceral reaction (and to show off the technology) rather than to further any narrative, but is almost always 
given some diegetic motive based on the movement of a person or object within the scene.
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Overt spatiality: the films of Greenaway
I have shown how the classical fiction film adopts and rejects particular ways of using 
space according to its objectives. It is not surprising then, that when the objectives are 
different, so is the space. In the films of Peter Greenaway it is possible to find spatial 
practices which have been rejected by the mainstream, but which place his films close 
in some respects to the spatiality of the now rejected styles just described and of 
factual television. I summarise here the salient spatial characteristics:18
 
There is extensive use of horizontal symmetry, together with the positioning of 
characters and scenes parallel to the picture plane – both practices which are 
anathema to the classical film (Figures 5.18 and 5.19). 
Figure 5.18.




Peter Greenaway: The Draughtsman’s Contract, 1982. 
Long shot with symmetry and parallel to the main axis 
of the scene.
0h 23m.
The films draw attention to the process of representation. For example every effort is 
made to identify the representation depicted in a film such as The Draughtsman’s 
Contract (1982) with the representation of film (Figures 5.20a-b and 5.21).
Cameras (and actors) move along straight lines parallel or orthogonal to the scenery, 
quite differently from the motivated free movement of the ‘eye’ in the classical fiction 
film. This artificial spatiality is reminiscent of a scrolling arcade game. 
      
Figure 5.20a-b. Peter Greenaway: The Draughtsman’s Contract, 1982. The face-on view of the draughtsman’s frames 
ensures that the viewer becomes conscious of the framing of the photographic shots. 0h 15m and 0h 24m.
18 Since they are partly formal experiments, his films each explore different kinds of spatiality, but there are many 
tendencies common to them all.
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Figure 5.21.
Peter Greenaway: The Draughtsman’s Contract, 1982. 
The face-on view of the draughtsman’s paper identifies 
the paper with the screen and draws attention to the 
medium.
0h 06m.
The possibilities are exploited of manipulating and combining images using digital 
media, notably in Prospero’s Books (Greenaway 1991). The results are not designed to 
be mistaken for straightforward seeing (unlike, say, the use of computer graphics in a 
film such as Titanic (Cameron 1997) which is entirely within traditional Hollywood 
filmic practices). There is a syncretic approach to modes of representation so that 
photography, drawing, animation and text are brought together, another feature 
common in newsreel and factual television but deprecated by the classical fiction 
film. Frames within frames draw attention to the edges of the image (Figure 5.22).
Figure 5.22.
Peter Greenaway: Prospero’s Books, 1991. 
Frames within frames (and multimodal information).
0h 01m.
Why does Greenaway use a spatiality which is at odds with that of the classical 
fiction film? Simply because his objectives are different. In his view ‘cinema is too rich 
and capable a medium to be merely left to story tellers’ (Katz 1994 p553). For him, the 
exciting areas of film-making are not primarily narrative (Melia and Woods 1998 
p130). While Greenaway’s films are engaging, they are also visibly formal exercises.  
He is not interested in hiding the mediated nature of the image. Describing the space 
of Zed and Two Noughts (Greenaway, 1985) Pascoe (1997 p12) suggests, ‘It is a space 
unlike any other into which [...] nothing has entered by accident’. This might be a 
description of any of Greenaway’s film spaces, in which nothing is filmed simply ‘the 
way it is’ (that is, using the transparent, because conventionalised, methods of the 
classical fiction film) but draws attention to its own formal qualities. 
Space is not just incidental to Greenaway’s films but is a subject of interest in its own 
right. Whereas Ridley Scott (another art-school trained English director of the same 
generation) uses his strong sense of pictorial space as a means to conventional ends, 
Greenaway exploits his to engage in formal experiments. He explores ways of 
objectifying the screen image – making the viewer media-aware – in a way which will 
always be of only marginal interest to most cinema-goers, precisely because it 
prevents the psychological immersion which is the essence of mainstream film-
making. 
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Turning from mainstream practice to a film like Prospero’s Books has shown how 
hybridity in modes of representation – the mixing of text and picture, of drawing and 
photography – tends to lead to a medium which is spatially hybrid even within the 
frame. The configurational possibilities that layering and spatial juxtaposition allow 
are exploited by Greenaway to construct new relationships not possible when spatial 
articulation is confined to configuring the model and manipulating the view of it. He 
gives himself the freedom to use space in the plane as arbitrarily as conventional film 
uses space in time, but at the cost of losing the simple directness of the unitary image. 
While time-wise deconstruction and synthesis of space has come to be regarded as 
natural, to the point where it is unnoticed by the majority of film-viewers, planar 
synthesis, like that of a cubist painting, will never pass the test of seeming direct and 
unmediated. To Greenaway this is a virtue not a cost. It nevertheless defines a clear 
separation between naturalist spatial practice designed to pass unnoticed, and 
formalist spatial practice designed to be seen.
It is obvious that any identification of one particular spatiality with the technology of 
film must be misleading. Though one set of spatial practices is dominant in film, this 
is because one genre, the classical fiction film, is also dominant. 
7 Film and vision
I have repeatedly touched on the relationship of film to natural vision. I now confront 
directly the relationship between film and natural vision in terms of both 
correspondence and function. In particular I underline again the pragmatic approach 
which film-makers take and which should inform any attempt to understand how the 
space of film corresponds to the space of the world.
In the previous chapter, I identified difficulties relating to PI-realism. The first 
involved possible incompetence, but this is not an issue in film, because films are made 
within a culture where the construction of PI-realist images is well understood, and 
because film’s basis in photography means that many aspects of mapping optical data 
to the planar image are taken care of by technology. Other difficulties were 
implementational, and I have already indicated that film has similar problems in this 
respect such as providing the optimal viewing position for the image. However, as 
with pictures it seems that it is the internal relations within the picture which are 
important, not the illusion that the picture is a window on a real space. 
 The other difficulties of realism in pictures were those of failure of correspondence and 
functional mismatch. In discussing the question of correspondence in pictures, I argued 
that imitation of the optical ‘sheaf of rays’ was only one interpretation of the concept 
of visual realism, and suggested that most pictures aim instead to capture subjective 
aspects of vision not accessible in the optical instant. I suggested that many pictures 
correspond more closely to what it is like to see than to the snapshot. The question of 
correspondence, then, is a matter of asking what pictures, or film, correspond to. 
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Secondly, under the heading of functional mismatch  I suggested that, even supposing 
some definitive correspondence to this subjective aspect of vision could be 
established, there were many reasons why the picture-maker might choose to avoid it 
if the objectives of the artefact were not well served by such kinds of visual realism, 
especially if the adherence to some strict form of realism led to a loss of 
expressiveness. 
These two questions are now pursued in relation to film. This is an opportunity to 
synthesise them into a clear picture of the rationale for the spatiality of film before 
moving on to other screen-based media.
Correspondence: is film like vision?
There are some techniques which might seem to hold out the promise of being more 
like vision than others. For example, cutting could be minimised or even eliminated; 
the camera could move in imitation of the movements of the head and eye, and shots 
could have maximum focal depth so that the whole frame would be in focus. Such 
techniques have been advanced as more realistic (meaning more like natural vision) 
in particular by Bazin (1967), an advocate of Welles’ innovations in this direction. Part 
of the difficulty with this argument is that it presupposes what constitutes vision. I 
noted the dilemma between using uniform and differential focus in pictures, since 
either is justifiable as being ‘like’ vision, and the same difficulties arise (and not just 
with focus) in relation to film.
Film is not like vision in some basic ways. Three examples may serve as illustration. 
They are offered only tentatively, since they require closer investigation if any 
definitive conclusions are to be drawn, but they suggest the nature of the problem. 
They are all concerned with movement, that aspect of film which seemed as if it 
would be wholly beneficial to visual realism, but which turns out to bring difficulties 
of its own.
Egocentric awareness
Awareness of one’s own movement and unity of position prevents in natural vision 
anomalies which arise in viewing film. If a camera is positioned under a bridge over a 
road and views an approaching car, the resulting scene will be as shown to the right 
of Figure 5.23a. If the camera tracks the car as it passes below and recedes into the 
distance, the image will be as in Figure 5.23b, in which the whole scene is upside 
down. This is not however the experience in natural vision. In natural vision, 
awareness of the body’s (especially the head’s) orientation prevents the receding car 
from being seen as inverted. The absence of such feedback, together perhaps with the 
fact that the image changes under the film-maker’s control rather than that of the 
film-viewer, makes the optical ‘truth’ of the camera seem incongruous and false. 
Media Space 5  Screen Space I: Film  |  Stephen Boyd Davis  |  June 2002  131
Figure 5.23a. A camera faces a car which approaches it along a road. The resulting image is shown at right.
Figure 5.23b. The camera follows the car as it passes below and recedes. The resulting image is shown at right.
Camera movement
The second example resembles the problem of deciding on the relative truth of 
differential and uniform focus. That difficulty arose because vision takes place in the 
visual system, not in the retina, and the mind suppresses any awareness of saccadic 
motion, convergence or focussing. Moreover, it seems that the visual system also 
partly suppresses awareness of grosser movements. When a hand-held camera is 
carried though a scene to capture the view as of a person walking, the film-viewer is 
painfully aware of the wobbling of the resulting image. This is presumably because in 
natural vision the wobbling of the head is compensated for in a way which does not 
operate in the mediated form of film. This seems not to be a problem of the 
inadequacy of a cumbersome technology: on the contrary if a tiny camera could be 
mounted on the head, or even in the eye, of the camera-operator, the problem would 
be no less, and probably worse. What happens in practice in film-making when the 
fluidity and ‘situatedness’ of the hand-held camera are required without distracting 
side-effects, is that Steadicam or some equivalent technology is employed to eliminate 
as much camera-shake as possible. What the film then presents is not equivalent to 
retinal vision but to the processed mental products of that vision after the accidentals 
of changing position have been eliminated: a clear case of VE-realism at the expense 
of PI-realism.
Panning and attention
If camera movement were used in place of the conventional cutting between discrete 
shots, the viewer would know for certain how one side of a room related to another 
because the camera would have swept across the whole of the intervening space. I 
discussed earlier the practical argument for omitting such ‘in-between’ information in 
the interests of narrative economy. If a camera pans across a scene from one 
significant detail to another, such as from actor to object or actor to actor, it must take 
in all that lies in between, and this is contrary to the principle of optimal views, since 
it fills the screen for several seconds with a great deal of information which is of 
almost no value. But additionally there is some doubt as to how closely such panning 
matches vision.
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In natural vision observers generally close their eyes whenever they make gross 
changes to their direction of view.19 One might say that they exercise a jump cut in the 
visual stream. For the film-viewer to see the sweep of this in-between material is 
therefore not only functionally unnecessary but also in a limited sense unrealistic. 
But, since in natural vision the brain eliminates awareness of this blanking during 
rapid movement, making it seem as though viewing were uninterrupted, it could 
equally be argued (and often is) that the cinematic cut is unlike natural vision. This is 
another case where there are valid rival claims for what constitutes realism.
Of Kane Bazin says, ‘Thanks to the depth of field, whole scenes are covered in one 
take, the camera remaining motionless. Dramatic effects for which we had normally 
relied on montage were created out of the movements of the actors within a fixed 
framework’ (1967 p33). Whereas Bazin habitually claims realism as the rationale for 
desirable filmic practice, this is an argument for maximal expressiveness – an 
argument from function, not correspondence. When he says (op cit p32) ‘we are 
witnessing the almost complete disappearance of optical effects such as 
superimpositions, and even, especially in the United States, of the close-up, the too 
violent impact of which would make the audience aware of the cutting’20 his ‘realism’ 
has a clear definition. It is not necessarily matching natural vision. The issue is the 
transparency or otherwise of medium and technique – the need to make the viewer 
unaware of the medium. This is not now an issue to which any ‘objective’ realism is 
necessary: it is defined in its own terms of transparency or otherwise.
Citizen Kane has become something of a battleground in relation to realism. Bazin was 
the first to suggest that its general avoidance of close-ups, its use of deep focus in 
which all parts of the frame are clearly resolved, and the long uninterrupted takes 
which these innovations facilitated, amounted to a style of film narration 
fundamentally different from the older montage style in which space was 
fragmented, and specifically suggested that it was more realistic (Bazin 1967 p23-40). 
Bazin’s arguments are complex, confused even, and in particular he does not 
differentiate properly between what I have called questions of correspondence – the 
degree of match to some visual aspect of reality – and functionality – the merits and 
demerits of particular techniques in terms of expressiveness. 
Bazin was writing at a time when, he believed, one was ‘constantly being told’ that 
montage was the ‘essence of cinema’: this in part explains his overstating of the case 
for techniques which by contrast show a ‘straightforward photographic respect for 
the unity of space’ (Bazin 1967 p46). As with the appeals to realism in the computer 
19 Evinger et al (1994) found activation of the orbicularis oculi (the lid-closing muscle) in 97% of saccadic gaze shifts 
larger than 33º. They eliminated the possibility that these were reflex blinks caused by air-currents over the eye or 
eye-lashes while the head is turning. The probability of a blink occurring increases with the size of the gaze shift (ibid 
p337). It is not certain that such blinks serve the purpose of temporarily blinding the eye, since saccadic suppression is 
also known to occur – the eye becoming partially blind (even when open) during saccades (Hochberg 1987 p607): it 
may be that these ‘gaze-evoked blinks’ (Evinger et al 1994 p337) protect the eye during the movement, or simply 
lubricate it at a time which is convenient in a way that it would not be during fixation (ibid p342). Nevertheless, the 
phenomenon seems to offer good supporting evidence of ‘blinding’ between fixations, using one or both of saccadic 
suppression and blinking, associated particularly with the kind of large-scale gaze shifts for which film-makers have 
traditionally used editing cuts.
20 Mainstream film-makers agree that editing should be unnoticed, for example, ‘you must never be conscious of going 
to a close-up or of going to a long shot.’ (Henry King interviewed Brownlow 1968 p109). Renoir (1974 p57) came to 
consider that ‘the best editing is the kind that is not noticed’ but like most film-makers he does not make clear why. 
Some kind of realism may be intended, but quite what kind is not explicit.
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graphics literature cited in the last chapter, Bazin adduces several different notions of 
realism. Often he puts the case in moral terms: ‘respect for the continuity of dramatic 
space’ (op cit p34), a technique which ‘does not deform’ reality (op cit p27), ‘Murnau 
has no need to cheat’ (ibid), ‘the tricks of montage’ (ibid), and even film’s ‘vocation in 
the service of realism.’ (op cit p38, emphasis added in all cases). 
What is this realism? Of Murnau’s films Bazin says that he is interested ‘in the reality 
of dramatic space.’ He suggests that ‘the composition of [Murnau’s] image is in no 
sense pictorial’ (Bazin 1967 p27). It seems that the goal is to present the viewer 
whenever possible with an automorphic mapping of the scene – to extend the full, 
though unclear, benefits of photography beyond the frame to the shot and to make 
that shot equivalent to what in a montage-based film would be the edited sequence. 
Murnau’s work is praised also because of ‘the uncompromising realism of a film 
whose settings are completely natural’ (ibid). Here it seems that there is a double 
realism: the scenes are realist in being like real places and the automorphic mapping 
of photography is transparent to that realism. This is a realism akin to social realism. 
In Stroheim’s films, ‘reality lays itself bare like a suspect confessing under the 
relentless examination of the commissioner of police’ (ibid); here realism gives access 
to (unspecified) deeper truths.
Generally Bazin considers realism as being an unproblematic relation to the scene: we 
know what scenes look like and film should look the same. He prejudges that the 
thing to which film should correspond is optical vision. However, he also advances 
arguments which include consideration of seeing. An argument for the continuous 
deep focus shot is that ‘it brings the spectator into a relation with the image closer to 
that which he enjoys with reality. Therefore it is correct to say that, independently of 
the contents of the image, its structure is more realistic’ (op cit p35). This is an 
argument not about the simple matching of the representation to the scene, but of 
making a representation which causes in the viewer a response similar to that on 
looking at the scene – the distinction between PI-realism and VE-realism. Bazin goes 
on to argue that such shots produce ‘both a more active mental attitude on the part of 
the spectator and a more positive contribution on his part to the action in progress. 
While analytical montage calls for him to follow his guide, to let his attention follow 
along smoothly with that of the director who will choose what he should see, here he 
is called upon to exercise at least a minimum of personal choice. It is from his 
attention and his will that the meaning of the image in part derives’ (op cit p35-6). 
While it should be noted that exactly the same can be said in favour of montage,21 this 
seems at least a far more complete view of the problem, and one which takes the 
argument from matching scenes to making experiences for the viewer. Each 
technique in its own way offers a set of affordances on the basis of which the viewer 
constructs meaning. This is what Furnham (1999, abstract) describes as producing ‘an 
effect on the viewer where the viewer engages in working out what is happening 
within an array of possible meanings contained within the audio-visual pattern.’
21 ‘By combining these monstrous incongruities we [film-viewers] newly collect the disintegrated event into one whole, 
but in our aspect.’ (Eisenstein 1977 (1949) p34)
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A shot which has proved controversial in relation to Bazin’s argument for realism is 
that from Kane depicting Susan Alexander’s attempted suicide. It is now known that 
great effort was put into contriving an extreme depth of field by matting two shots 
together, of the drugs on the side table and the figures in the doorway in the 
background (Allen 1995 p96). Similarly Carringer reports (1996 p94) that Welles and 
Toland overcame the difficulties of achieving very long tracking shots by using the 
optical printer to achieve effects not possible with the unaided camera. It is known 
that nearly fifty percent of the film was postprocessed using optical printing (Callow 
1995 p522).22 This is illusion in the service of ‘naturalism.’ Carringer remarks that 
‘Bazin’s point is valid, but his underlying premise was wrong: the shot reveals Welles 
not as a photographic realist but as a master illusionist.’ However Carringer here is 
confusing the means and the result, or difficulties of implementation with failures of 
correspondence: Welles might simply be using subterfuge to get round the limits of 
the technology and make what the viewer sees more like natural vision. 
When Welles says ‘The danger in the cinema is that you see everything, because it’s a 
camera. So what you have to do is to manage to evoke, to incant, to raise up things 
which are not really there...And the interior conception of the author, above all, must 
have a single shape,’23 it is clear that the visual realism of photography is for him a 
problem as much as a virtue. Welles subverts the concreteness of photography to 
fulfil his objectives.
Commenting on the work of the Japanese printmaker Sharaku, Eisenstein (1977 
(1949) p32) says of the nonrealistic proportion of the parts of a portrait face: ‘He set 
up the essence of the psychic expression as the norm for the proportions of the single 
features.’ Eisenstein 1977 (1949) p33. In other words Sharaku makes the parts of the 
face the size they need to be in order to achieve a certain effect, pragmatically, rather 
than the size they actually are. This seems to belong to a functional argument which 
prioritises expressiveness at the expense of adherence to some external referent. He 
likens Sharaku’s process to that of the filmmaker:
Is not this exactly what we of the cinema do temporally, just as Sharaku in 
simultaneity, when we cause a monstrous disproportion of the parts of a normally 
flowing event, and suddenly dismember the event into ‘close-up of clutching hands,’ 
‘medium shots of the struggle,’ and ‘extreme close-up of bulging eyes,’ in making a 
montage disintegration of the events in various planes? In making an eye twice as 
large as a man’s full figure?! By combining these monstrous incongruities we newly 
collect the disintegrated event into one whole, but in our aspect. According to the 
treatment of our relation to the event.
Eisenstein 1977 (1949) p34
In some ways this is also an argument from correspondence, though not a PI-realist 
correspondence to an external referent. Just as I have repeatedly noted the possibility 
of using media to imitate something like the experience of seeing rather than 
replicating what is ‘out there’, Eisenstein is arguing that fragmentation allows the 
22 Optical printing uses a combined projector and camera to enable previously processed film to be rephotographed. In 
the process many liberties can be taken with the original shots: for example two or more shots can be combined, 
including mixing live action and models, and the film can be rephotographed from a variable distance to imitate 
zooming (Katz 1994 p1039). Carringer (1996 p99) reports Dunn (who developed the techniques of optical printing) as 
saying that in some reels of Citizen Kane the percentage of optically printed work was as high as eighty per cent.
23 A ‘recent interview’ quoted by McBride (1972 p39).
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viewer to undertake the reintegration, avoiding the all-inclusiveness of photography, 
making it a more suggestive and less depictive form. This handing over of the task of 
integration to the viewer can be considered naturalistic in that it may better resemble 
experience of the world: it makes the film-viewer feel like a natural observer in a real 
situation which must be assessed, sized-up, made sense of, and less like the passive 
recipient of an authored presentation. 
Even the more prosaic Reisz sees editing as a synthetic process in which fragments of 
reality are presented to the viewer for recombination (Reisz and Millar 1982 p22). In 
one way this recalls the spatial practices of Cézanne, the ‘accumulated fusing of little 
tilted facets’ (Hughes 1980 p27) and of early Cubism: ‘They wanted to compress this 
inspection, which takes time, into one moment – one synthesised view. They aimed to 
render that sense of multiplicity, which had been the subtext of Cézanne’s late work, 
as the governing element of reality’ (op cit p20). Eisenstein similarly wants to 
combine views of things seen at different times and scales. Eisenstein – and even 
Welles to a certain extent – sees the surface appearance of reality as problematic, 
partly because it is too loaded with specifics and therefore in some ways a poor 
vehicle for expression. The visible world requires organisation by a stronger 
principle: ‘The dry quadrilateral [ie. the frame of the shot], plunging into the hazards 
of nature’s diffuseness’ (Eisenstein 1949/1977 p40). The task is ‘hewing out a piece of 
actuality with the axe of the lens’ (op cit p41). 
What no one could have predicted was that, whereas the forms of Cubism would 
continue to be seen as artistic interpretation – a strong interference with the 
appearance of the world – similar techniques used in film would become accepted as 
more or less unmediated representations of looking! 
The question of filmic realism – to what does the filmic image correspond? – is I 
believe undecidable. As with pictures, for film there are many alternatives as to which 
‘reality’ is imitated. This problem of correspondence is prior to any consideration of 
the functions that use or avoidance of realism may offer – how the objectives of a 
given artefact might be served by deliberately selecting from alternative realisms or 
by partly avoiding realism altogether. Once a style of depiction has been accepted 
and absorbed – that is, has become transparent to the content – there is a reluctance to 
give up what has turned out to be a highly expressive technique. Thus even those 
films which aspire to seem highly naturalistic are really informed by a deeply 
pragmatical approach.
———————————————————
In the history of cinema, innovations are tried and if they ‘work’, they are retained. 
There is no all-informing theoretical rationale, but a series of tendencies and 
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preferences – for the classical film above all that of apparent naturalness. As a general 
rule, nothing should remind the viewer of the characteristics of the medium, such as 
the flatness of the projected image, the fact that it is captured and projected using 
mechanical devices, that apparent parts of a unitary space may have been filmed at 
different times in different locations. It must seem unmediated.
We can say that film imitates vision, but in the same ways that pictures do; namely, it 
aspires to VE-realism – the evocation of visual experience, real or imagined. Even so, 
if adherence to any kind of realism would confound the objective of constructing a 
dramatic narrative experience, it is rejected. I have shown that classical films have the 
form they do as a result of the interaction of the many influences on the variables of 
the shot, shot selection, shooting style and editing, reconciled above all in a pragmatic 
way with a view to affording certain effects in the viewer. 
The differences between unmediated autonomous natural vision and authorial 
intention expressed through film-making are fundamental to the spatiality of film. In 
this mature medium, selected aspects of visual realism are espoused when they serve 
a purpose, and that purpose is the elimination where possible of any impediments to 
the sense of ‘just seeing’. Such film achieves its objectives by seeming realistic in many 
ways, but it ends up being a strange hybrid of a realism which is optical (based on 
those aspects of vision easily captured by photography whose automorphism enables 
it to exploit primal fears, such as vertigo and anxiety at approaching dangers) and 
high-level realism (based on the psychological experience of vision), even though 
each of these considered separately would seem to require a different artefact. 
The way in which this hybrid has evolved in one hundred years of cinema is a 
mixture of the almost inevitable (such as the preference for lenses which produce a 
more or less undistorted image, that is, in which the objects are where they would be 
if the screen were in fact a window) and other non-inevitable choices which may 
simply have arisen because an experiment by some particular film-maker seemed to 
work well in context and became adopted into mainstream practice.
In the end it is not necessary to characterise film as being ‘like’ anything at all in any 
pure way. Film may be fundamentally based on the evocation of certain aspects of 
natural vision, but almost anything else that can be said about film is capable of being 
contradicted or at least qualified. Film aims to conceal its mediation, yet sometimes 
visual conceits are used which draw attention to artifice and authorship. Film aims to 
be like natural vision, yet it often resembles visual imagination or recall. Film should 
seem real, but the fact that it is a representation is part of its attraction. Film relies on 
the verisimilitude of photography, but the unselectivity of photography is its enemy. 
The elements of the classical film have multiple rationales: there is no simple 
explanation. 
The fact that many innovations in film space were makeshift inventions which have 
subsequently been adopted into mainstream practice – and that the success of so 
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many of film’s spatial techniques could not possibly have been predicted – gives 
pause for thought in relation to new media. It suggests that substantial open-ended 
experiment is called for and that the spatialities of new media may be quite other 
than we currently imagine them.
I have shown that mainstream film is a spatial hybrid, highly automorphic within the 
frame, but between shots subject to wide variation. Sometimes the inter-shot 
relationship is approximately automorphic, such as when two consecutive shots look 
in slightly different directions from the same point. Generally however, between 
shots belonging to a single scene, it is not automorphic in that simple way, using 
many different views to give just sufficient illusion of a coherent space to serve the 
purposes of the narrative drama. I have shown that the time-wise juxtaposition of 
particular views is strongly motivated by the demands of storytelling and is inclined 
to be configurational in character: it puts shots in relation to one another under 
authorial control in order to create meaning, not to capture some pre-pictorial world. 
In cutting between scenes it is wholly configurational, imposing a structure which 
yields new meanings not inherent within the elements themselves.
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6 Screen Space II: Factual Television 
1 The spatiality of television
Several authors have dealt, at least in passing, with the spatiality of mainstream film. 
The same is not true of television, whose spatial practices are almost entirely 
unanalysed. Books such as those of Merritt (1987, 1993) and Crook (1986) celebrate 
the inventiveness of the graphic designer for television in creating title sequences and 
channel idents but have nothing to say about the overall spatial qualities of 
programme content.1 Gessner (1968 p272) dismisses TV space as ‘visually 
disorganised.’ However I will show that the spatiality of television is organised when 
considered in relation to its objectives. The focus is factual programming, using 
examples of news, documentary and adult education, in order to identify the 
distinctive issues. 
There is a far wider range of genres within television than in mainstream cinema, for 
example sports, light entertainment, education, arts, drama, soap opera, music-tv, 
situation comedy, advertisements, stings and idents, news and current affairs, though 
some of these named genres interpenetrate. Considered together they present a 
gamut of spatial practices extending from those broadly similar to the classical fiction 
film – for example in costume drama or soap opera – to those which are very 
different. It is in relation to the latter that I show how many of the spatial features of 
the newsreel which were summarised in Table 5.09 (in the previous chapter) have 
survived and indeed flourish in factual television, so demonstrating that spatial 
practices are selected for their fit with the objectives of the artefact, not on any 
universal basis. It is their very opposition to the spatial practices of the classical 
fiction film which makes them worth special consideration. However, as might be 
expected, even within the genre of factual programming there is some diversity of 
practice, so as always what is documented is a series of tendencies rather than a 
uniform behaviour.
In the absence of any literature or record of past practice, to what extent can the 
spatiality of current factual television be described without seeming to discern broad 
principles on the basis of short-lived, perhaps merely fashionable, practice? I have 
shown how a century of film-making practice has refined the spatiality of the fiction 
film such that, though innovation and change will continue indefinitely, the fiction 
film can be claimed as a mature medium which has achieved a high degree of 
expressiveness: its spatiality is so well attuned to its objectives that it is largely 
resistant to the sudden variations of fashion. While television has itself been 
developing for half a century, it is difficult to discern practices which are acquiring 
any level of permanence. In the analysis that follows, it seems evident that to a far 
greater extent than in the fiction film, change itself is a norm. The ephemeral nature of 
much television broadcasting and its need to be seen to be constantly new have a 
significant effect on spatial practice. I noted how spatial innovation was in itself 
1 A chapter in Crook’s book on the functions of ‘identification, explanation, promotion [and] props’ proves to contain 
nothing at all about explanation and to be entirely given over to identification and promotion.
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problematic for the fiction film in that it risked drawing attention to the means of 
representation, but this is not a difficulty for factual television, especially in peak-time 
programming such as popular documentary and news broadcasts, whose creators by 
contrast want to be noticed as innovators. It is important therefore to suspect that any 
particular cluster of spatial practices associated with a particular genre may change in 
time far more radically than those of mainstream film. Provided this characteristic is 
recognised, it is still possible to show general spatial tendencies which make the 
genres distinctive.
The three factual television examples discussed – an Open University adult 
educational programme; television news broadcasts on BBC News 24, Sky News, 
CNN, Bloomberg TV and Channel Four; the popularising science programme 
Superhuman (BBC Television) – are not uniform in their approach. Even within one 
genre they represent a gamut of approaches; for example Superhuman borrows in 
interesting ways from the practices of advertising, while the more sober Open 
University programme is clearly designed for repeated showing over many years. 
Nevertheless, it will prove possible to find many spatial characteristics which unite 
this genre in opposition to the practices of mainstream film.
I have shown that the classical fiction film, when taken as a whole rather than in 
terms of individual shots, cannot be conceived as ‘realistic’ in any sense of mapping 
the world. Nevertheless it is naturalistic in the sense that the medium is intended to be 
‘seen through’: it aspires to seem largely unmediated. The distinctive spatial qualities 
of factual programming for television can be roughly characterised by their 
opposition to these concerns and by their inheritance of spatial practices originally 
invented in film but subsequently expunged. However, even within this genre, it will 
be apparent that there is significant variation of spatial practice – in particular in the 
way in which two complementary spatialities are exploited. These are the space of the 
model, in which configuration occurs pre-pictorially (or at least appears to do so) and 
the space of the picture, in which viewing and picturing are the main means of 
configuration.
I indicated in the last chapter how closely in film the manipulation of the model M, 
the view V and the picture P are interrelated, and do not want here to suggest that 
they are separate: the difference between model-spatiality and picture-spatiality is a 
difference of emphasis only, so that any given programme or programme segment 
will tend to achieve its objectives through greater use of one or the other. For 
brevity’s sake I summarise the spatial characteristics of each of three different kinds 
of factual broadcast, emphasising what they have in common (and which 
differentiates them from fiction film-making) but also identifying whether they 
achieve their objectives principally by manipulating M or some mix of V and P. 
The manipulation of pictorial space in both television and multimedia includes the 
use of basic configuration – juxtaposition, grouping and alignment – of multimodal 
segments of which pictures are often only a part. Having seen how the space of film is 
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only automorphic within shots, but configurational between them over time, we are 
now dealing with images which are often configurational in space as well.
2 Non-fiction television space
For television it is again clear that while technology may set the outer limits of what 
can be done, it is genre which determines which spatial practices flourish and which 
decay. Ellis rather surprisingly suggests (1992 p159) that ‘there is no real difference in 
narrational form between news and soap opera’. Whether or not this is true of 
narrative style, it can certainly not be said of the spatial practices of the different 
genres. While the soap opera broadly imitates the spatial characteristics of the 
classical fiction film, factual television could hardly be more different.
Example one: Open University adult educational programme
In an Open University programme made some time during the early 1980s, the 
following spatial characteristics are noticeable:
Presenters appear against a plain studio background, facing the camera – and 
therefore the viewer – unlike the normal practice of film (Figure 6.06). 
Figure 6.06.
Open University: Electrostatic Charges, early 1980s. 
Simple, direct-to-camera presentation against a plain 
background.
0h 00m.
Again Ellis treats all television as equally different from film: ‘film events do not 
betray a knowledge that they are being watched’ while television is ‘forever 
buttonholing, addressing its viewers as though holding a conversation with them.’ 
(Ellis 1992 p132, emphasis added). He overstates the case, since, as indicated earlier, 
many genres of television aspire like the classical fiction film to conceal their 
mediation, but his remark captures the character of much factual broadcasting.
Figure 6.07.
Open University: Electrostatic Charges, early 1980s. 
A crude painted equivalent of the cloud scene has 
schematic graphics overlaid on it.
0h 00m.
Disparate modes of information are overtly used together: film, diagrams, still 
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photographs, animation and text.2 I have noted the unacceptability of such mixed 
modes of representation in the fiction film.
Film is speeded up to exaggerate the processes depicted and make economical use of 
time. By contrast fast motion is rarely used in mainstream film, except covertly as a 
subterfuge to make an action seem faster than when it was filmed. Its overt use in this 
broadcast inevitably draws attention to the medium. Historically it has been a comic 
device, and comedy often seems to involve a kind of objectification. 
Figure 6.08.
Open University: Electrostatic Charges, early 1980s. 
Speeded live-action film of a cloud accumulating.
0h 00m.
Unrealistic configurational relations are constructed between disparate elements. A 
presenter is seen in company with a graphic, so that she may comment directly on it 
(Figure 6.09). On referring to a change in the state of the cloud (visually indicated by 
new symbols appearing) she turns to look at the change she is describing, making use 
of the viewer’s tendency to observe what others look at noted earlier. This is a 
borderline case between manipulation of an apparently pre-pictorial model and 
pictorial configuration. It seems as though the graphic really is there with the 
presenter, yet the viewer probably does not see it as the wall-sized object it would be 
if it were really in the space occupied by the presenter.
 
Figure 6.09.
Open University: Electrostatic Charges, early 1980s. 
The presenter looks at the graphic material in order to 
direct the viewer’s gaze, even though the graphic is 
probably not really visible to her.
What size is this graphic – as tall as the presenter, or 
the size of the screen?
0h 03m.
To show two things at once, the screen is simply split (Figure 6.10a-b). The relation 
between the activities in the two parts is important, and there are none of the fiction 
film’s reasons for rejecting this method of solving the problem. This configuration is 
clearly confined to the pictorial component of the space, just the kind of pictorial 
configuration which has been expunged from mainstream fiction film-making.
2 By using different media, different realisms are exploited selectively for their own strengths, with pragmatism again 
to the fore, selecting ad hoc those realisms which best support the objectives of each component. There is no role here 
for the classical fiction film’s sense of a single unitary realism. 
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Figure 6.10a-b. Open University: Electrostatic Charges, early 1980s. In a a medium shot of the experimental set-up 
establishes the spatial relation between the parts. In b the most relevant parts of the equipment are forced into 
proximity using split-screen. 0h 06m.
This programme is certainly a narrative, so the spatial differences from the classical 
fiction film cannot be explained by the absence of narrative continuity: basic narrative 
spatial practices like those of film are in evidence, such as the use of a long shot to 
establish the spatial relationship of the parts of the experiment. The explanation is not 
a different narrative structure as such, but the lack of a requirement that the viewer 
forget the process of representation. 
There is a marked tendency to use basic configurational and pictorial devices, V and 
P, to convey meaning, in contrast to the fiction film where configuration is made to 
seem a property solely of the scene, the model M. It will be seen later that not all 
television, even within the broad genre of non-fiction, opts so clearly for this 
approach. 
At each moment, the spatial organisation is optimised to convey the necessary 
information, sometimes wholly filmic, sometimes diagrammatic, sometimes through 
the spatial juxtaposition or superimposition of multiple components. The 
programme’s spatiality is largely determined by simple communicative requirements 
which are answered in the simplest and most economical way. 
Example two: Television News
(BBC News 24, Sky News, CNN, Bloomberg TV, Channel Four)
Television news provision is an increasingly competitive business. Considerable 
resources are devoted not only to gathering news but to its presentation. Broadcasters 
‘show off’ what they can do technically and aim to make their programmes visually 
appealing. Though each of the broadcasters wants to be distinctive, there are many 
characteristic spatial factors which they have in common:
Spatial complexity Television news is becoming increasingly complex in spatial terms, 
both in terms of division of the plane and in the use of multiple planes in depth. Live-
action, pictures, diagrams and other media are juxtaposed. 
Complex textual interventions  The simple caption used historically has developed into 
a complex pattern of textual overlays and insertions. This emphasis on text brings the 
news broadcast strongly into the ambit of simple spatial configuration while 
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continuing to also rely on the pictorial and filmic spatial practices described in 
Chapters 3, 4 and 5. These television genres are moving from a display which 
transparently presents the unitary image of cinema to displays dominated by 
configuration of parts.
Multi-layered ambiguous spaces  Some of the distinctive spatial character of current 
news broadcasting is facilitated by digital technology. However, many of the spatial 
characteristics of factual television were in evidence before digital media made them 
easy to achieve. In a pre-digital election broadcast (Figures 6.11a-b) cut-out cardboard 
shapes were applied by hand in front of the camera, but despite using real objects in a 
real pre-pictorial space, the siting of these objects in a multi-layered and somewhat 
ambiguous space looks forward to the spatialities which would subsequently be 
made possible by digital techniques. The ambivalent relationship to information 
based on an assumption that many viewers require motivating by decoration, 
including intriguing spatial puzzles, is already in evidence.
Figure 6.11a-b. Described as ‘the old form of studio presentation ... of a London Borough election some years ago [at 
1987].’ From Merritt 1987 p86.
Pictorial frames and filters  Many news broadcasts carry a logo and other fixed overlays 
which are attached to the viewing frame rather than to the material being viewed. An 
example from BBC News 24 (November 2000) has such information in every corner of 
the screen, augmented by captions (Figure 6.12) and other devices. These objects 
belong to the picture, not to the view or the model, which are seen as beyond or 
through them. Historically such graphic objects were common in oriental pictures 
(eg. Figure 3.19, Chapter 3); now they are a distinctive part of the spatiality of 
computer games (Figure 3.28, Chapter 3). They are becoming significant in other 
kinds of interactive pictorial media, reviewed in the next chapter.
Figure 6.12.
BBC News24, November 2000. 
Overlays plus a translucent caption layer.
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Ad hoc reconfiguration  The segment displaying the presenter may be shrunk at need 
so that this smaller window becomes a component of a larger display (Figure 6.13). 
What was a more-or-less cinematic visual world is suddenly reduced to the status of 
a segment in a non-figurative composition. 
Figure 6.13.
BBC News24, November 2000. 
The full-screen display is shrunk (with a cut) to a 
subsidiary role. 
The acceptance by the viewer of this sudden scaling is probably built on the 
familiarity of windowing systems in desktop computer interfaces, but it also harks 
back to pre-Renaissance configurational approaches to pictorial information, before 
the notion of the unitary perspectival world became regarded as the norm (and still is 
in the classical fiction film).
Figure 6.14.
BBC News24, November 2000. 
The main multimodal display, including its presenter, 
is shrunk so that it may be presented by a signer.
Pictures within pictures  In addition to pictures within schematic configurations, there 
may be pictures in pictures, so that the whole of the normal display is shrunk into a 
smaller area. This inner area has an ambiguous character and relationship to the full 
screen, at times seeming a miniature within the plane, at others a space receding in 
depth (Figures 6.14 and 6.15).
Figure 6.15.
BBC News24, November 2000. 
The relationship between the signer and the subject 
takes on an almost pre-Renaissance spatiality.
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Multiple views by pictorial and pre-pictorial means  Both pre-pictorial (M-based) and 
pictorial (VP-based) configuration are used as ways of presenting dialogue between a 
presenter and others at remote locations. A generally pre-pictorial solution is to 
display the other party in a monitor on the studio wall. This allows the newsreader to 
be seen facing the other person, situating the conversation in pre-pictorial space 
(Figure 6.16). However, while the remote individual is speaking, the whole screen is 
taken periodically over by a standard-sized close-up of the speaker, so that the pre-
pictorial and the pictorial become exchanged. The oddness of seeing a person talking 
to a representation on a wall passes largely unnoticed because functionally the 
configuration is expressive – it fulfils its informational purpose. 
Figure 6.16.
BBC News24, November 2000. 
The presenter converses with a representation on the 
wall.
A more pictorial solution is used in Sky News (Figure 6.17) where the participants are 
presented in a diptych (a perhaps unwitting revival of a pictorial structure which 
might have been thought defunct). The illustration also shows the use of independent 
captions and tickers for unrelated news stories, a segmented approach which is taken 
much further by Bloomberg (discussed next).
Figure 6.17.
Sky News, November 2000. 
A diptych allows both parties to a conversation to be 
seen. One is grounded in a known location, 
Manchester, while the other is in a virtual place, Sky 
Centre.
Independent information streams   Bloomberg’s broadcasts (Figure 6.18) come nearest to 
the segmented space of the computer’s graphical user interface: there are at least 
seven streams of information on screen at any one time and, unlike those of most 
news broadcasts, they do not belong to a single story but are independent of one 
another. There is no intention that the user should integrate all the streams of 
information, though some aspects of the information could probably be monitored in 
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 peripheral vision while concentrating on another.3 There would be nothing to stop the 
different segments from being supplied by more than one broadcaster.4 
Figure 6.18.
Bloomberg, March 2001. 
Multiple independent segments in a single display. 
The would-be immersive becomes objectified when 
confined to just one segment among many.
A side-effect – which is predictable in light of the differences between unitary 
cinematic displays and segmented configurations already discussed – is the 
objectification given to the components. The top left part of the screen is occupied by 
a standard televisual channel which at times contains advertisements; instead of these 
engaging and absorbing the viewer in a subjective experience, they are objectified, 
their swooping and whirling spaces becoming noticeably incongruous in the context 
of the rest of the screen-space. This is partly a consequence of the positioning of the 
televisual stream: if it were in the centre it would be easier for it to capture the 
viewer’s attention: all computer games and virtual worlds faced with the issue of 
accommodating an engaging environment and ancillary information give the centre 
of the display to the immersive segment.
Presenters embedded in graphics  During BBC News24 weather forecasts, the screen is 
dominated by a series of animated maps, digitally composited to appear as behind 
the forecaster (Figure 6.19). Since the presence of the foreground graphic layer is 
maintained, the presenter is effectively embedded between two layers of graphics. As  
         
Figure 6.19.
BBC News24, November 2000. 
The presenter sandwiched between graphic layers.
3 For example the average colour of the two tickers, in which rising prices are green, falling are red, and unchanged are 
white, tends to indicate the overall state of the markets even when not being attended to.
4 A recent article by Fischetti (2000 p33) suggested that the temporal insertion of advertisements into television 
broadcasts would, when users can digitally omit advertising, be replaced by spatial insertion in the form of banners 
and overlays. Examples already exist of three-dimensional digital inserts of advertising material into sports 
broadcasts.
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Figure 6.20.
CNN News, November 2000. 
The presenter casts a shadow on
the virtual weather map.
 
these layers are positioned in the pictorial space of the screen, presenters seem to be 
partly dematerialised, an effect augmented by the fact that they move only in the 
plane and never orthogonally. Unusually in CNN News, the weather forecaster casts 
a shadow on the maps she describes (Figure 6.20). This evidence of materiality is in 
contrast to the general tendencies of the genre.
Figure 6.21.
BBC News24, November 2000. 
A layered and segmented space to support multimodal 
communication: the studio presenter, a static textual 
warning, a scrolling textual warning, live-action scenes 
and the usual overlays.
Further ad hoc  changes to the display are called for when weather forecaster, textual 
information and filmic evidence of the weather must be combined (Figure 6.21). In 
the BBC News24 example illustrated a further element is the scrolling ticker of 
weather alerts at the bottom of the screen, making four concurrent streams of 
information in all. 
Figure 6.22.
Sky News, November 2000. 
Presenters at Sky Centre, with monitors showing 
connectedness to the outside world. Whether this 
apparent pre-pictorial space exists or not is unclear.
Interchangeable virtual spaces and places  There are many examples where it is unclear 
whether a space really exists pre-pictorially or not. Frequently news-readers are seen 
with various television monitors visible at some distance behind them in the studio 
showing additional, but generally indecipherable, images (Figure 6.22). It is not 
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always clear whether these are really situated in some physical wall or in a virtual 
pane of the screen.
Archaic cinematic techniques   In some channels the use of transitions is in the tradition 
of the cinema newsreel pastiched by Welles. Figure 6.23 shows a horizontal wipe 
between the image for two stories.
Figure 6.23.
Sky News, November 2000. 
One trailer for a news story is replaced by another 
using horizontal wipes, long expunged from 
naturalistic film-making.
Also reminiscent of techniques defunct in the fiction film is the use of extended 
superimpositions, currently favoured by CNN (Figures 6.24 and TV.25). As with so 
many other characteristic spatial practices, the highlighting of the mediated nature of 
the image is not the problem for factual television that it is for the fiction film. 
 
Figure 6.24.
CNN News feature: Inside Africa, November 2000. 
Superimpositions of lettering, maps and live-action 
are used.  
Figure 6.25.
CNN News Weather Forecast, November 2000. 
Superimpositions of lettering and symbols on live-
action landscape scenes.
As with all the spatial practices discussed in this thesis, those of television have both 
informational and affective objectives. Together these explain its characteristic form. 
In terms of informational expressivity, television news must work within important 
limitations. There is much less control over the material than is available to the 
filmmaker. Unlike when making pictures or fiction film, there is little opportunity to 
configure the model M, the depicted scene, to articulate the meanings intended. It is 
to a large extent a given, and not designed symbiotically with the view and the 
depiction as in classical film. Each filmed segment has its own accidental visual 
characteristics. In addition, the material is by its nature fragmentary, making it 
difficult to immerse the viewer in an engaging experience. Finally, the material 
comprises multiple modes of information, including the inherently schematic mode 
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of text. Together these limitations are bound to push the genre more towards pictorial 
and configurational manipulation than is the case with the fiction film and its related 
television genres.
In relation to affective expressivity, there are again a number of distinctive factors. 
Visual patterning for its own sake – both over time and spatially – is considered 
important, because the programme must be formally appealing regardless of the 
interest of its content. Such formal characteristics were noted as an important 
influence also on the fiction film, but here they are allowed freer rein over spatial 
configuration. The design of television news broadcasts must reconcile a desire for 
affect, particularly with a view to suggesting ‘liveness’, connectedness, and variety, 
with the need to be seen as a reliable source of unbiased information. The great 
majority of segments in a factual television broadcast are photographic because of 
photography’s special authority as a means of conveying what is occurring or has 
occurred, because they impart a sense of immediacy, and because film and 
photography are relatively quick, effortless and inexpensive means of depiction 
(compared for example with digital models or hand-drawn animation).5 Factual 
television does not aim as the fiction film does to make the user mistake showing for 
seeing, yet within each of the time-wise segments and divisions of the plane the 
inherent believability derived from the automorphism, authority and immediacy of 
photography is extensively exploited. Though the space must perform interestingly, 
it must not seem to augment or modify the content in ways which would make it 
unbelievable.
In current news broadcasting practice, while it seems likely that the multiplanar 
character and the resizing and reconfiguring of panes at need (though by the system 
not the user) are derived in part from the graphical user interface, there are important 
differences. In the standard computer interface there is no necessary relation between 
any two things on the screen, whereas here the separate planes and areas are (with 
the exceptions noted) contributory strands of a single theme, and what is more are 
part of an authored narrative. As a result, in basic informational terms the depth-wise 
ambiguity favoured by most channels, though it seems to serve no practical purpose, 
is at least not actually detrimental. Basic gestalt principles, assisted by learned 
convention, ensure that the relationships between the parts are understood. 
Clearly, the spatiality of television news, though it is designed to be engaging, has no 
need to make the viewer forget the nature of the medium as the fiction film does. In 
fact, that each segment is objectified is beneficial to the viewer-news relationship, just 
as much as it is disastrous to the psychological immersion of the fiction film. It could 
be argued that if viewers are aware of the multiple segments then they appreciate the 
wealth of information with which they are supplied.
5 The truthfulness of television factual film became a point of legal contention during 2000 in a dispute with specifically 
spatial characteristics, the opposing positions being that of a journalist, Thomas Deichmann, for the magazine Living 
Marxism that ‘the image was created by “camera angles and editing” and “that there was no barbed wire fence 
surrounding the camp...”’ and that of ITN (Independent Television News) as summarised by a Guardian 
correspondent, Edward Vuilliamy, that “ITN filmed that which was before our eyes. The prisoners were there, the 
fence was there.” (The Guardian, 21 February 2000).
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The overall result is a spatial form which – however one might criticise its often 
gimmicky and gratuitous visual complexity – is highly attuned to its objectives. In 
every respect it is possible, on analysis, to see why it has the form it does. The spatial 
form and the objectives are well matched.
In the next example, a lavishly funded documentary for prime-time television aimed 
at an international audience, it is also true that the spatial practices adopted closely fit 
the programme’s objectives. While some of the core requirements which informed the 
Open University programme persist – of presenting information in direct, easily 
comprehensible form – the balance is tilted even further from informational 
expressiveness towards affective considerations by the need to maintain interest 
throughout fifty minutes (and this interest must also be carried over to the next 
week’s viewing figures, since this is a programme in a series). These requirements 
will be seen to have a powerful influence on the spatialities adopted. In particular, 
considerable effort is put into making pictorial configuration appear not to be 
configurational but to belong instead to the model. This is done in order to present a 
broadly educational, factual programme without the characteristic multi-segmented, 
multi-modal, objectifying interface which is seen to be normal for such material, and 
which the programme makers presumably feared would be literally a ‘turn-off’.
Example three: Superhuman, BBC Television, 2000
For this analysis I have selected one characteristic programme from the series, 
together with other related artefacts selected (significantly) from television 
advertising. 
Formal complexity as entertainment   The programme opens with a short title sequence 
of brief visually striking shots at a variety of angles and scales and which combine 
representations with different scales and modes, such as natural photography and x-
rays, models and live-action. Their briefness and visual contrast makes an almost 
abstract time-wise pattern while establishing roughly what the programme is about. 
The informational requirements of such material – idents, stings and adverts – are 
slight and allow the designer free rein, often with a substantial budget. The dominant 
spatial characteristics of such sequences are extreme spatial depth, strong contrasts of 
scale and spatial ambiguity. Many sequences make use of more or less surreal spatial 
conceits such as an apparently unmediated photographic scene which is suddenly 
disturbed like a pool by a stone (Figure 6.26), apparently insubstantial lettering which 
is shattered by piercing arrows (Figure 6.28) or a globe which opens to reveal a series 
of internal devices (Figure 6.27). Not surprisingly given that text is the only 
compulsory element of any title sequence, lettering is frequently used as a primary 
graphical component, animated, modelled, used as a window on images, morphed 
into non-textual objects, and in many other forms (Figure 6.29). Stasis and flatness are 
avoided at all costs. Such traits are also in general characteristic of Superhuman.
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Figure 6.26.
Diverse Television: Showreel: ‘Lakes’ programme title, 
1999. 
Lettering responds in a watery way to the fall of a 
droplet.
           
Figure 6.27. Pirate: Showreel: Title for weather forecast , 1997. Paradoxical spaces within spaces. A globe opens to reveal a 
series of interlocked, light-emitting mechanisms.
Figure 6.28.
Pirate: Showreel: Advert for headache remedy, 1997. 
Lettering which at first appears virtual is revealed to be 
physical when shattered by arrows.
Figure 6.29.
Pirate: Showreel: Ident for Channel Four Television, 1997. 
Lettering takes on a physical form, though framing and 
camera movement remain fluid and anti-naturalistic.
Figure 6.30.
BBC Television: Superhuman presented by Robert 
Winston, 2000. 
The presenter is composited with a fast-motion shot of 
fungus growing.
0h 00m.
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Scale and depth, pictorial and pre-pictorial  In the opening sequence of Superhuman which 
follows the title, a shot appears in which Robert Winston, the programmes’ author 
and presenter, is seen walking in a wood while in the foreground fungus grows 
(Figure 6.30). The scale of the background and foreground scenes is consistent with 
their really coexisting in a pre-pictorial space, but any illusion that they do is 
undermined by the fact that they are in different timescales – the fungus is seen 
growing. The technique serves the practical purpose of showing both presenter and 
subject matter, but of course the reasons for its spatial form extend far beyond that 
requirement. The principal objective is to intrigue, perhaps amuse, and this is served 
in two ways. The digital compositing of two scenes of such contrasting scales is 
something of a novelty, and for this kind of programme that is in itself sufficient 
motivation for its use. But in addition there is an appeal in strange juxtapositions of 
scale, if those differences of scale appear to arise out of natural vision, which can be 
traced back to some of the earliest experiments with geometric perspective. Alpers 
(1983 p83) notes the fascination with scale of Dutch seventeenth century painters who 
‘juxtapose a bull or a looming cow against a tower made tiny by its distance.’ She also 
notes (op cit p22) the enthusiasm for the loss of a sense of ‘true’ scale as a result of 
using microscopes and telescopes (which earlier times had regarded as a failing). 
Such incongruities are repeatedly exploited in Superhuman.
Spatial punning   Continuities which in the classical film create an illusion of pre-
pictorial unity of space, are here used mischievously, suggesting and then 
undermining spatial coherence. Winston picks a bluebell in a wood (unsurprisingly 
seen growing at an accelerated pace); when he is next seen holding the bluebell it is 
obvious that he is in an altogether different location. The presentation is designed 
again to bring out its own artifice. The viewer is not intended (presumably) to 
disbelieve the informational content of the programme through analogy with the 
obviously deceptive means of presentation, so one must conclude as always that the 
viewer’s inference of intention is vital: the viewer, experienced in the spatial practices 
of television, recognises – and thereby deals with – the divergence between the 
duplicitous mode of presentation and the apparently honest intentions of the author-
presenter in relation to the content.
Configuration made to seem to belong in the model   Further games are played with scale 
and spatial coherence to convey factual information using counterfactual modes of 
presentation. As Winston speaks, situated in a real-looking if somewhat improbable 
location resembling a warehouse, he is startled by the appearance of a giant lizard, 
whose sweeping tail for an instant threatens to strike him (Figure 31a-b). This leads 
into a more or less realistic use of the same computer-modelled lizard to illustrate the 
reptile’s ability to regrow a severed limb. Needless to say, the conjunction of the 
lizard and the presenter in the same apparent space serves no straightforward 
informational purpose. The effects of the persistent use of such techniques in the 
programme seem to be: (1) to situate the presenter in his subject matter, whereas 
simple cuts would present him as an external commentator;6 (2) to contrive a 
                        
6 In another programme in the series, Winston is seen looking at and commenting on a medical phenomenon as 
depicted in a historic oil-painting, but subsequently he himself enters the ‘painting’ and interacts with the characters 
within the pictorial space.
Media Space 6 Screen Space II:  Television | Stephen Boyd Davis  |  June 2002  153
continuity between discrete parts of the programme which might otherwise seem 
fragmented and episodic, creating a synthetic spatial coherence in the absence of a 
real one; (3) to amuse and intrigue the audience and motivate them to continue 
watching.
      
Figure 6.31a-b. BBC Television: Superhuman presented by Robert Winston, 2000. The presenter is composited with a 
computer graphics shot of a lizard regrowing a limb. 0h 27m.
 Where the Open University broadcast accumulates fragmentary elements with only 
just enough spatial coherence to make it clear where a close-up belongs in a larger 
pre-pictorial space, Superhuman frequently contrives to spatially unite things which 
really belong in different spaces and scales. While using a range of representational 
media such as live-action, archive film, computer graphics and model shots, it aims to 
unite these elements in a virtual three-dimensional space whose coherence is 
perturbed but not interrupted by changes of material. 
Text and flat graphics are almost entirely avoided, since they would risk reinforcing 
the planar character of the display (and because they would have unfortunate 
connotations of educating and informing rather than entertaining). Thus 
configuration is made to seem a property of the pre-pictorial model in preference to 
configuration at the pictorial level but, ironically, this pre-pictorial space does not 
exist, being engendered largely by pictorial means!
Though the programme makers are probably right to assume that viewers will 
distinguish between the tricks of representation and the honesty of the content, it is a 
somewhat risky strategy and would be considered inappropriate in a programme 
such as news or current affairs in which probity must not seem to be undermined by 
other motives. There would also of course be prohibitive problems of both time and 
expense.
———————————————————
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Except for the important shared reliance on the realisms of photography, the 
spatiality of factual television can be broadly defined by opposition to that of the 
fiction film. Where one is unitary the other is multi-faceted; where one gives 
transparent access through psychological engagement the other patently presents its 
content; where one coordinates fragmentary views to construct apparently coherent 
space the other uses many disjoint glimpses; where one is unimodal the other is 
syncretic; where one favours the diegetic the other uses extra-diegetic textual (and 
oral) commentary. However, I have shown that a programme like Superhuman, 
while it wants to be noticed in terms of the variety and richness of its components, 
tries in part to shift back towards the unitary image of an apparently preexisting 
model familiar from the classical film.
 Many practices of the factual television genre pragmatically combine automorphic 
and arbitrary characteristics of scale, perspective and mode of representation in ways 
which recall pre-Renaissance pictures.7 Crary (1990 p2) suggest that ‘most of the 
historically important functions of the eye are being supplemented by practices in 
which visual images no longer have any reference to the position of an observer in a 
“real” optically perceived world.’ Though this is a questionable assessment of 
displays such as fiction film, it is a reasonable summary of the spatial practices of 
much factual television, and will be seen also to describe well the spaces of interactive 
multimedia.
Factual television’s combination of the figurative-pictorial with schematic and textual 
configuration, bringing together two different forms of spatiality, will be seen to be 
also the basis of many interactive multimedia artefacts. Both news television and 
many forms of interactive multimedia aim to benefit from a combination of two kinds 
of ‘just seeing’ – segments which seem to offer unmediated vision, embedded in 
simple structures which aim to also make the interrelationships of the segments 
instantly accessible. Nevertheless, as the arguments of this chapter have already 
made clear, such hybrid configurations cannot, taken as a single display, achieve the 
illusion of unmediated viewing which is the hallmark of the fiction film. The 
intervention of configuration within the display is fatal to the ability to forget that the 
image is mediated. Where instead an immersive and apparently unmediated visual 
experience is to be offered then, just as with cinema and many genres of television, it 
seems that only a single, apparently mimetic, image is acceptable. 
7 To treat the Renaissance as a simple watershed is an oversimplification of the history of depiction. Alpers points out 
there was still, even at the height of the northern Renaissance’s concern with mimesis, a willingness to combine 
modes such as text and depiction, modelling and mapping (Alpers 1983 pp169, 172 and 197).
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7 Screen Space III: Depiction and the space of Interactive Media
1 Introduction
The objective of this chapter is to consider digital interactive multimedia in the light 
of the arguments developed so far, refining and developing the arguments while 
using them to make sense of the spatial properties of this medium, especially in so far 
as they relate to depiction. A taxonomy is proposed which is intended to reflect 
existing practice and indicate promising lines of enquiry for the future. 
While the spatial practices of film have their own literature, those of interactive 
media, like those of television, have little. Given the relatively short history of 
pictorial interactive media, all categorisation – and analysis based on that 
categorisation – must be tentative. 
In considering pictures, film, television and digital interactive media within a single 
coherent framework, it should become clear to what extent the spatiality of each may 
be fundamentally different from that of the others. In particular, as already indicated, 
it raises questions about the transferability of spatial practices from one medium to 
another, such as from narrative film to interactive media. The relatively new 
demands of interactivity will, I suggest, have a strong effect on spatial appearance, 
producing new developments and refinements of spatial practice. Genres which 
cannot be foreseen will come into existence and new spatial practices will be a 
defining characteristic of those genres.
In this chapter I will show that, like television, interactive digital media is not a genre 
but a technology supporting multiple (albeit emergent) genres and that the spatial 
practices required for each are likely to diverge as much as those documented in 
pictures and other screen-based media. While I have argued that the fiction film 
should be considered a mature medium, and the same is beginning to be true of 
factual television, I will suggest that the spatial practices of pictorial interactive 
multimedia currently mark it out as an immature medium in which form fails to 
articulate meaning. This is partly because there is insufficient understanding shared 
between makers and users, so that potentially expressive devices have not been 
assimilated into convention. I have made clear throughout the earlier parts of this 
thesis how the apparent transparency of spatial representations is in large part an 
outcome of the viewer’s acculturation to the representational devices used.
Each genre of digital interactive media will, I argue, tend to become identified with 
one of the rival positions defined in this thesis, offering on the one hand an 
immersive sense of realism which is designed to seem as far as possible like 
unmediated seeing (even though significantly culturally determined), or on the other 
hand as a more objective mode of showing. The former is derived from the traditions 
of figurative pictures, the classical fiction film and the console game, while the latter 
resembles the overtly configurational media discussed in factual television. 
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Examples studied
Since anything which combines three or more media types – for example text, 
graphics and sound – in an interactive digital display may be classed as interactive 
multimedia, it is necessary to be selective for the purposes of this analysis. At one 
time considered a single genre of publishing associated with CD-ROM, interactive 
multimedia is now understood to take in websites, personal digital technologies, 
interactive television, virtual environments, point-of-information systems and many 
other distinct forms. Since my aim here is to investigate the relationship between the 
spatialities of pictures, film, television and interactive media, I incline towards those 
artefacts which, unlike for example a current WAP telephone, are able to support 
relatively high-resolution displays and in which the scope for spatial articulation is 
fairly considerable. The discussion concentrates on artefacts with significant pictorial 
components. Despite divergences in the form, content and context of interactive 
media artefacts it is possible to make some useful general observations on the basis of 
a few examples. Some of the artefacts discussed are unpublished projects which take 
a rather more adventurous approach to spatial articulation than their commercial 
counterparts; nevertheless, all are chosen to represent the kinds of multimedia 
currently deliverable on standard computers. This is partly because these were 
examples accessible to me at first hand for extended study and partly because, as I 
shall show, the limitations of the technology have forced the development of 
interesting spatial innovations which have not previously been analysed .
2 Some characteristics of spatial practice in interactive multimedia
Once it became graphical, interactive computing could not evade comparison with 
film and television, with which in some respects it struggles to compete. The book 
metaphor of early works has been invaded by, and in some cases replaced by, spaces 
derived from these fluid, image-rich technologies. In combining media which have 
their antecedents in mature spatial genres, the makers of interactive multimedia 
artefacts seek to imitate some of the apparent strengths of other media. This imitation 
may in some cases be counter-productive and take insufficient account of the 
differences in objectives and modes of use of varied artefacts. For example, pictorial 
interactive multimedia tends to seek the benefits of cinematography without having 
yet found a way to form these ‘shots’ into a coherent whole, mainly because there is 
no internal motivation which ties the events and therefore the spaces together as 
there is in narrative. I showed previously how the spatiality of the fiction film is not 
designed to exhibit pre-pictorial space but is essentially concerned with pictorial 
issues – it constructs just sufficient space to serve the objectives of storytelling and 
psychological engagement.
A characteristic of the screen display of interactive multimedia is that it is in a simple 
sense generally unrealistic: the issue discussed in relation to pictures and film as to 
how closely a visual representation, considered as a unitary display, can correspond 
to looking at real scenes seldom arises, principally for reasons of performance. 
Technical impediments to the imitation of scenes have a far greater impact on what 
may be done in multimedia on standard computers than in film and television: in fact 
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these limitations dominate the visual form. In the case of film and television to simply 
point a camera at a scene yields unlimited quantities of broadly realistic full-screen 
material, but this has not been the case with computer-based media, where not only 
has a storage medium such as CD-ROM been inadequate in both volume and speed of 
transfer, but standard computers have been unable to deliver fluent full-screen 
photographic sequences, especially when synchronised sound is also required. In the 
analysis of a number of interactive multimedia artefacts which follows, it will be seen 
that few even attempt the kinds of all-embracing realism associated with film and 
photography, though as with news television they may make extensive use of 
embedded mimetic segments, photographic or cinematographic.
Whereas in television the introduction of digital technology meant ‘a new kind of 
magic’ in which ‘you can’t see the joins’1 its lower-powered equivalent in digital 
media has not generally succeeded in closely integrating discrete media components, 
and the early tools available did little to overcome this compartmentalisation. Despite 
the popular focus on ‘convergence’ – for example Murray 1997 p27, Fischetti 2000  –  
in spatial terms the integration of different forms of content has proved elusive. Early 
popular development packages such as Apple’s HyperCard2 or Asymetrix’s Toolbook 
treated each component as discrete, so that an item of digitised video footage would 
appear in a small rectangle resembling a self-contained cinema or television screen. 
More recently Macromedia Director when used in conjunction with image 
manipulation tools such as Adobe Photoshop has given developers greater facilities for 
integrating different media technologies in unified spaces, so that QuickTime movies, 
QuickTime VR scenes, still graphics and text can be combined moderately well into 
spatially and temporally integrated artefacts, though even with these tools such tasks 
are not trivial. 
Where the technology permits it, the combining of pictorial and other segments in 
single displays is often taken still further than in factual television. Instead of 
segments being contained by rectangles they are frequently matted into one another 
to create a seamless surface, albeit one that partakes of multiple viewpoints, scales 
and even modes of representation. These amalgams of pictorial segments go beyond 
mere configuration of parts and approach the status of pictures in their own right, 
pictures whose spatiality is designed in response to the special demands of 
interaction. 
Given the importance of the World Wide Web in terms of the quantity of artefacts 
produced and its prominence in public awareness, I should explain its general 
absence from this analysis. The structures available for the encoding and delivery of 
Web content are based on an even more strongly compartmentalised approach than 
in the early days of disc-based multimedia. Text is the only medium handled with 
1 Martin Lambie-Nairn in Creative Review September 1984, quoted in Crook 1986 p11
2 HyperCard © 1987-1993 Apple Computer; Toolbook © 2000 Click2Learn.com Inc.; Director ©1985-1998 Macromedia 
Inc; Photoshop © 1989-1996 Adobe Systems Inc; QuickTime © 1989-1999 Apple Computer; QuickTime VR ©1991-99 
Apple Computer; Shockwave © 1985-1998 Macromedia Inc; Shockwave Flash © 1986-1999 Macromedia Inc. 
Media Space 7  Screen Space III: Interactive Media | Stephen Boyd Davis |  June 2002  158
any facility by HTML3 and its derivatives such as CSS,4 all other media being little 
more than an afterthought. Early Web browsers even on graphical computers 
displayed nothing but text, passing over the display of non-textual segments to 
ancillary software which displayed them in a separate window. Gradually the use of 
tools such as Macromedia Shockwave and Flash is enabling greater visual and 
temporal integration simply by arrogating control of the browser window (Figure 
7.01), but at the time of writing these are of minimal importance for the majority of 
Web users (Nielsen 2000b). Nevertheless, I assume for the future a far greater range 
of spatial usages made possible by such technologies, and therefore concentrate on 
them at the expense of standard Web documents of today.
Figure 7.01.
Good Technology 2000: A website for the band U2. 
The site makes extensive use of modes not possible 
using the standard interface devices available in 
HTML. In particular the interactive timeline in the 
lower half of the display allows visual properties such 
as translucence and interactions such as dragging.
3 The importance of interactivity
Interactivity is not just an additional layer imposed over existing forms of spatial 
articulation but fundamentally influences how those forms are deployed. Text, easily 
manipulated by the computer, has become capable of change in spatial configuration 
on demand;5 however this is rarely the case with pictorial or filmic material. Generally 
each segment is of fixed form and even duration, though occasionally the user may be 
permitted to resize a pictorial or filmic component (Figures 7.02a-b). 
           
Figure 7.02a-b. Editoriale Domus: CD-ROM: Venezia, 1998. 
The user may switch between two sizes for the presentation of QuicktimeVR scenes, principally in order to overcome 
limitations of performance. The presence of the large VR segment leaves no space to display the map and some of the 
controls. In both cases a photographic background image fills the space not occupied by the main segments. Note also 
how objects are embellished with drop-shadows (such forms of ‘realism’ were discussed in Chapter 4). 
Nevertheless, even for pictorial and filmic material, basic differences are introduced 
by interactivity. A decisive influence is the fact that the user must be provided with 
3 The Hypertext Markup Language, which specifies the syntax of a Web page for interpretation by a browser.
4 Cascading Style Sheets, an extension to HTML which give somewhat greater control over the positioning and layering 
of graphical and textual components in Web pages (Lie and Bos 1997).
5 For example in outliners, diagramming software, presentation packages, database visualisation, hypertext systems, 
file management systems and so forth (discussed extensively in Boyd Davis 2000).
Media Space 7  Screen Space III: Interactive Media | Stephen Boyd Davis |  June 2002  159
objects with which to interact by pointing, normally by directing a cursor using a 
mouse, trackpad or similar device. Pointing requires the presence of an object on the 
screen at the time when the user wishes to make the interaction. It is thus quite unlike 
an object in the space of film or television which has earlier been seen by the viewer 
and which is assumed to be still present even when not on screen. Though Poole 
(2000, p73) lumps together joysticks, joypads, mice and keyboards as ‘curiously 
alienating devices’ it is pointer-based interaction which dramatically constrains 
spatiality. 
As well as marking a difference from film, the need for objects to be visible in order to 
be interacted with is one of the principal ways in which the graphical user interface is 
different from, and inferior to, the command line interface which preceded it. There a 
user could type copy a:myfile b: to move a file from one volume to another without 
any need to see a prior representation of the objects referred to. Multimodal 
interaction, allowing the user to interact using a mode such as speech (Cassell et al 
1999, Oviatt and Cohen 2000), could radically affect this spatial characteristic of 
interactive multimedia since users would then be able to address objects which they 
could not see.6 Though Grasso, Ebert and Finin (1998) enumerate several points of 
comparison between graphical and multimodal user interfaces, they omit this basic 
fact, that graphical interfaces are bound to make all available objects visible. This is a 
fundamental problem for most of the artefacts under discussion.
If many objects must be visible at once, an important determinant of the spatial 
characteristics of pictorial interactive multimedia is the issue of information density. 
Many characteristic spatial features arise from this difficulty. Using 9-point text on a 
display 800 by 600 pixels, about 350 textual labels or titles (approximately 740 words) 
might be presented in a table. Using continuous text, the number of words which 
may be displayed increases to about 1,500. Using some method of indirection, where 
for example each item is represented by a small dot with which the user interacts in 
order to access the information itself, it might be possible to display as many as 13,400 
items, assuming 3x3 pixels to represent each point and sufficient space between 
points to distinguish them. Pictorial and filmic segments however are considerably 
larger than their textual or schematic ‘equivalents’. I suggest it is hardly possible to 
make a picture which is usable for most purposes comprising less than about 7,000 
pixels. Fewer than seventy such pictures can be fitted into an 800 x 600 display, so 
pictures pose a considerable problem of density and space consumption.7 An 
inevitable outcome is that designers must often choose when to distribute pictorial 
elements spatially and when to use time as a substitute for space – for example by 
creating a pre-pictorial space of which the user views a portion at any one time.
While the need for the objects of interaction to be visible is one aspect of the special 
6 Sound has the potential to deal with another aspect of the same problem, if acceptable ways could be found to have 
objects currently outside the display emit sounds which reminded the user of their presence, thus replacing the binary 
cut-off of the screen frame with an analogue decay with distance. 
7 Almost 470 icons of 1024 pixels (32 x 32) can be fitted in such a display but only if packed edge to edge, and in any 
case such pictures are generally useful principally as visual mnemonics rather than true depictions. They have the 
realism of general recognition but almost no other. A ‘passport photograph’ portrait may be considered reasonably 
recognisable as a particular individual at 70 x 100 pixels. 
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demands of interactivity, another is the relationship between narrative and 
interaction which I have already suggested makes difficult any direct transfer of 
filmic practice to interactive multimedia. As examples will illustrate, a basic problem 
of the spatial design of interactive multimedia is that the more freedom is given to the 
user the greater the difficulty of using the practices of spatial articulation exploited in 
film, since these, as I have demonstrated, are outcomes of authorial control. I 
attempted in a book chapter on virtual environments (Boyd Davis and Athoussaki 
1999) to discern ways in which the spatial techniques of cinema could be repurposed 
in interactive systems, especially through greater use of the variables of the view such 
as selective focussing, but I now recognise more clearly the difficulties of such 
borrowings. I also underestimated the importance of the illusion of unmediated 
viewing. Persson (1998) similarly proposes ways in which the spatial practices of film 
might be adapted to support users in making sense of virtual spaces, for example in 
order to assist them in finding their way about. The difficulties of such transfer are 
discussed in relation to particular artefacts below. 
4 A spatial classification of pictorial interactive media
In what follows I categorise the uses of space according to principles arising from the 
analysis of pictures and of film, proposing six categories:
   1 Simple assembly
   2 Two-dimensional pre-pictorial space
   3 Three-dimensional pre-pictorial space
   4 Pseudofilmic space
   5 Hybrid space
   6 Integrated spaces combining pre-pictorial and pictorial space
   7 Pictorially dominated space
These range from simple assembly of pictorial components in the plane and in 
(shallow) depth, through to what I suggest are new pictorial forms specifically 
designed to support the demands of interaction and the limitations of the technology. 
Not surprisingly these new forms are largely derived from inherited practices 
reinterpreted in relation to the new objectives. Other categories bring out the different 
kinds of relations between the design of the pre-pictorial model and of the pictorial 
view by which it is mediated. This will be seen to be correlated with the mode of 
interactivity – allowing the user substantial freedom of viewpoint diminishes 
pictorial expressivity. Various designers have wanted to keep hold of the expressivity 
granted by authorial control of the view and have as a result concentrated 
interactivity into other aspects. The analysis concludes with some suggestions of 
ways in which the spatial representations of pictorial interactive multimedia will 
diverge according to the variety of objectives.
1 Spatial configuration: simple assembly
Under this category I include discussion of spatial organisation which is schematic 
rather than pictorial, since its inclusion will facilitate later discussion of systems 
having a stronger pictorial component. 
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The issue of information density, arising from the need to bring together multiple 
elements in a single space in order to make them all accessible not only to vision but 
also to interaction, leads in some cases to segmented spaces somewhat akin to those 
of the television news broadcast, using straightforward juxtaposition and layering of 
related elements. Like the news display, this sometimes approaches a kind of pictorial 
unity, but more often consists of a segmented configuration in which the components 
are arranged on simple principles such as the matrix, or by a depthwise accumulation 
of segments using basic occlusion. In the spatial organisation of interactive tools, such 
as applications like Adobe Photoshop or Macromedia Dreamweaver, this has 
principally taken the form of an accretion of numerous more or less standard 
interface objects such as windows, palettes and tool bars (Figure 7.03a). The screen 
furniture of these components serves to divide up the display into discrete areas. The 
relationship between them is not articulated visually, so that it is not generally 
apparent which objects control which until the user has learned the working methods 
for each particular application.
Figure 7.03a-b. 
a: Adobe Photoshop Version 4.0 ©1989-
1996. 
b: Macromedia Dreamweaver Version 
2.0 ©1997-1999.
The multiple windows and palettes 
typical of complex computer 
applications.
Figures 7.04a-f illustrate an application of a slightly different kind. Intended for those 
new to computing, the Interactive Course Map M206 (Open University 1997) makes 
use of overlaid as well as juxtaposed components but imposes a stronger authorial 
configuration on them than do the tools for advanced users just described. The user 
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may open and close overlaid panels but not move them. This artefact lies at the 
intersection of the authorially controlled and the fully interactive, offering a 
multimedia presentation with a strong narrative thread as well as a more interactive, 
open information structure which the user can interrogate at will. The user may 
follow a voiced narrative which explains each aspect of the subject matter (the 
syllabus and educational resources of a course in object-oriented programming) or 
click on various segments of the interface to access hidden detail. The design borrows 
from the strongly delineated discrete components of application tools but articulates 
the relationship between them rather more clearly using spatial configuration both in 
the plane and in depthwise layers. For example the imposition of spatial cues of 
figure and ground (Figures 7.04d and e) makes clear that only the foreground 
components are accessible. In Figure 7.05 an interesting comparison emerges between 
the strongly delineated components of the tool itself and the merged spaces and 
modes of representation of the embedded television sequence which combines 
presenter and animated map in a homogenised and ambiguous space. While both the 
television programme and the multimedia course map make use of segmented spaces 
they do so in different ways, determined partly by their respective antecedents and 
partly by what the technology of each makes easy. Considered as a whole, the 
program presents a multiplicity of variations on the idea of combining planar 
segments into meaningful configurations while preserving their discreteness.
One of the simplest devices used in the Course Map, as it is in standard computer 
interfaces, is the opaque overlay which occludes the underlying material. This is one 
of the spatial usages based on depth-wise stacking which is badly managed in the 
standard computer interface. The lack of visual semantic relations between the 
windows in the accumulated pile in such interfaces, together with the simple fact that 
the windows which the user needs access to are often obscured by others, has been 
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Figure 7.04a-f. 
Interactive Course Map for M206, Open University 1997.
The application uses overlaid components but incorporates them into a more strongly configured whole.
 
     
 
Figure 7.05
A multiplicity of segments can be seen, each delineated 
as discrete except in the case of the blended spaces and 
modes of representation visible in the embedded 
television sequence. 
accused of leading to poor performance by users when compared with more fully 
articulated configurations which preserve the visibility of every item (Kandogan and 
Shneiderman 1997). A related typical weakness is a lack of ‘intelligence’ in the 
positioning of windows so that for example a Find dialogue-box obscures part of the 
document in which searching is taking place and, though the underlying document 
scrolls to reveal each successive occurrence of the search term, it is not ‘aware’ of the 
presence of the occluding overlay so that occurrences are highlighted invisibly 
beneath it. The designers of the Course Map avoid the use of movable overlays and so 
aggravate the problem of occlusion since offending objects cannot be dragged out of 
the way, but in compensation they have done their best to position overlays where 
they will cause least difficulty and where they provide useful glimpses of the 
underlying context. The same cannot be said of the CD-ROM products of Dorling 
Kindersley which invariably position overlays in the centre of the display, the very 
location where the focus of interest in the underlying screen is itself likely to be 
located (Figure 7.06a-b). Frequently additional pop-up overlays can be summoned 
over one another so that the original subject to which they refer seems in danger of 
disappearing under an accumulation of boxes. This depth-wise spatial configuration 
is expressive of the basic fact that the new information is ancillary and that it may be 
dismissed by the user, but neither it nor the planar configuration contribute anything 
else to the meaning. 
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Figure 7.06a-b. Dorling Kindersley 1997: Sampler of Dorling Kindersley multimedia products. Typically a pop-up 
overlay obscures the object to which it refers.
 
Figure 7.07.
Donald Norman 1994: Donald A Norman – defending 
human attributes in the age of the machine, CD-ROM 1994.
Pictorial space contained more or less conventionally 
within a page-like assembly.
A complementary example of combined text and graphical space is offered by a 
Voyager CD-ROM based on several works of Donald Norman (Norman 1994). It 
works effectively as a ‘book’ with the additional digital benefits of free-text searching 
and facilities to easily mark and index passages for future reference. The illustrations 
function in most respects like those of a traditional book but with the ability to 
animate and use sound (Figure 7.07 – I comment later on the characteristics of the 
graphic segment in this figure when considered in its own right). The physical 
relation of picture and text is one of simple juxtaposition. 
Figure 7.08a-b. Maltez, Bennett and Cova 1997: Interactive Documentary ‘Contact’. 
In a the main televisual narrative sequence alone is available. In b the main narrative is partly suppressed when the 
user has activated one of the ancillary narratives which is offered at a time determined by the authors.
Whereas the spatial articulation of the interactive course map was a development of 
spatial usages familiar from application tools, Contact (Maltez, Bennett and Cova 
1997), a prototype interactive documentary, adopts an approach which slightly more 
resembles television (Figure 7.08a-b). The task which it addresses is less ambitious 
than that of the course map, yet there are more points of similarity than their 
respective interfaces might suggest. Both offer a continuous narrative in which every 
component is at some time embedded; in both narratives the user may advance or 
step back by interacting; both offer ancillary information at predetermined points in 
the overall narrative; and both allow the user to interrogate individual components of 
the interface. However, in Contact the user has not the same degree of arbitrary access 
to all the components and the sensation of authorial control is correspondingly 
stronger. The number of individual components in Contact, and the range of 
relationships between them, is smaller than in the Course Map, which makes easier the 
provision of a simple user interface.
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The spatial differences between the two artefacts are evident in the illustrations 
provided here, but the differences are augmented by the style of interaction. While 
the Course Map is based on the now conventionalised screen furniture of standard 
graphical user interfaces which are often considered examples of direct manipulation 
(Shneiderman 1992 p202-205), the form of interaction offered by Contact is often more 
direct in that it involves manipulation of the objects of interest rather than with 
control devices which in turn affect objects. For example, to control a digitised video 
in the Course Map the user drags a slider, while in Contact the user drags the pointer 
to right or left on the image itself. In the Course Map the user activates an element in 
the display by clicking the pointer on it – that is, by depressing and releasing the 
mouse-button – while in Contact the user merely moves the pointer into the segment 
of interest. This minimal action is sufficient to cause the indicated segment to become 
more prominent and to perform (it brightens and its narrative proceeds) and to 
suppress the other narrative, which is dimmed while its narrative is suspended. The 
relative seamlessness of the visual interface is therefore enhanced by the mode of 
interaction.
The contrast between controlling video in the Course Map and Contact illustrates the 
problem of maturity (or rather the lack of it) in interactive media. At present the use of 
a slider and buttons (a hybrid of the scrolling window and the video tape recorder) 
has become familiar, while the direct control of video by interacting with its image 
has not. It is easy to imagine a situation in which the reverse is true: the provision of 
external controls may come to seem obscure and alienating and the direct style 
natural and intuitive.8 Only familiarity, the sharing of a convention by makers and 
users, could make this happen. The simplified presentation and direct style of 
interaction taken together give some of the sense of unmediated access to content 
which I noted in relation to film, and emphasise the need to conceive of visual and 
interaction design as aspects of a single set of objectives. 
Despite their differences Course Map and Contact both preserve the discreteness of 
segments. A different approach is taken in Britain in Brief, a CD-ROM for the Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office (1997) (Figures 7.09 and 7.10a-c). Here there is an attempt 
to bring multiple images, each with its own perspective geometry, together in a 
                    
Figure 7.09. 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Britain in Brief, 1997.
A digital collage of multiple mimetic images. Each object 
or scene has its own perspectival geometry, but the 
overall tonality is adjusted to equalise the salience of each 
of the objects.
In this illustration a pop-up text is also displayed (below 
centre, left) which seems to emerge out of the overall 
assemblage. Considerable effort has been made to make 
this text box soft-edged and translucent.
8 The advantages of indirect manipulation discussed earlier in controlling non-visible objects cannot be claimed for the 
slider and buttons, since it is never likely that the controls will be visible in the absence of a filmic sequence itself.
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Figure 7.10a-c. 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Britain in Brief, 1997.
Figures a and b show two states of the same screen. In b a small digital filmic sequence 
(using QuickTime) is displayed in place of a static graphic. Figure c shows the post-
processing applied to each frame of the QuickTime movie in order that it should 
appear integrated in the overall collage-space, disguising the fact that the movie is in 
fact rectangular.
digitally collaged space. The motivation is presumably similar to that behind the 
blending and spatially ambiguous techniques of television – to suggest an indefinite 
wealth of information (as well as perhaps simply being the fashion of the moment). 
The visual blending on which considerable effort has been expended begins to offer a 
quasi-pictorial space complete with relations of scale and depth between the parts, 
but I suggest this is more of a graphic conceit than a meaningful expression of 
relations between the parts, which are essentially just accumulated. 
2 Two-dimensional pre-pictorial spaces
Figure 7.11 (left).
Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Britain in Brief, 1997.
The display offers a partial view of a large planar space 
containing symbols for thirty topics such as Parliament, 
Tourism and Religion and Beliefs.
Britain in Brief has the characteristic common to many multimedia artefacts that its 
various parts use different approaches to spatial organisation. In addition to the 
browsable digital assemblages just described, and a televisual opening sequence, 
another interface offers a six-by-five array of iconic pictures based on photographs. 
Clicking one of the pictures leads to one of the themed digital collages already 
described, while simply pointing at it causes the display of a label, the production of 
an appropriate sound, and a small animation of the picture. The pictures themselves 
are of some interest spatially, in that, in common with many components of the 
computer interface, they cavalierly combine spatial realisms derived from being 
photographic with the contrived realism of objectness imparted by cast shadows. This 
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pragmatic attitude to combining the different realisms associated with different 
modes of representation will be seen to be more fully exploited when other categories 
of interactive spatiality are analysed below.
The user is never permitted to see all thirty pictures at once since only about four fit 
the display (Figure 7.11) and there is no facility to zoom-out for a broader view (nor, 
as a Web-user might expect, to alter the frame of the window). This is clearly 
deliberate, since there would be sufficient space to exhibit thirty such images at a 
usable size in a single screen – the designers have obliged users to scroll for some 
reason. There are no tools such as scroll bars for effecting the movement of the view 
in relation to the space, nor need the user drag (that is, move the mouse while 
holding the mouse-button down): the space moves if the user simply moves the 
pointer towards the perimeter of the display. As in the modeless activation of 
alternative narratives in Contact this has the effect of minimising the degree of 
conscious motor control of the interface and has some of the qualities of simply 
shifting one’s attention. The nearer the pointer is to the perimeter the faster the 
display moves, avoiding the sense of transitional time wasted which I noted when a 
camera moves under authorial control from one significant part of a scene to another. 
I define this scrolling surface as pre-pictorial in the sense that the scrollable layer can 
be considered to belong to a model, albeit itself containing pictures, on which the user 
may choose any view, and in which these views are not responsive to what is viewed. 
Like an imaginary camera (not a real one) the window renders in unmediated fashion 
the view of the model beyond. No aspect of the view is altered in response to what is 
viewed, unlike in painting for example where I showed that it is normal for a picture 
to re-present pragmatically and constructively the observed scene – to create the space 
of the scene – rather than simply to open a frame upon it. I also showed how film too, 
despite exploiting the mechanised automatic picture-making of photography, is 
essentially pictorial because it designs the model and the view as aspects of each 
other, manipulates the variables of the view and makes space through the relations 
between discrete shots. Here by contrast the window really is just a window.
Returning to the model proposed previously, a further refinement is required. I 
proposed previously that the the objectives, non-visual idea, pre-pictorial model, and 
view could be crudely diagrammed in relation to the picture as follows:
O   I   M   V   P
In the case of a still picture, film or television programme, the author has control over 
the specific view of any pre-pictorial model, which offers a particular picture. When 
considering interactive systems, however, the user often has the freedom to choose 
which parts of the model to view, from what distance and what angle. Nevertheless it 
would be quite untrue to say that the user has access to the model itself. As defined, 
the model is not a visual entity (though its form does imply some visual 
characteristics). As already stated, the model is given visual form by the parameters 
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of viewing and depiction, and in almost every case these are substantially decided by 
the author, not the user, imposing strong limitations on the kinds of pictures which 
may be seen. This may be represented as follows:
O   I   M  
Vu   P
Vp  P1,P2,...
— full authorial control
— some user control
Here the use of pictorial means under full authorial control is represented by the 
upper branch, in which uniquely prescribed views Vu yield particular pictures P over 
which the user has no control. The lower branch represents those interactive systems 
in which viewing parameters Vp rather than actual views are decided by the author. 
These yield an unlimited number of pictures P1 ,P2,.... 
The Britain in Brief scrolling interface shows some odd characteristics in the relation 
between its pre-pictorial and pictorial aspects. The user might expect the boundary of 
the scrolling model-space to soon be reached, as when scrolling pages in a word-
processor or a Web browser. However this is not so since attempts to scroll 
continuously either horizontally or vertically eventually show the whole space 
repeatedly: the space turns out to wrap back on itself. This infinite topography could 
be conceptualised as a torus within which the user is located, but there is no visual 
evidence of curvature – everything about the graphic suggests that the model is a 
plane. As with film, it is experience of the visuals over time which constructs this 
‘space’, as much as any single view of it, but in this case the single view – suggesting 
a plane surface – and the aggregation of views – suggesting a toroidal model – offer 
contradictory evidence.
Such indeterminate or contradictory spaces are potentially a characteristic of any non-
physical medium but digital methods facilitate them, and there are clear precedents 
in the predominantly textual realm of databases and similar digital structures where 
objects can be in more than one space and more than one configuration at once. If a 
new form of non-physical space proves on repeated and extensive use to offer 
advantages in relation to the objectives of the artefacts it serves, no doubt 
conventionalised nomenclature will emerge to normalise these unfamiliar concepts 
and they will become transparent as so many filmic techniques have done.9 
The intention of the authors of this particular space, declared on the packaging, is to 
offer a ‘voyage of discovery’ in which users can ‘explore.’ Another probable motive 
was to give the impression of an unending wealth of information. In both respects the 
product seems likely to disappoint since it soon becomes clear that there is a limited 
number of items, while at the same time it is not easy to find any particular one, even 
if it has been seen before, because of the featureless character of the background. 
Nevertheless such a spatial system, redesigned for more straightforward use, has the 
9 Similarly the bizarre metaphoricity of ‘scrolling a window on the desktop’ has decayed to simple naming of now 
familiar devices and behaviours.
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potential to solve some of the problems of information density while supporting a 
fluid interaction style which obtrudes only slightly into the process of looking.
While the space described supports simple browsing it is clearly incapable of 
supporting in its present form other functions such as searching. The need to support 
multiple means of access to information – something that interactive textual 
configurations are generally good at – is part of the rationale for the provision of 
more than one graphical organisation in a single artefact. A particularly poor 
example, which I include as a measure of the immaturity of the spatiality of 
interactive multimedia, is a recent companion CD-ROM to the BBC’s A History of 
Britain television series (V&A/BBC 2000). Like many this product offers more than 
one spatial organisation of the material yet it is unclear why. Many possible browsing 
and searching functions which might have been offered are not, while the two 
interfaces which are provided (Figure 7.12a-b) duplicate one another: the ‘timeline’ 
and ‘stories’ interface differ only in that one must be scrolled and is horizontal and 
the other need not be scrolled and is vertical. In both screens the disposition of objects 
in one axis very approximately represents time while that against the other axis is 
meaningless. Poor design exists in all media; the significance here is that it would be 
hard to imagine organisations such as those involved in the production of this CD-
ROM – the BBC, BBC History Magazine and the Victoria and Albert Museum – 
sanctioning work of such incompetence in a medium with which they were more 
familiar. There is a strong impression of designers failing to find any fit between the 
new spaces made possible by digital interactive media and the functions which the 
artefacts are intended to perform, and little suggestion as yet of a mature spatiality 
which gives form to meaning, which is expressive in the way that the customary 
spatial practices of older media are.
Figure 7.12a-b. V&A/BBC 2000: A History of Britain CD-ROM. 
The ‘timeline’ and ‘stories’ interfaces differ only in insignificant ways.
For new spatial forms to become adopted into a developing spatial ‘language’, use 
must reveal a close relationship between the spatial form and the makers’ intentions. 
When what is intended by the provision is unclear, spaces are doubly 
incomprehensible. The user has the problem not only of understanding an unfamiliar 
spatial device, but of attempting to discern an intention behind it. Whereas spatial 
innovations in film, such as the close-up, generally had discernible motivation, this is 
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often not the case in interactive media.10 I noted earlier how film-makers tended to 
abandon unmotivated devices in favour of those which articulated meaning. I do not 
wish to suggest that innovation derived from open-ended experimentation with 
technical possibilities is to be deprecated, but it seems clear that over time only those 
devices which in context have or acquire meaning will flourish.
3 Three-dimensional pre-pictorial space
In the case of the three-dimensional world presented in the plane of pictures and film, 
every aspect of the artefact may be regarded as pictorial, since the depicted model is 
chosen and designed with a view to appearing in particular views, views whose 
variables are chosen by the maker and which in the case of film are also sequenced 
with a view to articulating particular meanings. In the case of pictorial interactive 
multimedia the situation is more complex. Some of the example three-dimensional 
spaces discussed here are best considered as pre-pictorial. Users can look where they 
wish in the space and no accommodation to the model is made in the view – the view 
is an entirely automatic outcome (like cinematography but lacking any deliberate 
interventions) of the virtual viewing device’s processing of the model. Other 
examples, discussed next as pseudofilmic spaces, are more truly pictorial in a similar 
sense to film in that, though the user may move about the space to a certain extent, 
every view has been chosen by the maker. The users’ decisions as to which trajectory 
to follow are responded to by the showing of pre-rendered views. Though the user 
has some freedom of movement, the mode of viewing largely resembles the optimal 
view discussed in relation to film.
The use of sequences of separate views of a three-dimensional model is in many cases 
a consequence of limitations in delivery technologies. Since, as discussed, standard 
computers have not been well suited to the provision of smooth-flowing filmic 
sequences rendered on the fly as users move their viewpoint, the pre-rendering of 
selected views has presented a solution to this practical problem. This might be 
regarded as a disappointing compromise, but I suggest that some of its benefits may 
not be abandoned even when technological advances make it unnecessary.
To the class of pre-pictorial spaces which allow the user largely unconstrained and 
unarticulated views of the model belong most virtual worlds, such as Active Worlds 
(Activeworlds.com Inc.) in which users build three-dimensional environments which 
can be viewed in a suitable browser (Figure 7.13.). It is certain that the geometry and 
other attributes of this world exist independently of any particular view: a given 
depiction at any moment is the automatic outcome of the application of generalised 
viewing parameters to the world-data, so there are none of the opportunities to 
engineer a particular pictorial outcome in order to fulfil particular objectives which 
are so important in authored picture-making. Nevertheless, users may not really look 
entirely where and how they please in such environments. For example they are 
10 The presence of a rationale for technical innovation could be overstated for film. ‘What mattered to me was a fine 
close-up. It so happened that if they were to accept a close-up the public had to be given a story’ (Renoir 1974 p56). 
Nevertheless mainstream film-makers tended over time to eschew gratuitous effects and exploit technique in the 
interests of narrative.
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never permitted to reach the pictorial horizon – it is infinitely far away and no 
amount of travelling will take the user to it. The focal length of the virtual lens is 
fixed and certain viewing angles are forbidden; for example, the viewpoint may not 
pass in an arc through the vertical, probably to avoid the disorientating inversion 
noted in the chapter on Film (or perhaps to protect the program from divide-by-zero 
errors). In addition, since the user is by definition an inhabitant of such shared spaces, 
the viewpoint is always either through the user’s eyes or over the avatar’s shoulder (a 
clear borrowing from film). 
Research with young children in Active Worlds by Bailey and Moar (2000) casts 
further light on expectations of filmic convention. Children who were enabled to 
apply scanned photographs of their own faces to their avatars wanted to be able to 
see not only the faces of their friends but their own as well. Such views of the 
protagonist would, with the rare exception of experimental first-person films like The 
Lady in the Lake (Montgomery 1946), be a standard part of any film and it is tempting 
to think that this experience of another, powerful screen-based genre, rather than the 
experience of real life, prompted the children’s desire. An ad hoc solution sufficient to 
satisfy the children was to apply the face to the back of the avatar’s head as well as to 
the front so that it was always visible in the over-the-shoulder view, a nice indication 
of the selective approach to realism which the conjunction of an unfamiliar 
technology and a set of objectives can engender.
Figure 7.13. 
Active Worlds: Scene in Active Worlds 2.2. 
© 1995-2000 Activeworlds.com, Inc.
In this Web-based virtual environment, 
there is no doubt of the distinction between 
the pre-pictorial (three-dimensional) space 
and the (two-dimensional) pictorial space 
of the display.
In Active Worlds, the space itself is a substantive part of the experience, rather than 
being simply a means to an end, but three-dimensional environments are increasingly 
used to offer access to data-sets, where the information content is the substantive 
feature. 
Kullberg has developed a three-dimensional timeline (Figure 7.14). An interesting 
difficulty arises in its attempt to support multiple modes of access within a single 
space. The user may navigate the data by ‘travelling’ through the space, but also 
using ‘virtual’ routes which connect sequences of data-items in non-topographic 
ways, for example through the results of a search operation. In this mode, time is 
used in place of space to present a sequence of face-on views of each item, but they 
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still have their visual framework of adjoining items (Figure 7.15). The surrounding 
information which in smoothly animated ‘fly-throughs’ of the space enhances the 
sense of concreteness and imparts useful context is now experienced as a distraction.11 
This highlights the problems of constructing pre-pictorial spaces which fail to support 
all the modes of interaction demanded of them. Although no mimesis of the world is 
involved there is nevertheless an excessive adherence to the unmediated viewing of a 
pre-pictorial three-dimensional structure. The example of film suggests that the mode 
of picturing should not be independent of the objectives in this way. In a close-up in 
the classical fiction film the viewing parameters would be quite different – probably 
the background would be both darkened and defocussed – in order to support the 
different kind of viewing relevant at that juncture: the unmediated depiction of the 
pre-pictorial model fails to provide such an optimal view.
Figure 7.15. 
Robin Kullberg: Dynamic Timelines: Visualising Historical Information in 
Three Dimensions, 1995.
The user can jump through a series of images without navigating the 
space. Contextual information which was useful when navigating 




Within broad limits in the systems just described the user is allowed to look 
anywhere. A related class of artefacts also offers full-screen views of a pre-pictorial 
model, but this is explicitly mediated by the maker since only views which have been 
pre-rendered are available. The user infers that there is a single consistent pre-
pictorial model of which these views are scenes, in the manner familiar from film. 
In each of the artefacts discussed now, some degree of entertainment is intended. 
Examples include CD-ROM ‘edutainment’ titles and adventure and strategy games. In 
all cases there seems to be an attempt to make the space immersive by eliminating 
counter-cues such as the paraphernalia of the everyday computer screen, or at least to 
11 My observations of the Kullberg project are based on a 5-minute video and the author’s MSc dissertation (Kullberg 
1995). Attempts to engage in correspondence with the author have been unsuccessful.
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Figure 7.14. 
Robin Kullberg: Dynamic Timelines: Visualising Historical 
Information in Three Dimensions, 1995.
From Kullberg 1995.
 
subordinate such items as far as possible. In this they aspire to the apparently 
unmediated qualities of the fiction film. The success or failure with which this quasi-
cinematic usage is implemented is instructive.
       
Figure 7.16a-c.
Dawkins 1996: The Evolution of Life with 
Richard Dawkins. 
A borrowing from film: the photocopier 
provides a distinctive point of reference 
which allows the user to infer continuity 
between three angles of view. However there 
are weaknesses in the way the technique is 
applied.
 In the case of Evolution of Life (Dawkins 1996) there are two principal ‘sets’, one of 
which is apparently Dawkins’ Oxford study and the other is a slightly futuristic 
gallery space. Some spatial practices used are borrowings from film. For example the 
prominence of an identifiable object in multiple views helps users to infer that these 
are aspects of the same space (Figure 7.16a-c). As Persson points out (1998), object-
continuity in film is generally supported by the familiarity of objects and scenes 
depicted, which make it easy for viewers to surmise the parts they cannot see and to 
construct a whole environment from a series of glimpses.12 In Dawkins’ study there is 
a set of views which users see when they choose to rotate their viewpoint. These 
consecutive views are orthogonal to one another, which has just the tendency to draw 
attention to the medium which the fiction film studiously avoids (and Greenaway 
revels in). This is inappropriate here where it seems that there is an intention to make 
viewing seem naturalistic. The cutting from one shot to another is not in itself a 
problem and is as I have pointed out standard practice in film, but the mature art of 
‘transparent’ film editing would have ensured that the distinctive item whose object-
continuity is used to tie consecutive shots into a single space (here the photocopier) 
was matched for position from one shot to the next, whereas it jumps to the opposite 
side of the frame (Figure 7.16a and b). Insufficient attention has been given to the 
pictorial aspect of this quasi-filmic practice when compared with the care lavished on 
the pre-pictorial model.
The user begins to be accustomed to looking into the three-dimensional space despite 
the awkward means of moving within it. However shortly afterwards, on attempting 
12 This is one possible argument for the situating of abstract data in realistic objects which is additional to the usual 
arguments for metaphor in the interface (eg. Andersen 1990 p155, Preece et al 1994 p456-461, Nardi and Zarmer 
1993).
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to pass through a door by clicking on it (a simple form of direct interaction with a 
diegetic object), the user is suddenly presented with a textual explanation which 
appears in the immediate foreground and suspended in the air (if it can be conceived 
as in the space at all). It is a strong and sudden reminder of the planar nature of the 
display as a whole, undermining the preceding attempts to make the screen 
transparent to a pre-pictorial world. Again it would be wrong to object that the 
difficulty is caused by a lack of realism. That would be to invoke a simple, unitary 
concept of realism which I have been at pains to demolish. The problem here is not 
one of realism as such but that two incompatible spatial modes have been combined. 
The floating notice (Figure 7.17) belongs to the objectifying spatiality of the Dorling 
Kindersley pop-up window (though at least it does not occlude the object to which it 
refers!) and effectively destroys the newly created immersive space of the pre-
pictorial set. 
Figure 7.17.
Dawkins 1996: The Evolution of Life with Richard Dawkins. 
Awkward intrusion of other spatial modes: when the user clicks 
on the door at the back of the room to gain access to other spaces, a 
pop-up window appears in, or perhaps over, the space.
In Art of Singing, from the same company (Notting Hill/JHM 1996), some of the 
difficulties raised by disconcerting switching between orthogonal views have been 
avoided. More care has been taken to sequence views so that they seem to be part of a 
trajectory, though there are still times when consecutive shots fail to suggest 
continuity of location and the user must make a conscious effort to integrate two 
views, which predictably breaks the sense of immersion. The standard optimal view 
principle of showing only the relevant is used to advantage. For example, when users 
choose to get into the lift that faces them, the next thing they see is the view normally 
taken by someone riding in a lift – the view back towards the door – whereas in a 
virtual environment users would be obliged to rotate their own point of view, with all 
the inclusion of irrelevant visual information discussed in relation to such shots in 
continuous camerawork.
Figure 7.18.
Notting Hill/JHM 1996: The Art of Singing
One of the pre-rendered views in a trajectory through the 
building. Shots are post-processed to increase their 
painterly qualities and distinguish them from the 
photoreal. 
A portable computer (bottom-right) remains in the 
periphery with viewers as they travel.
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Though clearly intended to evoke a kind of pre-pictorial space, Art of Singing employs 
some painterly effects which emphasise that these scenes are mediated with artistic 
and metaphorical intent, rather than being transparent photo-realistic shots of a real 
place.13 This kind of mediation seems to fit quite naturally with the objectives of the 
artefact. 
In this same CD-ROM, there is an attempt to give the user a means of gathering 
information encountered while touring the virtual building. On entering the space the 
user is ‘given’ a portable device and subsequently this is present in the periphery of 
the screen whenever there are texts available that the user may wish to capture 
(Figure 7.18). The floating device exists in a rather awkward visual relation to the 
main scene, but it does properly support the function to which it pretends. If the main 
scene were presented as a fluid sequence of moving images rather than as a series of 
‘shots’ then the peripheral portable would appear more strongly attached to the 
user’s own frame of reference in a manner analogous to those floating screen 
elements in the corners of the factual television display described earlier. This 
permanent attachment of objects to the periphery of the display seems more effective 
than when such elements pop up suddenly in the diegetic space, and is common in 
the design of many games (see Hybrid Spaces, next). It is also a situation familiar to 
the car-driver whose view is constantly accompanied by items such as the tax-disc on 
the windscreen.
Figure 7.19.
Notting Hill/JHM 1996: The Art of Singing
The ‘portable console’ in which users can collect and 
view texts.
The texts which may be collected and viewed using the device are displayed in a 
modified version of standard text fields but these are situated in the portable console 
(Figure 7.19). Two significant visual features are that a part of the console overlaps 
the main rectangle and that its lower edge is not parallel to the sides of the screen. 
This goes some way towards anchoring it in the diegetic space: it will be remembered 
that the asymmetric tendencies of the classical fiction film associate naturalism with 
non-parallel views (while one of Greenaway’s principal devices for drawing attention 
to the mediation of the image was to frame it symmetrically and position it parallel to 
the picture plane). The technology of 1996 did not easily permit ‘live’ text to be 
presented other than parallel to the picture plane and even now there are problems of 
readability when texts are presented at an angle on the screen. As live text becomes 
13 Ironically, in order to achieve this effect, many of the painterly characteristics are actually water-colour painted 
elevations texture-mapped onto the model, though there is also some hand retouching of the rendered images. 
However, to the user this is not evident – it is the pictures which seem to be painted, not the environment. (Personal 
communication, Tim Warren, art director for the project, November 2000.)
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both feasible and pleasant to read at other angles, then the ‘naturalist’ tradition of 
film will be likely to affect the presentation of all texts meant to be interpreted as 
diegetic.
Figure 7.20.
Notting Hill/JHM 1996: The Art of Singing
An attempt to make use of a pre-pictorial set as a site in which 
random access to textual information is also possible. Clicking on a 
topic label on a shelf triggers an animation in which a light beam 
travels from the shelf to the console centre-screen. Then a more or 
less standard text window is displayed as though it were the 
contents of the console screen.
In the same production, another solution is offered to the problem of combining 
textual and pictorial modes (Figure 7.20). Seeking to provide some of the random 
access to texts of an encyclopaedia, the designers encounter the problems of trying to 
use a certain kind of spatial realism while not imposing intolerable constraints on 
users  – such as making them advance to each shelf and take out a book. The solution, 
amusing at first but soon irritating, is to connect each topic label in the library shelves 
to a console by a conduit through which light flows when the user clicks the label. 
This ‘sends’ information to the console which is then displayed as a more or less 
standard text window. Even this does not overcome the fact that the user must find 
the library, one specific room in a labyrinthine building, in order to get this kind of 
access to reference topics. Nor does it offer any of the advantages of multiple 
classifications and free-text searching of digital media – a book is in just one place and 
indexed only by simple category. It is clear that this attempt to afford multiple kinds 
of interaction in a single pre-pictorial space is hopelessly compromised. Art of Singing 
and similar products fail to deliver many of the functions they might offer because 
the spatial mode they have chosen makes it too difficult. I showed how in the case of 
factual television multiple media are used expressively: each media type is used 




Miller and Miller: Myst. Adventure Game. 1993.
All non-diegetic components are eliminated. The 
paper on the ground contains information which 
the player needs. 
In Myst (Miller and Miller 1993) the fact that the functions to be supported are more 
narrow and homogenous benefits the spatial approach adopted. The environment as 
presented supports both idle browsing and purposive attempts to solve the ‘game’ 
14 This is of course not to suggest that all such decisions in television are wise ones. Postman comments at length 
(Postman 1987 passim) on the potential damage to understanding and to mature debate caused by television’s need 
to fill the screen with an unending series of moving pictorial images.
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but need not be concerned with generalised information retrieval or reconfiguration 
on demand. Here also the user sees only pre-rendered views so that the advantages 
of optimal views – compositional and narrative interest and relevance – are again 
available. The user’s trajectory as represented by sequences of views has a broadly 
naturalistic feel, with each shot having a reasonably fluid relation to its predecessor.15 
All non-diegetic elements are eliminated: if users must know something, then a note 
is left for them in the diegetic space (Figure 7.21).
5 Hybrid spaces
Figure 7.22.
PopTop Software 1998: Railroad Tycoon 
II. Strategy Game. The main interface.
The centre of the screen is dominated by 
the immersive scene while ancillary 
information including alternative views 
of the terrain is offered at the periphery.
In Art of Singing, the portable console was always present in the corner of the display 
when there were texts which could be collected from the environment. This was a 
step away from straightforward viewing of a pre-pictorial environment, intended to 
support functions which the environment itself could not. Though the object was 
presented as a diegetic component its spatial discontinuity from the environment 
tended to contradict it – it clearly is anchored to the frame of the view, not to the 
world. The strategy game Railroad Tycoon gives over a third of the display to such 
components, and makes similar attempts to excuse them through graphical conceits. 
The user never has an unencumbered view of the terrain, since it is always framed by 
a variety of other representations. Visually this is the most distinctive aspect of such 
games – their juxtaposition of many spatial schemes, styles of representation and 
forms of realism (Figure 7.22 and 23a). There is a map-like aerial view of the terrain, 
the designers having chosen to offer two optimal views on screen at once rather than 
making users switch between them (as noted previously, such straightforward 
solutions to the need to convey two kinds of information at once are taboo in film). 
There are configurations of buttons, compressed into the periphery to help prevent 
them obtruding on the main view of the terrain. Not only do the buttons have 
modelled shading to impart some of the familiar realism of ‘objectness’ but they are 
‘attached’ to the surround using structures reminiscent of Victorian engineering in an 
attempt to justify their intrusion into the overall display. When a dialog-box is 
displayed (Figure 7.23b) the extraneous pressure gauges and dials operate and a 
15 Another aid to a sense of continuity is the use of environmental sound which is not interrupted by changes of view. 
This technique, noted by Persson (1998), is an important means by which film conceals its intermittent visual nature 
but is outside the scope of this thesis.
Media Space 7  Screen Space III: Interactive Media | Stephen Boyd Davis |  June 2002  178
valve emits steam! To the left of the dialog it can be seen that the diegetic shadows of 
the trees in the landscape are indistinguishable from the extra-diegetic shadows of the 
dialog box itself, a literal blending of two complementary forms of realism. Even 
though when considered objectively this juxtaposition of realisms is disconcerting, in 
practice for the involved user it achieves its purpose of making a spatial hybrid more 
or less acceptable. However, I will suggest later that such genres may move away 
from this overt hybridity to a greater use of diegetic interaction.
 
Figure 7.23a-b. PopTop Software 1998: Railroad Tycoon II. Strategy Game. 
Left, the main interface (detail). Right, a dialog box. An extraordinary amalgam of spatial styles and realisms.
Users have greater freedom to choose how they observe the pre-pictorial space than 
in the shot-based trajectories of the CD-ROMs using pseudofilmic space. They may 
look at any part of the terrain at a number of scales and may choose any of four 
cardinal axonometric views. The reason for limiting viewing angle and scales in this 
way is that every ‘tile’ which can appear in the terrain is pre-rendered in a series of 
variant forms, partly for reasons of performance but also to ensure that the user is 
always presented with an informative view (so once again authorial control of view is 
not entirely absent) but there is no expressive use of viewpoint in response to the 
events which unfold. Indeed such filmic responsiveness might seem impossible given 
that users may choose to build a railway anywhere across terrain of their own 
devising and that the events which may ensue are not known in advance. However, 
there is no reason in principle, as I suggested in relation to Kullberg’s timeline, why 
the system itself should not select suitable variables of the view and make use of 
narrative spatial devices to increase the drama of the game. 
Such pictorial approaches would in simple form deal only with the permissive aspect 
of film, when optimal views are allowed to the viewer. An important benefit of the 
game’s current spatial design is that events may be unfolding out of the sight of the 
player and only discovered subsequently, adding to the surprise element of the 
game-play. Any more ‘filmic’ approach would need to recognise the benefits to the     
game-play of this invisibility, which in a filmic mode of presentation could only be 
dealt with by the other vital aspect of film’s narrative expressivity, the deliberate 
denial of view. ‘Intelligent’ viewpoint animation is already being investigated in the 
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context of computer games,16 for example to cut briefly to an aerial shot of a crashed 
car in racing games, but I am not aware of any automated cinematography which in 
addition to selecting what should be shown also decides what should not.
Throughout this thesis I have claimed that the selection of perspective and other 
projection systems, the combining of configurational and pictorial approaches, and 
the selection and combination of different kinds of realism in any medium, are best 
conceived as pragmatic, based on the objectives of the artefact, and not as matching 
an external referent. I remarked on the multiplicity of demands on the design process 
and the hybridity of the solutions which emerge. In some ways Railroad Tycoon is a 
perfect illustration: at every turn it is clear that the designers are concerned with what 
seems to ‘work’ and that the various realisms and spatial principles are selected and 
balanced to that end. Nevertheless, I do not wish to claim for such artefacts the 
maturity of expressiveness that I attributed to the fiction film. On the contrary, 
despite the efforts of the designers to disguise the incongruity of the components, the 
overall impression is that they coexist uncomfortably and the same is true of the 
experience of the product over time. The atmospheric, dynamic filmic sequences of 
the product’s opening which absorb the user into a subjective view are at odds with 
the inert highly objective presentation which succeeds them. Perhaps Gessner’s 
complaint that television is ‘visually disorganised’ could fairly be applied to artefacts 
like Tycoon. However, it is also possible that the impression of incongruity is itself a 
temporary phenomenon arising from the relative unfamiliarity of these spatial 
configurations and that in future they will come to be seen as transparent and 
natural. Certainly these hybrid spaces do not have the failing, so often noted in this 
chapter, that their purpose is unclear, and they do support well the functions which it 
seems they should. In that sense their expressivity is high.
Another project which is best classified as using hybrid space is a prototype office 
tool of primarily functional intent, though it takes into account other factors than 
simply executing tasks, in dealing with social as well as functional aspects of 
interpersonal communication in a work context. It exploits translucence as a solution 
to the problem of integration and moves this study towards the more fully integrated 
spaces of the next category. 
Figure 7.24. 
Chung et al 2000: Virtual Office, a project 
visualising a shared virtual work 
environment.
Translucence is used in an attempt to 
integrate components with different spatial 
modes.
16 Personal communication from Chris Webb, Attention to Detail , UK
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In Virtual Office (Chung et al 2000), if a user approaches the (robot) secretary’s desk 
(at right in Figure 7.24) a textual conversation is automatically initiated in a 
superimposed text chat window. Translucence binds the different modal elements 
closely together so that each is used appropriately to its function, but without the cost 
of their becoming spatially divorced. The likely importance of translucence in 
pictorial interactive media is discussed below. The position and visual integration of 
the chat window give it something of the character of a speech bubble in a cartoon 
(cartoons are themselves a rich area of multimodal representation deserving study as 
spatial artefacts), so that it seems part of the diegetic space while still being accessible 
to the user. Like a head-up display for a pilot it also ensures that the user may 
encompass diverse stimuli within a fairly narrow visual field. Axonometric views are 
used as in other artefacts already discussed, both for computational efficiency and to 
prevent loss of resolution with distance, but here they also have the effect of allowing 
the overlaid textual and iconic elements to be seen as more tightly integrated than if 
convergent perspective were used.
  a   b
Figure 7.25a-b. Chung et al 2000: Virtual Office, a project visualising a shared virtual work environment. Filmic 
continuity devices are used: the character in red passing out of the door in a is seen entering the connected space in b.
The pictorial scene functions in several ways including to indicate who is currently on 
line and to show what actions they are performing, and also to manage dialogue: a 
user may move close to another user by clicking on their avatar, and this proximity 
then allows text conversation to take place. Particular realisms are used, for example 
to represent fairly accurately the actual appearance of users, but irrelevant realisms 
are suppressed. Use is made of techniques derived from film to bind together 
separate spaces which are juxtaposed only in time and not in the display. In Figure 
7.25a the user in red can be seen leaving the room by the lift, as a result of having 
elected to move to a different space at another level. The next scene (Figure 7.25b) 
shows the user emerging from the lift in that other space. No other visual information 
is necessary for users who are accustomed to filmic techniques. 
6 Integrated spaces: combining pre-pictorial and pictorial space
In the categories of pre-pictorial and hybrid spaces discussed so far, it seemed 
possible to separate the model from the view to the extent that one could imagine 
reconstructing a coherent pre-pictorial space on the evidence of the views provided. I 
now analyse some spaces which at first sight also seem to offer depictions of a 
coherent three-dimensional space but in which it becomes apparent that the depiction 
in itself undermines the distinction between depiction, view and model. In this thesis 
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I have repeatedly cited the argument of functional mismatch as a justification for the 
avoidance of various realisms, and these are digital artefacts which for their different 
reasons deliberately abandon the realism of pre-pictorial coherence.
 a  b
 c
Figure 7.26a-c. 
Eberle 1996: Upholstery Weekend. 
Optimal views of the relations between 
‘characters’ in the scene. The view in a acts 
as an establishing shot, creating a space 
using the size and geometry of the furniture 
items. 
In b an optimal view from above allows the 
distance and scale of the objects to be 
assessed.
The chair which threatens the toy in b is seen 
in c in extreme close-up – a subjective shot 
from the point of view of the toy.
The first artefact is not interactive. This is significant and points up some important 
aspects of the relationship between film practice, digital space and interactivity. 
Upholstery Weekend (Eberle 1996) is an animated narrative. There is no attempt to 
abolish the awareness of representation – indeed the artefact keeps drawing attention 
to its mediation for ironic purposes. This is not of course a unique characteristic of 
digital animation – traditional animators have also made media-conscious jokes of 
this kind17 – but here it helps indicate some of the ways in which mainstream film 
practice may be adapted and subverted in a digital space. The apparent pre-pictorial 
‘space’ is defined only by the relationships between a small number of objects which 
have been dissociated from their original backgrounds. As in classical film, optimal 
views from widely varying viewpoints are exploited to afford the best possible view 
of an event or situation as well as to create visual interest and engagement. For 
example the shot illustrated in Figure 7.26a, in which an armchair threateningly 
approaches a small toy, is succeeded by that in Figure 7.26b in which the approach of 
the predatory armchair is more easily assessed by the viewer and in which the victim 
appears significantly smaller. There is a brief cut-away to an extreme close-up point-
of-view shot of the front of the armchair (Figure 7.26c) before the armchair crushes 
the toy.
Later (Figure 7.27) defocussing (almost entirely neglected in digital media outside 
high-budget quasi-photographic feature films) is used to give extreme depth to the 
‘shot’. The impression that a second small toy is in the near foreground is a visual 
joke, since it turns out that this is in fact a giant toy seeking revenge.
17 An example of such media irony in traditional animation is a character who climbs out of a hole in the ground and 
then picks up the black oval representing the hole and walks away with it (illustrated Lord and Sibley 1998 p7-61).
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 Figure 7.27. 
Eberle 1996: Upholstery Weekend. 
Focus is used to create distance and increase the drama of a 
near object.
So far this seems only a witty exercise in pre-pictorial space, but subsequently the 
coherence of the pre-pictorial space is subverted (Figures 7.28a-b) when a sofa is 
transformed in a wholly pictorial way which has nothing to do with the space which 
it seemed to occupy. Such ‘media-savviness’ will always increase the objectification of 
the representational artefact, here with humorous intent.
 a  b
Figure 7.28a-b. Eberle 1996: Upholstery Weekend. 
At times the evocation of a pre-pictorial space is abandoned in a way which forces the user to become aware of the 
fact of representation. 
This animated narrative makes the best possible use, for its purposes, of spatial 
devices and their associated forms of realism, combining the particularity of 
photography with the digitally facilitated omission of all extraneous photographic 
evidence and apparently constructing, but then undermining, a pre-pictorial spatial 
environment. It is not simply a film delivered by digital means, because of its high 
level of selectivity which suppresses the accidentals of straightforward photography, 
and because it uses overt pictorial manipulation. However its strengths arise 
precisely because it is a wholly authored experience. Far from representing a solution 
to the difficulties of pre-pictorial spaces outlined previously, it confirms them, by 
underlining the expressivity of authored depictions of space in which the maker 
decides exactly what shall be seen, from where, with what variables of the frame, for 
how long, and in which every shot is designed in the known context of what precedes 
and follows it.
Cosmic Osmo (Cyan Incorporated 1993), an interactive production, also plays tricks 
with the user’s expectations of spatial coherence. Like Myst (which was created 
subsequently by the same team) and the two Notting Hill CD-ROMs, Cosmic Osmo 
takes advantage of being limited to sequences of still images to offer optimal views of 
each scene. Here the ‘shots’ are related to one another in a way which is not intuitive  
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 a  b
Figure 7.29a-b. Cyan Incorporated 1993: Cosmic Osmo. 
When these ‘shots’ are seen consecutively, the user pauses momentarily before inferring that the ladder glimpsed in 
in a is that also seen in b. Eventually the attempt to infer a coherent pre-pictorial space turns out to be futile.
for accustomed film-viewers. There is no attempt at ‘shot-matching’ so that the user is 
dependent on a conscious process of inference based on object-continuity. When 
experienced in time, rather than in space as here in Figures 7.29a-b, it takes a 
moment’s deliberation to decide the relationship between consecutive shots. Some 
shot relationships are more conventional such as in Figure 7.30a-b which moves the 
viewpoint into the shed for a closer view.
 a  b
Figure 7.30a-b. Cyan Incorporated 1993: Cosmic Osmo. 
Some shots are more conventionally related as here where the objects glimpsed inside the shed become the subject of 
the next scene.
Initially the user seems to explore a standard pre-pictorial space; longer exploration 
reveals that the space is convoluted and it becomes impossible to sustain any rational 
model of how the scenes are connected together. This ironical use of spatial 
conventions fits with the whimsical nature of the production’s humour as a whole. 
Figure 7.31.
Donald Norman 1994: Donald A Norman – defending human attributes in 
the age of the machine, CD-ROM 1994. 
Integrated components dissociated from their original photographic 
contexts, but still partaking of some of the other realisms which 
photography can contribute.
 Upholstery Weekend made extensive use of dissociated graphic elements extracted 
from their photographic or cinematographic context and positioned in a blank plane 
to construct a new space. Similar dissociation of photographic and quasi-
photographic elements is used in 1994 in the Voyager CD-ROM of Donald Norman 
already described. In graphics like the one illustrated (Figure 7.31) an animate Don 
Norman is extracted from the accidentals of photography and inserted into a new 
space at a new scale and with shadows which belong to the environment of the 
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virtual page rather than to the environment in which filming took place – spatial 
invention which as so often selects and rejects realisms on a pragmatic basis.
Figure 7.32. 
Jacques Bonnaud: film poster for Les 
Enfants du Paradis (Marcel Carné) 1944. 
A compositional technique common in 
film posters from the 1940s. Components 
derived from individual production stills 
are collaged together in a composition 
which embraces multiple perspectives. 
Taken from Edwards, Gregory J, 1985, The 
International Film Poster, Columbus 
Books,London, p151
Such graphical techniques are not of course confined to screen-based media. Film 
posters have often made use of synthetic amalgamations of photographic or quasi-
photographic segments. There are a few examples of photomontage equivalent to the 
simple assembly class of digital collage described above, constructing almost no intra-
pictorial relationships, but generally these collages take on the character of pictures in 
their own right, with a strong resemblance to pre-Renaissance forms of picture-
making – where each component has its own optimal view (and therefore perspective 
geometry) largely independent of the other components, but all are nevertheless 
organised into a unitary composition. In the example illustrated (Figure 7.32), though 
the perspectives of size and geometry are not consistent with a natural scene the 
components are such as could be seen together in an actual pre-pictorial space, and 
some of the internal pictorial relationships also conform to everyday expectations (so 
that for example the characters look towards the woman and so do the crowds in the 
gallery). Below I note other forms of photomontage which take greater liberties with 
realism.
7 Pictorially dominated space
 a  b
Figure 7.33a-b. Holley et al 1998: Eclipse. Objects are dissociated from their original photographic contexts and 
reassembled in new pictorial wholes. Objects of wide ranging scales are brought into conjunction.
Differentiated from the previous category not in kind but by the degree of pictorial 
arbitrariness, the final class of pictorial spaces takes further the possibilities of 
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recombining dissociated graphical elements into new spaces – spaces which depart 
further from any likely pre-pictorial model. As the integrated digital spaces described 
above have antecedents in montaged film-posters, so there is a tradition in other 
forms of photomontage of combining fragments taken from their original contexts 
and assembling them in a unified composition with a more or less conventional 
underlying pictorial structure, in some cases even evoking aspects of a naturally 
observed scene though those components could never appear together in the world 
(Figure 7.34 and numerous examples in Ades 1986). However, I shall suggest that 
interaction differentiates the case of static media from that of digital photomontage.
Figure 7.34. Max Ernst: Murdering Aeroplane, 1920, collage. From Hughes 1980 fig38, p72.
Despite the disparate origins of their parts, many collages are contrived – often as here with ironic intent – to recall 
conventional compositions derived from pre-pictorial spaces.
 
Eclipse (Holley at al 1998) constructs a space from dissociated graphics, coercing 
disparate elements into a pictorial ensemble which, when interacted with, operates as 
an integrated system. Its pictorial coherence makes it unlike simple graphical 
assembly but also unlike a depiction of apparently pre-pictorial space. It allows an 
astronomical device to be brought into direct connection with the heavens which it 
surveys (Figure 7.33a-b), pictorially uniting elements which in pre-pictorial terms are 
literally light-years apart. In addition it facilitates the use of mixed modes of 
presentation, so that it does not seem incongruous to see spatial coordinates 
presented as text which alters and moves as the space changes. Graphically it gives 
the maker the traditional freedom of combination of photomontage but to this is 
added the effect of the interactivity, in which actions on one part affect the behaviour 
of the whole display, creating a coherence which exceeds any purely pictorial unity. 
                                                        
Figure 7.35.
Lac, Wölwer and Wu: Esfore-Entropy, 1998 . 
Integrated components dissociated from their original 
photographic contexts are combined into new entities which 
acquire pictorial realisms of their own.
Its relation to realism is intriguing. Each graphic element has the realisms associated 
with photography –  especially a sense of tactility arising from surface qualities and a 
strong sense of ‘objectness’ enhanced by the dissociation of elements, together with 
the realisms of recognition – yet the whole resembles nothing which might actually 
be seen in the world. Nevertheless, the sense of unity arising from the nature of the 
system’s interactions with the user evokes the realism of coherence, a coherence 
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which belongs only to the pictorial and not the pre-pictorial world. Esfore-Entropy 
(Lac, Wölwer and Wu 1998) similarly combines dissociated graphical elements 
(Figure 7.35), and in this case the new ensembles move according to ‘organic’ patterns 
of behaviour, so importing an additional realism – that of animate existence. This is 
once again at a pictorial level, since no user will infer an actual pre-pictorial creature, 
even in the imaginary way that they might infer a pre-pictorial alternative life-form in 
a fiction film.
Taken as a whole the displays of Eclipse and Esfore-Entropy are visually unrealistic in 
two basic ways: they cannot be mistaken for a window on the world, and they are not 
automorphic to any imaginable natural scene. They make use of realisms but can never 
offer the illusion of unmediated access to the pre-pictorial world. However, 
interactivity does seem to make a vital difference because it reintroduces, albeit as an 
analogue, the ability to seek more visual information as one can in the real world 
(Figure 7.36). As users interact, new scenes are revealed: this tends to enable users to 
become at least partially unaware of the medium, even though they cannot fail to 
know that they are manipulating representations and not real things. Where user 
investigation leads to the discovery of new scenes, the naturalism of this experience 
seems to compensate for the evidently representational qualities of the objects and 
scenes encountered. There is a possible analogy here with the acceptability of editing 
in Film which was seen earlier to be unlike natural vision but is nevertheless 
perceived as in some deeper sense ‘natural’ and has through custom become almost 
invisible to the film viewer. 
Figure 7.36. 
Holley et al 1998: Eclipse. 
A new scene is revealed through the apertures of the 
astronomical instrument as a result of the user’s interaction.
A more prosaic use of dynamic translucence is made by Instrumentor, a prototype 
product by Art of Invention (1995). A display – which even in its static form makes 
use of translucent overlays to show more than could otherwise be accommodated in a 
single screen – displays additional overlays on demand to provide detailed 
information without loss of context (Figure 7.37a-c). This device is not without 
obvious difficulties: the example illustrated shows that material may become hard to 
decipher. However, there again seems be something of a sense of naturalness arising 
from the form of interaction, a feeling of direct access to information in context and 
on demand, which has some of the qualities of ‘just seeing’ even though it has no 
generalised resemblance to natural scenes. 
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 a   b
 c   
Figure 7.37a-c.
Art of Invention 1995: Instrumentor.
A background graphic displays translucent overlays on 
demand when the user interacts with different parts of the 
display. Detail is displayed without loss of context.
Difficulty in reading the text and discerning the details of the 
graphics indicate some of the problems which may arise.
Translucence has been exploited in several of the artefacts described so far.18 Though 
of some benefit in static form, it seems particularly effective when responsive to the 
user. I noted earlier how the use of prolonged superimposition in film was 
abandoned because it militated against the sense of direct access to the pre-pictorial 
world (while other ‘non-realistic’ mechanisms survived) but also pointed out its 
continued use as a linking device; I drew attention to the use of blended images in 
television to enable more than one space at a time to be combined in a single display. 
In digital multimedia it seems that the addition of interactivity to translucence makes 
a significant difference to the sense of naturalness. In existing examples the degree of 
translucence is at all times under authorial control, but it would be a simple matter 
technically for users to be allowed to control this property. A simple and direct form 
of interaction would be essential for this purpose. Users have been obliged to learn 
many new conventions and techniques in dealing with interactive digital artefacts, 
and this may be one which could be assimilated into a natural-seeming form of 
interaction. Such speculation emphasises again, as the history of film illustrated, that 
it is not always possible to predict which devices will come to seem natural and 
which will not. User-controlled translucent overlays seems to offer some promising 
characteristics which were not shared by the entirely authorial superimposition of 
early film.
A final example which also largely abandons the evocation of pre-pictorial spaces and 
makes extensive use of pictorial intervention is Ceremony of Innocence (Mayhew 1997). 
It uses the fact that it is an interactive narrative about a surreal, or perhaps magical, 
postcard correspondence to make visual puns on the nature of representation. Given 
that the narrative suggests that one of the correspondents may have invented the 
other, ambiguity and self-reference of representation and of space are appropriate. 
Since the diegetic material comprises picture postcards, everything seen on screen is 
18 Virtual Office, Eclipse and Instrumentor. It is also used, though not to any great extent, in application packages. In 
Macromedia Director it allows the display of ancillary information about graphical objects while not completely 
obscuring them.
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already depictive to at least one degree (Figures 7.38a-d). The user interacts with 
graphic elements in ways which fluctuate between interacting with the scene 
depicted and interacting with the depiction itself. The bird visible in a is also depicted 
in the stamps on the card – which seems to confirm its pictorial status – yet it moves, 
and squawks and eats when coaxed by the pointer. The pictured wine glass in b 
breaks when hit by the pointer and the fish swims round to the other side of the card, 
the card turning to reveal its written side. The boundary between the diegetic and 
extra-diegetic is constantly invaded and the mouse pointer, normally wholly extra-
diegetic and as it were the user’s ‘property’ is often captured by, or becomes part of, 
the representations with which it interacts. 
 a  b
 c  d
Figure 7.38a-d. Mayhew 1997: Ceremony of Innocence. This CD-ROM explores the boundaries between levels of 
representation in which the diegetic and extra-diegetic interpenetrate.
Mayhew has said that whereas a film-maker might traditionally ensure that character 
development enhances the narrative while the development of the narrative enhances 
the understanding of character, he has attempted in Ceremony of Innocence to make 
similar use of the opportunities for the user to intervene, making a virtuous triangle 
of character, narrative and interaction.19 Spatial decisions about visual representation 
are taken in support of this aim, so that how the representations look and how they 
behave are designed to be mutually appropriate. Whereas in most pictorial 
interactive multimedia the spatial design gives little clue to the intentions of the 
artefact – it is unclear why they look as they do – this is one of a small number of 
examples where spatiality seems to articulate content.
I do not wish to suggest that the spatiality of Ceremony of Innocence offers a paradigm 
for other kinds of interactive media – the aim of this chapter is to elucidate the 
19 Personal communication, August 1999.
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different spatial forms which have emerged to serve differing requirements. 
Ceremony’s objectives are relatively simple – to allow the user to progress through a 
narrative by means of interaction – whereas I have shown that many of the problems 
of devising expressive spatial organisation in interactive media arise from the 
conflicting demands of widely varying functions; functions which are currently 
visualised using the competing spatial practices of antecedent media. 
———————————————————
I have distinguished seven classes of spatiality in pictorial interactive media and in 
doing so have made use of the concepts developed earlier in the thesis. This in turn 
has required the refinement of some of those concepts, in particular the division of 
spatial interventions into those concerned with the model, the view and the picture. 
This framework helped make sense of interactive media, clarifying the location and 
nature of the opportunities for spatial decisions to influence representation. However, 
in adding interactive media to the range of disciplines to which the framework was 
applied, it itself required modification to capture a different mode of spatial 
representation – that in which the parameters of viewing and picturing are 
authorially determined, but specific views and pictures are not. I discuss some 
implications of this below.
If the approach to spatiality proposed in this thesis is a useful one, it should not only 
help to explain the form of existing artefacts but also assist in showing how design 
may deal with new issues. These chapter conclusions therefore deal both with what 
may be expected to happen as the various genres of digital interactive media develop, 
and with what I suggest should happen, especially by indicating promising lines of 
inquiry in the light of this study taken as a whole. Though I have repeatedly 
emphasised the differences between the spatial practices of the varied visual genres 
which media support, differences which are profoundly tied to their objectives, I have 
also shown that this does not invalidate the possibility of discerning deeper 
correspondences between spatial practices even in widely varying genres and media. 
The limitations imposed by the technologies of pictorial interactive multimedia have 
led to invention and a number of innovative spatial forms have been devised. 
Nevertheless the expressivity of the spaces of interactive media seems generally poor. 
While the spatialities of pictures, of film and of television seem to have a high degree 
of fit with their objectives, the same is not true of this newer collection of genres. 
Neither in terms of affect nor information are they well tuned to their objectives. 
However a small number of productions seem to suggest the beginnings of new 
forms of expression particularly suited to pictorial interactive media which may 
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represent emergent genres. This question of genre is an intrinsic part of the problem. 
In becoming finely attuned to their objectives, the spatial forms of an axonometric 
engineering drawing or of a de Chirico painting have emerged as clearly identifiable 
genres, as have the spatiality of the fiction film and the news broadcast. The spaces of 
pictorial interactive multimedia are, with rare exceptions, awkward amalgams of the 
spatial practices of antecedent media. In general these spaces not only fail 
individually to serve the functions (both affective and utilitarian) of the artefact but 
when combined together fail to operate together in a coherent way. I have 
documented several instances of inappropriateness between spatial usage and design 
intention – or in which the intention is simply unclear. 
Any discussion of the inadequacies of current spatial design for digital interactive 
media revealed in this chapter must take place in the light of two other insights which 
the thesis as a whole has made possible. The first is that there is no ‘short cut’ to 
spatial maturity – an essential component of spatial expressivity as I have shown – 
since this maturity lies in the relationship between representations and those who use 
them, not in the representation alone. The other is that the pragmatic, almost 
accidental, approach by which spatial innovation is achieved means that no precise 
predictions can usefully be made. What I emphasise in these concluding remarks is a 
general principle: the need to rethink inherited pictorial and spatial practices to suit 
the demands made on the artefact. This includes adapting concepts of visual realism 
to suit the technology and its uses.
This chapter has highlighted the influences which will determine the emergent 
spatiality of interactive media. Some are simple while others are more complex. The 
three principal ways in which digital interactive media are unlike their antecedents 
are: they require (at least currently) the display of everything with which the user 
may interact; the visual experience is only partly authored, reducing the maker’s 
control over viewing and picturing at any moment; for the same reason, there are 
fewer narrative possibilities for structuring the user’s experience over time. These 
differences affect the spatiality of the medium, or rather the different genres which 
the medium supports, fundamentally.
The functions of the artefact: information and affect in interactive media
Throughout the thesis I have discussed how different depth cues, realisms, and 
depictive devices such as illicit marks have been employed in mature media to 
support the objectives of the artefact. I have separated those outcomes which are 
principally affective from those with a stronger informational function, and shown 
how digital interactive media can also be understood in terms of this distinction. For 
example, the spatial configurations which I named simple assembly and two-
dimensional prepictorial space could be used both as a practical means of giving access 
to multiple discrete objects, and as a means of conveying a general impression of a 
wealth of material. Pseudofilmic spaces employed a particular balance of authorial and 
user control to provide the user with appropriate visual information for the execution 
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of the task, and also by elimination of non-diegetic elements could facilitate an 
immersive sense of presence in a world.
In this thesis the functional demands of information and affect have sometimes been 
seen to be in conflict. I noted for example how the sense of co-presence and 
immersion is facilitated by stereopsis but that this technology offers little 
informational advantage so that for many purposes it has been ignored. As the design 
of digital interactive artefacts matures it will tend to achieve a better fit with its 
objectives, so that to a greater extent than now the spatial forms adopted will be those 
which fulfil exactly the information and affective functions required. This will lead to 
the abandonment of particular spatial forms where they are inappropriate, and to the 
increased adaptation and hybridisation of familiar kinds of spaces. This will have 
implications for realistic depiction, since any simple notion of realism will be 
undermined by functional necessity. Sometimes this has a strictly practical rationale. 
For example, already in most virtual environments it is possible to overcome some of 
the disadvantages of having to travel through the space to reach a known location by 
simply ‘teleporting’ from place to place, and I have documented several other 
examples in this chapter where some aspect of strong realism is rejected when it 
would conflict with the demands of either execution or use. In this of course it 
operates on principles which I have shown to be fundamental to all other forms of 
spatial depiction.
Crudely, one could say that affect will be a particular concern of spaces designed to 
seem real, present and immersive, while informational demands will dominate the 
design of those spaces which are overtly presentational. However this simple 
divergence should not be overstated. As indicated previously in the thesis, for any 
given artefact in use informational and affective expressivity may be closely 
intermingled. For example, in a three-dimensional timeline such as that of Kullberg 
illustrated earlier, the possibility of entering the space offers both an affective sense of 
immersion in time, and an informational advantage in terms of a clearer grasp of 
what preceded, followed or was contemporary with a particular occasion. I discuss 
below the relevance for interactive media of shifts in the relationship between 
information and affect within a single work, such as when they are sometimes in 
concert and sometimes in conflict in narrative.
Interaction
Though this chapter has been about the spatial design of interactive media and not 
about interaction as such, the importance of their mutual relationship is clear and 
informs most of these conclusions. Interactive media artefacts attempt to 
accommodate the demands of the available interaction methods, principally pointing 
and clicking, and this has a decisive influence on spatial design. Conversely, how an 
artefact responds visually to interaction influences how that system is perceived. For 
example, I suggested that when spatial design and interaction are highly integrated, 
this can turn a set of relatively unrelated visual parts into a coherent responsive 
system which begins to acquire a kind of naturalism of its own. It benefits from the 
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realism of spatial coherence even though it is not in the conventional, rather vague, 
sense ‘realistic’. Similarly the use of superimposition as a means of providing 
multiple views in a single display seems to become more ‘natural’ when under user 
control, in a way that cannot be achieved in wholly authored media (I noted in 
Chapter 5 how it seems to be the sense of uncalled-for authorial imposition on the 
viewer which now makes lengthy superimpositions unacceptable in the classical 
fiction film). Spatial and interaction design must be conceived as complementary 
parts of a whole, since each affects how the other is perceived.
A sense of unmediated access to what is depicted seems to arise when an artefact 
requires little effort to negotiate – for example if the user need only point at some 
component to make it respond, rather than clicking on it; or if a display scrolls when 
the user approaches the perimeter rather than requiring scroll-bars or other explicit 
devices. This suggests the value of further exploring modes of interaction which 
require minimal physical intervention by the user, with a view to making selecting 
seem more like simply attending-to. In general it seems that ‘direct manipulation’ 
should be more direct than it is currently. Users should be able to interact directly 
with media content, rather than devices which in turn control it. In the short term this 
will lead to confusion among users, but this will not persist once new forms of 
interaction have become ‘transparent’ through familiarity. The transparency of 
techniques in film which seemed difficult and incongruous when they were new 
shows that this is possible.
 
Transparent and configurational approaches
What is the role of visual realism in digital interactive media? As the example of 
factual television showed, there is often no need to create an impression of 
unmediated access to the depicted subject, but in the case of film, this was exactly 
what was required. This is a divider of visual genres: there are those which are 
accepted to be primarily configurational, and those where the sense of artifice and 
construction is minimised (though never entirely forgotten). In digital interactive 
media, at one extreme lie practices in the tradition of the fiction film, designed to give 
in general the impression of unmediated access to reality, while at the other are the 
descendants of factual television and the overtly configurational approach of existing 
text-dominated interactive interfaces. Building on the analysis of pictures, film and 
television, one can predict that digital interactive media will tend to divide still more 
clearly between those artefacts which aspire to be taken as realistic views on a pre-
pictorial world – they are intended to seem like looking at a world rather than at 
pictures, whether this be a fantastical environment for a game, a convincing real-
world setting for an interactive fiction, an interactive documentary about a real place, 
or a synthetic information space – and those where overt configuration – showing, 
rather than the illusion of unmediated seeing – is acceptable. These are overtly 
representational – the user is not expected to look ‘through’ them but at them.
The pictorial devices of digital interactive media, while beginning already to be 
differentiated from those of antecedent media, will diverge from them still further. 
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This will also involve increasing divergence of the spatial practices of individual 
genres within digital interactive media. 
When the illusion of transparent access to a pre-pictorial world is wanted, it can be 
predicted that those forms will tend to be accepted which, however much they 
actually intervene pictorially, suppress the user’s awareness of that intervention by 
one of two methods. Either they make their intervention seem to be an aspect of the 
depicted model (just as film and some kinds of painting were seen to contrive 
diegetic excuses for authorially determined parameters of viewing and picturing), or 
the pictorial intervention is so chosen and used as to seem natural and transparent to 
the act of viewing. The analysis in preceding chapters emphasised that the sense of 
realism is promoted not by the presence of anything, nor by any one relationship to 
optical truth, but by minimising the sense of encoding or mediation. For any medium 
which aspires to seem realistic it will therefore be more productive to concentrate on 
reducing the user’s awareness of mediation than on adopting any particular pictorial 
structure, projection system, rendering method and so forth. As repeatedly pointed 
out, transparency of depiction is not inherent in the artefact but arises from the 
interaction of the artefact and the prior knowledge embedded in the culture. In this 
chapter several products were described which it seemed would have benefited from 
a clearer decision whether to adopt an overtly presentational or a ‘transparent’ 
approach, rather than compromising awkwardly between the two. Nevertheless, 
since the perception of unnaturalism is aggravated by unfamiliarity, the building up 
of a body of shared conventions will in itself assist the sense of transparency.
Given the problem for those digital interactive media products which aspire to seem 
transparent that – in the absence of multimodal interaction – many facilities must be 
provided to the user through ancillary interface objects, there may be an increasing 
tendency to offer these operations through diegetic objects and agents, as games 
already tend to do. In the case of games, virtual environments, interactive films and 
as-yet unformed genres which aim to simulate unmediated access to visual worlds, 
there will be less and less toleration of extra-diegetic visual controls, such as buttons, 
sliders, dialog boxes and so forth.
The extreme constraints which the demands of point-and-click interaction make on 
the spatiality of digital interactive media will be subject to radical change when those 
methods are supplemented or replaced. Above all, to be able to talk to the artefact or 
to some agency within it will obviate the need to see the object of interest. 
In relation to digital interactive media, it is probably fair to say that inherited 
concepts of visual realism have not yet been sufficiently revised. Even though digital 
interactive media space is heavily constrained by current interaction methods, it is 
clear that adoption of rigid pictorial and spatial models often unnecessarily militates 
against the kinds of flexibility which we associate with other, principally text-based, 
forms of digital media. The extent to which existing spatial forms require rethinking 
has been underestimated.
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‘Pictorial’ aspects of configurational systems
It is not only predominantly pictorial systems which seem to require deeper 
exploration of the possibilities of spatial articulation. Though tangential to the main 
subject of this thesis, the examples of non-pictorial configuration at the beginning of 
this chapter suggests that such configurational systems would benefit from some of 
the ‘sense-making’ characteristics of pictures (and perhaps films) with a view to 
clarifying the relationships between their currently discrete parts. Rather than 
application software presenting the user with an uncoordinated aggregation of visual 
objects, some move towards constructing a coherent working ‘environment’ would 
make such software more readily comprehensible. To be beneficial these need not of 
course employ graphical conceits imitating the look of occupiable spaces, but visually 
articulate the hierarchies and interdependencies of the objects provided. As always, 
only relevant depth cues and pictorial devices need be employed.
Narrative versus interaction
Current quasi-cinematographic practice, as evidenced by what I have called 
pseudofilmic space, in which the only views seen are pre-rendered, tends to 
demonstrate the inexperience of current ‘virtual cinematographers’. These designers 
would benefit from studying the details of traditional filmic practice as well as the 
deeper lessons which can be derived from it and which I have analysed in this thesis.
In pictures, film, television or any wholly authored genre, I have shown that the 
ability to choose how and when the viewer sees, including exercising outright denial 
of views, is a vital part of expressivity and furthers the user’s engagement.
O   I   M  
Vu   P
Vp  P1..Pn
— full authorial control
— some user control
The revised framework of objective, idea, model, view and picture, which 
acknowledges that when dealing with prepictorial worlds it is the parameters of 
viewing and not necessarily the views themselves which are authorially determined, 
reveals that interactivity need not lead to a complete loss of opportunities for pictorial 
intervention. Generalised pictorial intervention is of course endemic in such systems 
in any case, in the sense that there must be procedures which make the model visible, 
but these are normally considered to be largely a technical matter. This is not 
surprising since it arises from that assumption of some kind of definitive ‘correctness’ 
for particular parameters of viewing and picturing which I have criticised before. 
Because the sense of natural vision in film in particular is so convincing, designers of 
digital interactive media may tend to overlook the extent to which its apparently 
natural qualities are dependent on authorial control.
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The analysis offered here makes clear two opportunities for intervention in viewing 
and picturing in the interests of increased informational and affective expressivity –  
depictive intervention driven by the objectives of the artefact. 
The first is to identify opportunities to exploit the insertion of narrative sequences 
into interactive software. Any moment when the user is not actually interacting can 
be considered such an opportunity. Such narratives can be used to clarify what is 
happening now and the relation to preceding and following actions, as well as to 
produce affective results in the viewer. This amounts to giving users views which thy 
did not explicitly ask for but which in the author’s view will enhance the user’s 
experience, and can clearly include spatial articulation of the model, the view or the 
parameters of picturing for any of the purposes which have been discussed in this 
thesis. Currently such narratives tend to be only carried out in the model, for example 
to show an avatar moving towards a place which the user has indicated.20 But 
additionally, as the user moves from place to place in a virtual environment, the view 
may be altered to offer a more expressive viewpoint on the action. Or as discussed in 
relation to the Kullberg timeline, the depiction may be altered, such as throwing out of 
focus those items which are irrelevant to the current action. Software thus interprets 
the user’s actions in context and adjusts viewing and picturing accordingly. Even in 
those systems where the viewpoint is entirely under the control of the user, there is 
no reason not to exploit the systematic use of picturing.
Games – prime examples of user-driven exploration of pre-pictorial spaces – show the 
benefits of attending to viewpoint animation, combining the expressivity of authorial 
choice over viewing and picturing with fluidity and freedom of exploration for the 
user. For example in a race game, when a character turns, the ‘camera’ may follow it, 
rather than rigidly tracking it. In the case where a user of a virtual environment 
initiates the simple action of getting into a lift, the system should extrapolate to 
include both entering the lift and rotating to a position facing the door. This is based 
on the automated sequences (such as ‘dance’ or ‘fight’) in existing virtual worlds, but 
unlike them is sensitive to context: the avatar does what is relevant in the 
circumstances. Another example of such ‘context-sensitive cinematography’ would be 
to respond to the arrival of a new character in a space in the same way that authored 
media habitually do – for example centring the view briefly on the new arrival before 
resuming a neutral position.
More sophisticated work would extend simple optimal-view based cinematography 
to presentational models which include an awareness of spatial narrative practice, in 
which the system would deduce how the content should be presented. I noted that 
this would include the authorial denial of view for expressive purposes, which would 
now be delegated to the system for decision on the author’s behalf. Though of initial 
interest for games and interactive fictions, such techniques would eventually be 
20 Simple narratives in standard desktop interfaces include file-copy animations, the zooming of windows and the 
dropping down of menus. Though apparently trivial, they indicate that a scalable model of narrative which includes 
minimal animations at one extreme and feature films at the other (with interactive-narrative artefacts such as games 
somewhere in between) may prove valuable in showing how narrative interludes can be used to give greater meaning 
to screen-based artefacts.
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applied in many interactive systems not confined to fictional genres.
Such context-sensitive cinematography would have a similar relation to realism to 
that of traditional cinematography, namely that while it is a deliberate pictorial 
intervention it is accepted as natural and even realistic because it is done on the user’s 
behalf – it presents an answer to what Hochberg called the user’s ‘visual question’. 
Over time such motivated interventions will become transparent through 
acculturation.
———————————————————
The conclusions of this chapter have been confined to applying the observations 
arising from the previous chapters to a new discipline. The final chapter summarises 
and reviews the argument of the thesis as a whole.
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8 Conclusions
1 Summary and conclusions
My experience with students and researchers had made me aware that picture-
making is riddled with assumptions about what constitutes a proper picture of the 
world. The aim of this research has therefore been to inquire how planar 
representational images work. It was particularly occasioned by the suspicion that 
new media, especially if they are used in new ways, require, and therefore will tend 
to produce, new kinds of pictures. This would imply that picture-making is a 
pragmatic activity in which the objectives intended for the artefact are as important or 
perhaps more important than the relation between the picture and what it depicts, the 
proposition at the heart of this thesis.
The inquiry has sought a pattern of common elements across a wide range of media 
from static pictures, through film and television, to digital interactive media, for 
which there was no single body of literature. Indeed for television and interactive 
media there is no literature of visual representation or even of spatial practice in 
general. It was therefore necessary to make use of an eclectic set of literatures relevant 
to particular aspects of the theme, ranging through works on visual perception, 
theories of visual culture, film theory, art theory and history, computer graphics, and 
aspects of information design and human computer interaction. This ruled out the 
possibility of reading exhaustively the literature of any one discipline as one would in 
an established subject.
The development of the argument
Before embarking on the main argument of the thesis I gave a short account of two 
approaches to spatiality which embodied strongly contrasting approaches. One, the 
gestalt approach to visual perception, sought certainty in acultural factors in the 
apprehension of visual forms and configurations, while the other argued a high level 
of acculturation in the way that pictures are made and perceived. I showed that 
gestalt approaches, if used to inform basic design guidelines, could assist in ensuring 
that a spatial configuration conveyed what its designer intended, but they could not 
guarantee it, partly because even for quite trivial artefacts cultural knowledge had a 
significant effect on how the configuration was interpreted: without its assistance 
gestalt principles alone were inadequate. 
I discussed visual culture studies partly to give a context to the debate cited later in 
the thesis over the extent of cultural conditioning of pictorial representation, but also 
for three of its insights: the raising of the question of the cultural determination of 
concepts of space which might otherwise seem natural and innate; the ‘invisibility’ of 
shared beliefs and attitudes within a culture, an idea which I adapted in this thesis to 
pictorial convention; and a method of dealing with the concept of intention when no 
conscious intending (and no particular intending individual) is implied. 
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Since one of the most obvious ‘problems’ with which pictures must deal is that they 
are flat – unlike the world they represent – a promising starting point seemed to be to 
study the depth cues used in a variety of pictures, principally paintings, from a range 
of periods and cultures. Using Gibson’s taxonomy of depth cues, originally proposed 
by him partly to cast doubt on pictorial theories of vision, I was able to show that the 
selective use of such cues allows a varied range of results to be achieved, both in 
terms of information and affect. This conceptual separation – of information 
conveyed by a picture and changes wrought in the relationship between the picture 
and the user – proved useful throughout the thesis (though I emphasised that the 
distinction was often a difficult one to make for some aspect of any given artefact). 
The distinction helped clarify the answers to otherwise puzzling questions such as 
why some depth cues have been largely ignored and others far more generally 
exploited.
By using Gibson’s taxonomy, I was able to show that the identification of the general 
concept ‘perspective’ with the practices of linear and size perspective had led to an 
impoverished view of the ways in which the depth of scenes could be represented. In 
particular it produced a view of depth-construction in pictures as a matter of 
correctness, of matching views of the world, rather than as a means to an end. I had 
already suggested the value of considering how each aspect of picturing might be 
influenced by its objectives. This led me to propose a framework for picture-making 
which related the objectives to several discrete stages, each involving a process of 
representation, which transformed the idea for the picture into a model – that which 
was to be depicted – which was then made visible by two further transformations, 
those of viewing and picturing. Though crude, this framework was to prove useful in 
relation to all the media under consideration, and particularly assisted in identifying 
the opportunities for pictorial intervention where there might otherwise have 
appeared to be none.
The widespread identification of geometric and size perspectives with a notion of 
correctness made it necessary for me to consider the concept of pictorial realism. 
There were a number of puzzling questions. Is there one kind of picture which is 
more nearly correct in its representation of scenes than any other, or perhaps is 
simply right? If one kind of picture is right, why do the great majority of pictures not 
conform to this form of depiction? If there is not one correct pictorial representation 
but many, does this mean that pictures are coded representations in the same manner 
as diagrams, that they achieve their effects by some means other than being ‘like’ 
what they depict? It seemed that a clear definition was required, but this proved 
elusive in papers devoted for example to realism in computer graphics, where visual 
realism was often invoked as a concept apparently requiring no definition. The 
implicit definitions which emerged were extremely varied, and this was to prove a 
problem also in relation to the alleged realism of film.
Rather than trying to use a single, unitary concept of realism, I proposed that it might 
be more helpful to consider a series of different realisms (I suggested a list of twelve). 
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This would have the benefit of making it possible to account for the sense of ‘realness’ 
created by something as simple as a drop-shadow in a computer interface, despite the 
fact that such a usage subscribed to almost no other aspect of real-world appearance. 
(If the rationale for such usages were not to impart some kind of sense of realness, it 
was difficult to see what it might be.) Like the division of depth-representation into 
multiple cues, the division into multiple realisms made it easier to see how each 
could be chosen to make a different contribution to the informational and affective 
outcomes of a given depiction.
Nevertheless, the question remained, whether these multiple realisms might all be 
brought together in one super-realist picture which was more like the scene than any 
other. Reviving a neglected trial of pictorial truth, I suggested that the test to answer 
this question should be whether a picture could create the illusion that it was not a 
picture but the depicted scene. However, there was always a possibility that such an 
illusion might be culturally determined, operating through learned codes rather than 
offering an acultural illusion. This required dealing with texts in the literature of 
visual culture which suggest, following an early suggestion by Panofsky, that many 
representations have equal claim to be considered correct (or that none have).
While I was able to demonstrate that there is a single geometry which has a superior 
claim to match scenes, there were a number of qualifying factors. It was obvious that 
true illusion could only be maintained by strictly controlling many aspects, including 
the content and the context – the conditions of viewing. There was considerable 
doubt about the possibility of establishing for certain the optical truth in relation to 
the non-geometrical aspects of vision, because of the complex relationship between 
the retinal image and the ‘image’ constructed from that retinal evidence by the brain. 
Furthermore, it seemed that while full illusion might be the only useful theoretical 
benchmark, it mattered little in practice to either picture-makers or users.
If realism-as-illusion was a limiting concept and could not account for the vast 
majority of figurative pictures made, this meant that the question remained 
unanswered of what it was that broadly realistic pictures sought to represent – and 
perhaps more importantly, why they did so. I proposed that if pictorial illusion, PI-
realism, was not the primary aim, then perhaps what was sought was the evocation 
of what it was like to see the scene: visual experience or VE-realism. This would be 
both less and more than PI-realism: less because it could not claim any absolute truth 
value and might be selective in its use of pictorial devices; more because it could be 
used intentionally to achieve objectives that the illusory image could not, and could 
incorporate many known aspects of the world not available in the single optical 
image. Many of these could be conceived as related to time, an important aspect of 
vision which still pictures have generally been acknowledged to fail in imitating. 
If, as I argued, VE-realism is more expressive, both in terms of information and affect, 
than attempts at PI-realism, it pays a price, namely that it is dependent on cultural 
encoding. In a way, this is just common sense: the only representation which does not 
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rely on shared knowledge must be the truly illusory PI-realism – any other must be 
harnessing prior knowledge, and probably not just of the world but of pictures too. 
While this might seem unfortunate, I showed that shared culture makes possible 
subtle visual artefacts whose spatiality supports complex interpretation. It also means 
that an illusory but still effective sense of naturalness can be created, without actually 
trying to imitate natural vision. This is only possible after a process of acculturation 
when the community of makers and users has developed shared knowledge of a 
body of spatial practices. This differentiates a mature from an immature medium.
In the light of the divergence between the practical and functional limitations of PI-
realism and the contrasting potential of VE-realism, I proposed that we cannot say 
exactly to what most realistic pictures correspond, and that to seek such an answer is 
unnecessarily to curtail the potential expressivity of picture-making, which is better 
conceived as an intentional, pragmatic activity, in which decisions are made as much 
to achieve certain informational and affective results as matching any external 
referent. I argued that the spatialities of different kinds of pictures have arisen as 
much from ad hoc invention as from any coherent attempt at mimesis.
If realistic pictures use convention and other prior knowledge, how can they seem 
like seeing? I showed that this is where the concept of visual culture is particularly 
useful, emphasising the invisibility of that which is shared. It was this that could 
explain how a picture might seem a completely natural representation, providing 
unmediated visual access to a scene, within one culture, yet seem blatantly encoded 
in another. For the contents of a spatial representation to be effortlessly apprehended 
by the user, the user must be so familiar with the normal usages of the medium that 
there seems to be no effort of ‘decoding’: it is as though the user ‘looks through’ the 
spatial conventions at the subject matter itself. The sense of ‘just seeing’ was best 
characterised by the absence of a sense of encoding, rather than by the presence of 
anything. 
If the literature of pictures, especially digital pictures, was full of ill-considered and 
conflicting definitions of realism, that of film also proved confused. In general it 
seemed that the kind of realism which photography contributes to the film image was 
assumed to hold good for the experience of film as a whole, though I showed that this 
is certainly not the case. When a film theorist asserted that one technique was more 
realistic than another, what did this mean? As with pictures, it seemed unclear what 
was being imitated: it was like real life, it was honest, it was like vision, it evoked the 
experience of being in the scene, and so forth. 
I applied to film-making the objective-idea-model-view-picture (OIMVP) framework 
which I had proposed in relation to pictures. While film-making, partly because of its 
basis in photography, might be considered as operating serially within such a 
framework, so that the model is made and then filmed (which obviously in temporal 
terms it is), I proposed an alternative approach, in the light of the influence of the 
objectives on every aspect of the depiction, in which the whole process could be 
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considered essentially pictorial, since the intention at every stage was to achieve a 
series of images from which the user could construct a meaningful narrative. In that 
sense every part of the process was a contribution to the (possibly false) pictorial 
evidence provided to the viewer. 
Just as for pictures, the question of seeming real arose. If, as I had shown, film was 
fundamentally contrived in the service of its narrative objectives, how could it seem 
like seeing? By evaluating techniques which had at one time been popular with film-
makers but had eventually been rejected for the classical fiction film, I was able to 
discern a pattern. Just as one would have expected from the analysis of pictures, the 
techniques eliminated were those which drew attention to the mediation of the scene. 
I used the contrast with a style of film-making whose objectives were quite different  
– and also that of some kinds of factual television – to point up the difference between 
those representational techniques chosen because of their relatively low visibility, 
their ability to become transparent to the content and not to obtrude a sense of 
mediation, and those which are overtly presentational.
If film is driven more by its objectives than by mimesis, what are they? I showed that 
the spatiality of film is essentially subservient to narrative. However, not only was it 
clear that film serves narrative, but also that narrative serves film, in the sense that it 
is another important means by which its unlikeness to natural vision is obscured. 
Because film, by use of what I called the optimal view, answers the question which the 
viewer has been prompted to ask, it acquires a sense of naturalism which is mistaken 
for being like seeing even while in fact it is a highly authored form of showing. 
However, as for all depiction, there is no single, simple answer. Just as it is not the 
remit of most pictures to be wholly transparent, since much of the affect of pictures 
comes from the viewer’s dual awareness of them as substance and as ‘window’, 
certain kinds of awareness of representation in film are also important. Authorial 
denial of view and other obtrusions into the sense of ‘just seeing’ emphasised still 
further how the spatiality of film is bound up with its narrative objectives.
The analysis of the spatiality of television, a subject without an existing literature, 
allowed two main points to be made. One was that despite lacking the sense of unity 
and naturalness of fiction film, the space of factual television is equally well attuned 
to its objectives. The other was that even within the genre of factual television 
broadcasting, there is variation of spatial practice, depending – of course – on its 
objectives. I related these differences to the OIMVP framework. Whereas some 
programme-making makes uninhibited use of overt configuration within the pictorial 
display (and in so doing approaches the margins of the subject of this thesis) I 
showed how other programmes make pictorially determined interventions which 
either belong, or are disguised as belonging, to the model. In so doing they tend 
towards the unitary image of an apparently preexisting model familiar from the 
classical film.
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Finally I considered the uses of spatiality in digital interactive media, applying to it 
the analysis of depiction developed in the preceding chapters. This allowed me both 
to make sense of the variety of existing practice and to discern opportunities for 
future development. 
Running through the preceding part of the thesis had been an argument that the 
spatial practices of pictures, film and television could be considered mature. By 
contrast, digital interactive media (at least when attempting to make use of depiction) 
seems immature, placing undue reliance on inherited practices from antecedent 
media, and suffering from the lack of shared knowledge common to makers and 
users which would make its pictorial usages seem transparent. 
I have demonstrated that picture-making in all media is best conceived as a 
pragmatic activity in which the objectives intended for the artefact are as important 
as, often more important than, the relation between the picture and what it depicts. 
This is of course itself a pragmatic argument: when I say ‘best conceived’ I mean that 
it serves two useful purposes. It can explain the extraordinary variety of depictions 
which are accounted ‘realistic’. It is also the most useful model for the designer of 
pictorial representations, since it clarifies what purposes pictures serve and how they 
serve them. The practical implications for the design of digital interactive media have 
been drawn out in the previous chapter. 
Several subsidiary principles have emerged during the course of the main argument, 
which I summarise here. They all in some way have implications for design. While I 
feel that I have ‘proved’ the main argument of the thesis, some of these observations 
are advanced more tentatively.
2 Implications for design
Designers should not fear innovation on the grounds that users will not understand 
new spatial forms, interaction techniques, and so forth since, as the example of film 
showed, spatial practices in immature genres are often difficult to understand. Media 
genres such as film would not exist in their present highly expressive form if early 
practitioners had limited themselves to using techniques already fully understood by 
their viewers. 
The transition to maturity is more likely to be achieved by ad hoc innovations 
designed to solve particular needs, than by adherence to rigid systems and standards. 
Inventions made to overcome technical impediments are not necessarily abandoned 
when those impediments are taken away.
Pragmatism
Spatial design should be approached pragmatically. The key criterion is what works –  
that is, what works for a given set of objectives and users and in a given context 
(including cultural context) – rather than the matching of some external referent such 
as a scene. This has obvious implications for realism. In some cases the main objective 
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of a representation will be to convince the user that what they see is like reality, but 
that does not mean that in any simple sense it need be.
Spatial design is pragmatic in another sense too: it is best conceived in terms of what 
users can do with it and what it does to users. The key consideration is the range of 
objectives which the artefact must fulfil.
Realism
Realism is not the uncontentious unitary concept it is often presented as. There are 
two problems with simplistic concepts of realism: we cannot easily say what in the 
world we are trying to capture when we make spatial representations, nor that some 
kinds of ‘capture’ are definitively correct. It is better understood as multiple realisms 
which can be selected according to suitability to the objectives of the design. 
If there is not a simple, easily defined realism, then the realisms used should be 
defined in terms of their reception by the user, as much as in terms of their relation to 
an original. As with depth cues, more realisms are not necessarily better: expressivity 
may be increased by their selective use.
One of the most basic achievements of a graphical representation is to suggest depth 
in a planar image. However, the view of ‘progress’ since the Renaissance is unhelpful 
when it prioritises geometry (linear and size perspectives) over other important depth 
cues. Even for images which aim to produce a sense of transparent viewing of a pre-
pictorial world, not all depth cues will be either necessary or desirable, since different 
depth cues afford different kinds of looking at, and interacting with, images.
Though there is one projection system which offers a stimulus to the retinae which is 
closest to that from natural scenes, this is often irrelevant to the expressivity of an 
image.
Expressivity
Picture-making is a process of transformation in which the task is to make something 
from the visual material, selecting which aspects of scenes in the world are to be 
represented (in some way) in the artefact. Complete representation is impossible and 
unnecessary. Omission is as important as inclusion in expressivity. For example, all 
film-making relies on omission – framing images and selecting shots – for its 
expressive power. In informational terms, the suppression of detail in a picture, or the 
adoption of a non-optical projection system, may make an image more informative: 
this also is expressivity. However, representations rely on other strategies as well: 
marks and other interventions are inserted in the artefact which are not visible in the 
scene (‘illicit marks’); most representations do not simply evoke the raw optical 
impression of a scene (‘PI-realism’) but some kind of experience of seeing (‘VE-
realism’). Even if a picture-maker were trying to reproduce the raw optical 
impression, there is a limit to the certainty with which it can be said what that raw 
impression is.
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In specifying and designing pictures there is no place for ‘purist’ approaches. The 
picture-maker using paint, photography, computer graphics, still, moving or 
interactive images should consider any picturing as a process of creating an 
experience for the user.
Distinguishing information and affect
An important difference among objectives is between the affective and the 
informational. The objectives of any artefact should be considered as including 
what the maker wants to do to, or for, the user and therefore what relation the user 
should have to the artefact. Crudely, informational expressivity is a measure of how 
much the user knows more about the depicted scene, while affective expressivity 
reflects changes to the relation between the user and the scene. 
Some forms of spatial representation which add little in the way of information may 
nevertheless make a fundamental difference to affect (for example binocular 
imagery). Often however a spatial attribute will contribute to both affective and 
informational aspects (for example a close-up which allows a face to be studied in 
detail also causes it to impinge on the user’s space).
By understanding what each of the spatial characteristics is capable of contributing in 




In a mature medium, limitations are exploited as strengths. For example, the way 
scenes are clipped by the frame in traditional pictures and in established screen-based 
media has been extensively exploited as part of their expressivity. In a mature 
medium there is a reasonable number of forms available with which to express any 
meaning which may arise and these forms are sufficiently pliable to be modified and 
combined in order to suit the objectives. The form is a good fit with the objectives: 
when the user experiences an artefact in a mature medium, the objectives of the 
maker are clearly inferred (probably unconsciously) from the design. The role of the 
user is also crucial because a mature medium is one in which a community of shared 
knowledge has arisen between the makers and the users of the medium, allowing its 
conventions to be largely unnoticed.
In an immature medium, techniques are noticed, and this act of noticing gets in the 
way of any direct, natural sense of ‘just seeing’. Even in traditional media, a newly 
introduced technique may remain problematic and be generally rejected, or it may 
become assimilated into the range of familiar and therefore transparent practices. 
However, too-noticeable representational practices may still find a place in more 
overtly configurational genres. For new spatial forms to become part of an expressive 
‘language’, use must reveal a close relationship between the form, the maker’s 
intentions and the user’s needs.
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Maturity does not lie in media or technology. It is a measure of how well developed 
the relationship is between a technology and its users. There is therefore no instant 
solution: it inevitably takes time for the genres allowed by a technology to reach 
maturity. 
Genre
Spatial characteristics vary according to genre. The relation between genre and 
characteristic spatiality is a symbiotic one in which each helps to define the other.
For any genre over time, only those spatial devices which are expressive will survive.
Stephen Boyd Davis
1 June 2002
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